
Tom Vaughan
University of Bristol
© Tom Vaughan

School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies
University of Bristol
Working Paper No. 09-13
Abstract

Since India and Pakistan each carried out their second tests of nuclear weapons in 1998, US foreign policy discourse and Western media has often taken as fact the 'threat' of nuclear conflict in the region. This dissertation argues that a critical constructivist approach is required when studying Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations, given the inadequacies of structural realism and its unhelpful assumptions about the 'nature' of international politics. Since realist accounts make up the majority of recent literature on the subject, this dissertation aims to provide an alternative account, examining how US foreign policy discourse constructs the condition of threat through representations of the US, India and Pakistan. Using a discourse analysis methodology, I investigate the gendered and orientalist constructions of India and Pakistan which contribute to the mainstream perception of nuclear threat on the South Asian subcontinent. In a two-part analysis, I examine the effect that the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks have had on the US discourse around Indo-Pakistani nuclear behaviour. I find that the US discourse changes significantly over time. From the 1998 tests onwards, a direct and imminent nuclear threat to international security is constructed. After 9/11, this threat is increasingly negated. Across both periods, the US discourse consitently feminises and orientalises India and Pakistan in relation to a dominant US masculinity – practices which are instrumental in the representation of threat – although the uses and effects of these representational practices shift over time. The discursive changes observed demonstrate how 'radical breaks' in history can change knowledge about international politics, and illustrate how US foreign policy discourse reconfigures the US's global identity after 9/11.

Keywords: United States, India, Pakistan, Nuclear, Non-proliferation, Foucault, Discourse, Gender, Orientalism
The nuclear capabilities and policies of India and Pakistan are often touted by the United States administration as posing one of the gravest threats to international security in the South Asian region. Sporadic conflicts since both states gained independence in 1947, military exercises close to their shared border and nuclear tests carried out as recently as 1998 have led security analysts to warn that this 'amorphous but potentially cataclysmic threat ... cannot be ignored or dismissed' (Joeck, 1997: 33). In the wake of India's Pokhran-II and Pakistan's Chagai-I tests, carried out in May 1998, US President Bill Clinton declared the Indo-Pakistani border as 'the most dangerous place on Earth right now' (in Nizamani, 2001: 38). The idea that a 'threat' exists from the 'standoff' between the two nations has dispersed into mainstream Western consciousness and media with journalists identifying the frontier as 'the world's most dangerous border' (The Economist, 2011).

My dissertation aims to uncover the discursive mechanisms by which the conditions in the region have been constructed by the US as posing an imminent threat of a nuclear exchange, menacing not only immediate South Asian region but also the US and world at large. I will take a critical constructivist perspective and carry out a discourse analysis of US foreign policy texts between 1998 and 2009, in an attempt to reveal the gendered and orientalist representations of India and Pakistan which contribute to the construction of nuclear threat in South Asia. I begin with a short outline of my theoretical perspective, followed by a broad overview of the recent literature relating to Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations, including some works by critical and constructivist scholars. I then set out the methodology used to carry out my discourse analysis. This is followed by a two-part, in-depth investigation of the discursive mechanisms and representational techniques present throughout the discourse, and their significance in constructing the nuclear threat, and finally concluding remarks.

**Research philosophy and literature review**

My intervention draws on the Foucauldian premise that "'Truth' is understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements' (Foucault, 1994: 132). This means that foreign policy discourse employed by the US is understood to have a productive quality; it produces certain 'regimes of truth' which are not absolute or fixed, but contingent upon history, settings and contexts (Hall, 1997: 49). The nuclear 'threat' therefore does not meaningfully exist outside of discourse. Rather, the subjects India and Pakistan are, through discursive practices, ascribed certain qualities, characters and positions within an international 'system' whose nature is equally dependent on its representation in discourse. It is not
an unproblematic, independently existing condition posing an objective 'threat' but, if accepted as 'truth', will have accordant real-world consequences (ibid.).

This approach is advocated by Shafique (2011) in the specific case of India-Pakistan relations, precisely because the history of conflict between the two cannot be sufficiently explained by '[t]he purported anarchic structure of the international system and India and Pakistan's place within it'. However, a wealth of literature influenced by positivist epistemology and realism has been written on the issue of nuclear weapons in South Asia, attempting to map out the problematique of proliferation. Structural realism as advocated by Waltz has been particularly influential in this regard. Building on the traditional realist assumption that the political world and international system can be empirically observed from outside, and the behaviour of states thus predicted and explained, structural realism holds that '[w]hen external conditions press firmly enough, they shape the behaviour of states' (Waltz, 2000: 34). States exist under conditions of international anarchy, and the the pressures of this condition push them into aggressive or defensive acts, such as nuclear proliferation.

