Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth (PDF, file 160 KB) (PDF, 159kB)
Marisa Ratto and Wendelin Schnedler
We consider a principal-agent relationship in which two tasks need to be carried out. Each task involves a decision. The principal can neither contract on the two decisions nor on the benefit which she receives from them but only on a signal, which simultaneously reflects both. We show that the efficient choice cannot be achieved if the principal employs a single agent. If, however, the principal employs a second agent, she can set a payment scheme such that the efficient choice can be implemented. We also examine when this implementation is vulnerable to collusion.
This has now been updated. See 05/126 (PDF, 154kB)
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