Professor In-Uck Park
In-Uck Park's main research interests are in the areas of contract theory; industrial organisation (theoretical approach); game theory and information. He is currently working on: reputation and trust in market environments; glass ceiling as a competitive outcome of labor market; startups and Intellectual Property; and competing networks.
Michael Peacey, Jin Son, Wenbo Zhao
Fields of interest
Contract Theory, Industrial Organisation, Game Theory,
- Jullien, B & Park, I-U 2014, New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility. Review of Economic Studies, vol 81., pp. 1543-1574
- Park, I-U, Peacey, MW & Munafò, MR 2013, Modelling the effects of subjective and objective decision making in scientific peer review. Nature.
- Choe, C & Park, I-U 2011, Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies. BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol 11.
- Ochs, J & Park, I-U 2010, Overcoming the Co-ordination Problem:Dynamic Formation of Networks. Journal of Economic Theory, vol 145., pp. 689 - 720
- Jun, BH & Park, I-U 2010, Anti-Limit Pricing. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, vol 51., pp. 57 - 78
- Park, I-U 2005, Cheap-Talk Referrals of Differentiated Experts in Repeated Relationships. RAND Journal of Economics, vol 36 (2)., pp. 391 - 411
- Grout, P & Park, I-U 2005, Competitive planned obsolescence. RAND Journal of Economics, vol 36 (3)., pp. 596 - 612
- Park, I-U 2004, Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets. Econometrica, vol 72 (3)., pp. 701 - 746
- Park, I-U 2004, A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities. Contributions to Theoretical Economics, vol 4 (1)., pp. 1 - 24
- Grout, P & Park, I-U 2004, Promoting competition in the presence of essential facilities. International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol 22 (10)., pp. 1415 - 1441
- Kim, J & Park, I-U 2002, The Stock Market Condition and Initial Public Offering Pricing: A Theory and Evidence from the KOSDAQ Stock Market. Korean Economic Review, vol 18., pp. 349 - 371
- Park, I-U 2002, Cheap Talk Coordination of Entry by Privately Informed Firms. RAND Journal of Economics, vol 33 (3)., pp. 377 - 393
- Park, I-U & McLennan, A 1999, Generic 4x4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria. Games and Economic Behaviour, vol 26., pp. 111 - 130
- Park, I-U 1999, Cheap talk reputation and coordination of different experts. Submitted to Review of Economics Studies.
- Park, I-U 1999, Sequential cheap talk and coordination of entry by privately informed firms. Submitted to Rand Journal of Economics.
- Park, I-U 1999, Competitive planned obsolescence. Discussion Paper 474, submitted to Rand Journal of Econ, vol 99/4 74.
- Park, I-U 1998, A revealed-perference implication of weight utility decisions under uncertain. Economic Theory, vol 11., pp. 413 - 426
- Park, I-U 1998, Repeated moral hazard with renegotiation and free access to credit markets. Working Paper (Discussion Paper 450).
- Park, I-U 1997, Generic finiteness of equilbrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver games. Journal of Economic Theory, vol 76., pp. 431 - 448
- Park, I-U 1997, Using access pricing of essential facilities to promote Effective Competition.
- Green, E & Park, I-U 1996, Bayes contingent plans. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, vol 31., pp. 225 - 236
- Mclennan, A & Park, I-U 1996, Generic 4x4 two person games have at most 15 equilibria. Unknown Publisher
- Green, E & Park, I-U 1995, Bayes Contingent Plans. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
- Park, I-U 1994, A Revealed-Preference Implication of Weighted Utility Decisions under Uncertainty. University of Bristol
- Park, I-U 1993, Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions for Sender-Receiver Cheap-talk Games. University of Bristol
- Park, I-U 1993, Three Essays in Game Theory. University of Minnesota, PhD Thesis.
Full publications list in the University of Bristol publications system