Repealing the presumption of parental involvement in private child care law cases

9th December 2025

Members from the Centre for Childhoods and Social Justice (CSJ) reflect upon the government’s recent announcement to repeal the presumption of parental involvement from the Children Act 1989.

Presumption of Parental Involvement

Whilst most parents who separate make decisions outside of the courts for their children’s post separation living and contact arrangements, some parents need the assistance of the court to do so. Where the court is required to adjudicate on these private law children cases, the court will presume, unless the contrary is shown, that the ‘involvement of that parent in the life of a child will further the child’s welfare.’ (Section 1(2A) Children Act 1989). ‘Involvement’ is defined in the Children Act 1989 to include direct or indirect involvement (which may include face to face contact or contact by telephone), but not any particular division of a child’s time (s1(2B)). Furthermore, any involvement by the parent in their child’s life, should not put that child at risk of suffering harm (s1(6)).

However, in practice, this has raised ongoing questions over whether the presumption has created a ‘pro-contact culture’ which favours parental involvement in a child’s life following parental separation - despite the child’s welfare being the paramount consideration for the court. The provision relates to cases where the family court is considering whether or not to make an order regarding parental responsibility and in relation to appropriate contact or residence arrangements (Child Arrangement Orders).

The decade-long campaign led by Claire Throssel has been described by the Deputy Prime Minister, as ‘instrumental’ in bringing about the planned repeal. Her two boys (Jack 12 and Paul 9) were killed in 2014 by their abusive father after he was granted contact following their separation. Since their tragic death, Throssel has been campaigning for a change in the law.

In addition to Claire Throssel’s campaign, in 2020 the Ministry of Justice published the Harm Report which raised concerns about how the family courts identify and respond to allegations of domestic abuse and other risks of harm in private law children cases. The report suggested four key themes could be identified in terms of the way in which the family courts make Child Arrangements Orders (CAO). These were:

• children should have contact;
• contact should progress;
• co-parenting is promoted and
• dependence on the court is discouraged.

The Report concluded with a list of recommendations, including that the presumption of parental involvement should be  reviewed.

The resulting Review of the Presumption of Parental Involvement [2025] suggested that the courts take a ‘no stone unturned’ approach to parental involvement and that they are intrinsically geared towards fostering involvement between a child and their parents following separation. Although the review did note that the presumption is not the driving force behind this ‘no stone unturned’ culture, it stated that the Government considered that the repeal of the presumption is ‘an important step in addressing the pro-contact culture’ (2025:40).

On 22^nd October 2025, the Government announced that it planned to repeal the presumption of parental involvement set out in the Children Act (1989). The proposed reform indicates an important policy and practice development and has been welcomed by domestic abuse campaigners as long overdue in the protection of children from parents who perpetuate abuse through court-ordered contact arrangements. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner, for example, found evidence of abuse within 73% of hearings, and 87% of case files reviewed (2025).

Parental Rights and Responsibilities

This decision marks a subtle, but significant shift, in how society thinks about parents and children. Up until this point courts have been required to begin from the position that a child’s welfare is normally advanced by the involvement of both parents. The repealing of the presumption of parental involvement disrupts that position, with the intention to ensure that any decision made about a child’s life is responsive to their individual circumstances, as opposed to an assumption that parental participation is always beneficial for all children.

It can be said that beneath this reform lies a deeper, more philosophical question about the basis of parental claims: do parents have a right to be involved in their child’s life because of the perceived benefit to the child, or because the relationship also holds value to the parent? The answer shapes how we understand not only the purpose of parenting, but also the limits of parental authority.

From one perspective, parental authority can be considered entirely child-centred. Parents hold rights and responsibilities only because their children need sustained, caring relationships to develop and flourish. Their authority is justified as a means to secure the goods of stability, affection, and moral growth that children require. Here it can be argued that a parent’s standing is always derivative: they exercise power not for their own sake but on behalf of the child. Taking this view, the former presumption of parental involvement looks misplaced. To presume that parental involvement promotes welfare is to give weight to a parent’s status as opposed to the child’s situation - and necessary safety within it.

A child-centred approach should ask, in each individual case, what form of contact or relationship best supports that particular child’s safety and wellbeing?  The Governent’s announcement to remove the presumption of parental involvement can therefore be seen as a significant move which brings the law into closer alignment with this view: welfare remains the test, but no prior assumption shapes its application within the court system.

An alternative perspective begins from the thought that parenting is not only valuable for children but also for parents themselves. It could be argued that being a parent allows an adult to form a distinctive relationship of love, responsibility, and identification: not simply sentimental attachments but a core principle of human flourishing. From this view, sometimes called a ‘dual-interest theory’ the parent’s claim to raise or remain involved with their child is not purely instrumental. It reflects the value of the parent–child relationship as a shared human ‘good’.

This idea has been developed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift who argue that the opportunity to sustain a close, caring relationship with one’s child has moral importance independent of the benefits it brings to the child. Parenting, they suggest, is one of the ways adults pursue meaning and connection in their lives. Protecting that opportunity is therefore a legitimate social concern. The legal presumption of parental involvement can be read as an expression of this thought: it reflected a confidence that, absent harm, maintaining parental connection serves goods on both sides and should not have to be re-justified in every case.

From a dual-interest perspective, the removal of the presumption narrows the moral picture. The move signalled by the Government’s announcement could be said to risk treating parents as service-providers whose role rests entirely on external judgments of welfare. This is not to question that children’s safety and wellbeing should be paramount, but to resist the idea that parental relationships have no independent standing. For these theorists, the law needs to take seriously the importance of being a parent to the parent herself. Consider a case where a child is removed from her parents based on a mistaken allegation of abuse. All theorists might agree this wrongs the child, but dual interest views also suggest it deeply wrongs the parents directly. To only think about the parent-child relationships impact on the child is to overlook how parenting can be seen as forming part of adults’ moral and emotional lives, and how adult’s own sense of identity can often be bound up with that connection.

These two perspectives share a strong commitment to children’s welfare, but differ in where justification begins. Child-centred theories treat parental rights as contingent, granted only insofar as they serve the child. Dual-interest theories see both parents and children as participants in a relationship whose goods may justify continued involvement even when welfare outcomes are uncertain. A fundamental question is raised here about whether society and its law should regard parenting as a good that belongs only to children, or as a good partly shared between them and their parents. To deny that parents have any independent claim to their relationship with their child may down play the depth of what ‘family life’ represents, but where parental involvement risks harm, the child’s safety rightly takes priority.