Structural realists recognise changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War, the period during which their theory rose to prominence. Nonetheless, they maintain the continuing relevance of structural realism whilst acknowledging the conditions faced by future proliferants such as India and Pakistan will be different (Waltz, 1993, 2000; Kapur, 2005). 'Changes of the [international] system would do it [render structural realism out-dated or obsolete], changes in the system would not', says Waltz (2000: 5, original emphasis). Kapur's study, for example, identifies the 'stability/instability paradox' as responsible for ongoing violence between India and Pakistan; the presence of nuclear weapons on the South Asian subcontinent 'has promoted low-level [conventional] violence' (2005: 130). Violence on the subcontinent is a key departure from the conditions of the Cold War, but states are still subject in the same way to structural conditions (such as the stability/instability paradox).

Ganguly and Wagner (2004) take such an approach, tracing the reasoning and bargaining processes that may increase the likelihood of conventional or nuclear conflict on the South Asian subcontinent. The role of the US is also given consideration, and how its own expressions of concern regarding proliferation in the region may affect the chances of war depending on how much information is known by each side (2004: 500). This work takes a very strong realist stance, evidenced by its bold pronouncements of fact: 'Because India’s conventional forces are superior to
Pakistan’s, it is only Pakistan that might consider the first use of nuclear weapons, in response to a conventional attack by India' (ibid.: 484). Accounts such as this are based on a conception of rational, self-interested states, acting to maximise their own utility within an anarchic, self-help international system.

Perkovich has produced a comprehensive study following Indian weapons development since 1948, with the aim of explaining the nuclear programme. Perkovich retains a positivist viewpoint in the factors which prevent India from winding down its proliferation and evaluating whether the US has succeeded in keeping Indian nuclear capabilities in check (2000: 5-8). However, his approach is considerably 'softer' than Waltzian structural realism, affording greater consideration to factors such as national identity, which is covered in more depth by Abraham (1998). The main focuses are the decisionmaking processes that have led India to take the path of proliferation, and excellent consideration is given to the historical origins of the Indian state and its weapons programme, including the effects of colonialism.

In particular, his work commendably recognises that proliferation cannot be explained solely by security concerns, but that 'India's national identity and normative aspirations have shaped nuclear policy choices' (ibid.: 448, emphasis in original). It also recognises the instances in which American realist theory can be insufficient to explain Indian nuclear behaviour and is erroneously based on models of Cold War competition between the US and USSR (ibid.: 316). However, it still remains concerned with the positive and descriptive aspects of international relations, its purpose to assist others to 'explain and predict the behavior of other states' (ibid.: 446).

Such accounts hold that states, their identities, their interests and the norms binding their actions are taken as fixed and unproblematic, and their intersubjective and social nature ignored. They are insufficient for analyzing state behaviour since they disregard the socially constructed identities and norms which equally influence state actions on the international stage. In other words, as Wendt argues, 'whether a system is conflictual or peaceful is a function not of anarchy and power but of the shared culture created through discursive social practices' (in Copeland, 2000: 188). Realist approaches are therefore inappropriate as they obscure an important dimension of international relations and 'unable to account for the origins of what constitutes these states and the international system itself' (Shafique, 2011). Put simply, instead of examining the 'why questions' which simply try to explain the behaviour of states, it is useful to consider 'how questions' which ask how exactly the identities of states are constructed and what state actions are rendered possible by
these constructions (Doty, 1996: 4).

Whilst relatively limited when compared to the body of literature on Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations influenced by realist thinking, there exists a valuable body of critical and constructivist work dealing with aspects of the subject. This literature tends to focus on the productive and constitutive qualities of the social identities of India and Pakistan, rather than specifically dealing with the construction of nuclear threat. Nevertheless, it aptly demonstrates that the representations of actors are key factors in the construction of international political phenomena, a dimension that realist accounts do not recognise. My dissertation will draw on the approaches taken by these authors and aim to add to this small yet significant body of work.

