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for a past academic year. Please see the current academic year for up to date information.
| Unit name |
MRes Microeconomics 2 |
| Unit code |
EFIMM0027 |
| Credit points |
15 |
| Level of study |
M/7
|
| Teaching block(s) |
Teaching Block 2 (weeks 13 - 24)
|
| Unit director |
Dr. Eugene Jeong |
| Open unit status |
Not open |
| Pre-requisites |
MRes Microeconomics I
|
| Co-requisites |
None
|
| School/department |
School of Economics |
| Faculty |
Faculty of Social Sciences and Law |
Description including Unit Aims
The course mainly covers mechanism design, cooperative game theory, and social choice theory. We apply these ideas to auctions, market design, and matching theory. The unit aims to build in students the ability to know, understand, apply and evaluate these tools and to apply themselves when undertaking novel research. Topics covered will include:
1. Incentives and Mechanism Design
- Revelation Principle - Optimal Auction - Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism - Efficient Mechanisms - Bilateral Trading - Bayesian Mechanisms
2. Collusions and Cooperation
- Core - Cooperative Game Theory
- Social welfare function - Social choice function - May’s Theorem - Arrow’s Theorem - Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Independent Private Value Model - Revenue Equivalence - Interdependent Model
Intended Learning Outcomes
This unit follows on from MRes Microeconomics I in providing a thorough and in-depth treatment of further basic concepts in microeconomics and introduces fundamental analytic paradigms rigorously, with a view to equip the students with sufficient foundational understanding of the discipline to be able to access the journal articles first-hand, to evaluate them critically and to start independent research projects.
Teaching Information
Teaching will be delivered through a combination of synchronous and asynchronous sessions such as online teaching for large and small group, face-to-face small group classes (where possible) and interactive learning activities
Assessment Information
online exam (85%) and coursework (15%)
Reading and References
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green (MWG), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995
Vijay Krishna (K), Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2009
David Kreps, Microeconomic Foundations I: Choice and Competitive Markets, Princeton University Press, 2012
Tilman Borgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015
Rakesh Vohra, Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach, Cambridge University Press, 2011
Paul Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press, 2004
Paul Klemperer, Auctions: Theory and Practice, Princeton University Press, 2004
