Diagnosing testimonial injustice in institutions
Theorists of epistemic injustice have recently been turning to the task of diagnosing such injustice in institutions. One example that has received a reasonable amount of attention in the literature is that of asylum adjudication - the institution by which states determine whether asylum claimants should be granted international protection. Many grounds have been identified for concluding that asylum adjudication systems perpetrate epistemic injustices. For example, I (along with others) have attempted to show that asylum adjudication systems should be seen as testimonially unjust, insofar as they are structured in ways that wrongfully deflate the credibility of asylum testimonies.
In this talk I anticipate and respond to a challenge to this diagnosis of testimonial injustice. The challenge goes as follows: The litany of problems that theorists have identified with asylum adjudication systems should lead us to question whether these institutions are genuinely in the business of epistemically assessing asylum claims. Some have suggested that the true goal of the UK asylum adjudication system, for example, is to refuse as many asylum claims as possible. This is certainly an injustice, but it is one that takes place without the genuine epistemic misjudgment Miranda Fricker claims to be necessary to testimonial injustice. I will respond to this challenge by providing reasons for viewing this institution as testimonially unjust, even if its primary goal is material (refusal) rather than epistemic (credibility assessment).