Abraham (1998) deals with the complex relationship between the development and possession of nuclear weapons and Indian national identity. He begins by arguing that the realist explanation of India's 1974 nuclear test, as a signal of nuclear capability towards China, is flawed. The explosion was not followed by further tests and therefore India did not take the 'conventional' route of a new nuclear power wishing to assert its presence (1998: 16). Instead, Abraham goes on to explain the Indian nuclear programme in terms of post-colonial identity and a national desire, even fetish, for 'modernisation'. Nuclear weapons were 'inscribed with all the accoutrements of the postcolonial state's desire – science, modernity, indigeneity', at least partially standing in for development and signifying India's future, at the same time bearing no trace of the past (ibid.: 156).

On Abraham's account, nuclear weapons allowed India to self-identify as a modern, scientific actor, ostensibly freed from the shackles of its colonial past. It demonstrates how important identity is to the actions of states on the international stage; whilst its intentions may be peaceful, India's persistent refusal to sign the CTBT are explained by the new-found virility conferred by nuclear weapons, yet presented in the dominant realist discourse of national security and self-interest (ibid.: 165). This is an excellent example of normative, social interpretations of identities visibly influencing state action (Shafique, 2011).

Jalal (1995) and Khattak (1996) both trace the discursive origins of the Pakistani state, which is 'conjured' through language, religion and history which make up 'creative imaginings of national identity' (Jalal, 1995: 74). Khattak focuses this approach on Pakistan's relation with the wider world by examining how discourses of identity can be politically useful for the Pakistani state. Security discourses within Pakistan centre around a pervasive fear of Indian attack, based on
particular interpretations of events such as the Kashmir dispute of 1990 and India's nuclear tests. India is constantly discursively 'othered', presented as an enemy and existential threat, in such a way that casts the Pakistani state as the ultimate source of protection for its people (1996: 353). Such posturing can prove advantageous when vying for international aid and UN assistance, a further instance of the role that identities constructed through discourse can influence the behaviour of states and change the face of international politics.

Finally, Nizamani (2001) and Das (2012) extend their analyses of identity discourses onto the international stage, studying 'how the nuclear issue is employed to create and consolidate particular versions of national identities in India and Pakistan' (Nizamani, 2001: 33) and, conversely, how particular constructions of South Asian nations affect US-India nuclear relations (Das, 2012). This dissertation will engage with the Indo-Pakistani nuclear question on a similar level, and I will draw heavily on the techniques used by Nizamani and Das in my critical reading of source texts.

Nizamani argues, following Abraham (1998), that the weapons programmes of both India and Pakistan are integral to the defence of each nation; not in a purely military-strategic sense, but because they 'safeguard' particular national identities (2001: 36). Nuclear posturing, embodied in each country's 1998 test detonations and refusals to sign the CTBT and NPT, is one medium through which these states reproduce themselves. The dominant Foucauldian 'regimes of truth' in each society posit nuclear weapons as the ultimate protective devices for national security, in turn legitimating continued spending and research on weapons at the expense of pressing domestic issues such as education and health (ibid.: 42). Nizamani demonstrates the processes by which India and Pakistan construct their own and each other's identities through their nuclear relations. However, nuclear behaviour does not unilaterally construct identities; the relationship between these two factors is complex and intersubjective. Das goes on to sketch how the US and India both use discourses of identity to distinguish themselves from other nations, shaping South Asia's nuclear terrain (2012: 94).

Das finds evidence of 'globalized masculinities' in US nuclear discourses towards India in the post-9/11 moment, with the US constructing India in feminized and Orientalist terms; the US is taken as 'good, rational and responsible' whilst India is constituted in opposition to these qualities as a feminine and irrational 'other' (2012: 94 – 95). Whilst India may see its nuclear weapons as a signifier of post-colonial independence (Abraham, 1998), one function of US nuclear discourse is to
India into an infantilized role. India is subordinated through discourse to the US and its interests in the region, and in turn engages in its own 'internal' othering of Pakistan with reference to the subordinate masculinity conferred on it through its dealing with the US (Das, 2012: 100). These discursive relations serve to construct a hierarchy in the region, placing the US, India and Pakistan into subject positions relative to each other.

In sum, my dissertation aims to examine how such positioning constructs conditions of 'threat' in the region, and how these 'regimes of truth' as identified by Nizamani come to be established through US foreign policy discourse. Nizamani’s and Das's interventions therefore touch on important points, on which I will expand. In particular, Das's consideration of US discourse towards India and Pakistan merits further investigation. In necessarily responding to the shortfalls of realist theory I will draw on the valuable pool of critical constructivist literature, whilst contributing my own research to it.

