Accounting and Finance Seminars- David Veenman (Amsterdam)

21 May 2019, 1.00 PM - 21 May 2019, 2.15 PM

David Veenman

G.15, 15-19 Tyndalls Park Road

Title - Does CEO Inside Debt Ownership A ffect Financial Reporting Quality

This study presents a reexamination of the relation between CEO ownership of inside debt" (i.e., de ned bene t pensions and deferred compensation) and the quality of firms' fi nancial reporting. While recent research finds that CEO inside debt ownership is associated with higher quality nancial reporting, as indicated by proxies for aggressive financial reporting, we argue there are both conceptual and empirical reasons to suggest this relation is not as clear-cut as prior research concludes. Using several proxies for aggressive nancial reporting, we do not nd robust evidence suggesting that CEO inside debt ownership is associated with higher quality nancial reporting. This study contributes to the literature on the incentive e ects of managerial inside debt ownership, as well as the broader literature by responding to recent calls for replication in accounting research and by illustrating the importance of documenting "null" results. In addition, we highlight the importance of transparency in research about simple, yet in uential, design choices.

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