Methodology

My data is drawn from various sources, primarily archived documents of the US State Department as well as news and television interviews, Presidential speeches, Congressional research documents and academic papers penned by US government figures. These are reliable sources which provide a broad scope for research into the discourse used by various US actors (the President, Department of State, Congress and the civil service), as opposed to focusing narrowly on one part of the foreign policy apparatus. Using the methodology outlined below, I will search for recurring uses of particular discursive mechanisms and note how they combine to construct a particular 'regime of truth' that identifies nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan as a security threat to the US and wider world. Texts interact with each other to form discourses, and 'meanings are circulated between texts through the use of various visual and literary codes and conventions ... [and] the endless repetition of certain symbols, images and ideas' (Hooper, 2001: 122). Discourses are made up of overlapping bodies of texts and I expect my body of data to contain several repeated representational techniques, which will be the focus of my analysis.

The methodology I have selected for this paper is based on that set out by Doty (1993; 1996) in her studies of imperial encounters between nations of the global North and the South. Whilst rooted in the Foucauldian theoretical tradition which sees discourses as constitutive of entire realities (1996: 6), Doty's methodology simultaneously specifies a set of representational practices
which can be easily recognised within diverse texts. Searching for these widely-applied devices is a clearly structured and straightforward approach, which also permits in-depth analysis of several different textual formats. Together, these devices form the process of articulation, which Weldes defines as the production of meaning 'out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources' (1996: 284). This methodology shows how existing resources within language and culture (signifiers such as metaphors or characterisations of certain actors) are articulated in order to produce identities, the roles of states in global politics and in relation to others, and consequently conditions of threat which are presented as geopolitical realities.

The first representational practice I will use, identified by Doty (1996: 10), is *predication*, which 'involves the linking of certain qualities to particular subjects through the use of predicates and the adverbs and adjectives that modify them' (Doty, 1993: 306). Predicates are signifiers which specify qualities and attach them to subjects and actors. Predication therefore assigns characteristics to subjects in a similar way to presupposition and classification, although it is a more direct representational practice. For instance, Doty reveals how how Filipino natives were inscribed as 'doglike' followers, 'naturally greedy and cruel' and 'imprudent' (ibid.: 307) in Western discourse during the Spanish-American war, through the simple yet effective use of adjectives and description. By searching for the linking of certain qualities to subjects, I hope to find out how they are constructed as particular types of actor, as well as their subject positions relative to each other. Using predication as an analytical technique should allow a nuanced and interesting examination of the supposedly 'essential' characters of the US, India and Pakistan. Predicates attached to subjects are often underlain by other, subtle assumptions, which can be deconstructed through further analysis of other representational practices.

The next practice is *presupposition*, whereby pre-existing knowledge about the nature of the international system and its workings is taken to be true. Presupposition serves to 'naturalize' certain 'truths' about the world, meaning that assessments of geopolitical phenomena are based on internalized theories seen as 'fact'. For instance, Ish-Shalom (2010: 479) argues that 'commonsense is the reservoir of background knowledge', framing people's understanding of the world and therefore permitting certain courses of political action. The Israeli government, he argues, attempted to mobilise presupposed, 'commonsensical' knowledge regarding the characteristics of armed conflict in order to define the Second Lebanon War of 2006 as a routine military operation rather than a 'war' (ibid.: 476). This helped to legitimate violence carried out by the state, portraying the campaign as 'normal' and avoiding the negative, controversial connotations of war. This move
demonstrates the role played by presupposition; it creates naturalized theorisations which in turn inform political 'realities'. It is therefore important to identify within discourses the assumption and deployment of presupposed knowledge. Presupposition can also manifest itself in the form of arbitrary binary oppositions – such as mind/body, masculine/feminine, good/evil. The effect of such oppositions is to create artificial divides, which encourage audiences to interpret the world in dichotomous terms and negate other possible configurations of knowledge (Doty, 1996: 10).

Related to presupposition is the process of classification (ibid.), the arbitrary placement of people and actors into discrete groupings, 'in which they "naturally" belong'. For instance, Said notes that during the 19th century there existed a vocabulary of sweeping generalities (the Semites, the Aryans, the Orientals) [which] referred not to a set of fictions but rather to a whole array of seemingly objective and agreed-upon distinctions' (1995: 233). Classifying people in this manner imbued them with supposedly essential characteristics, which were then presented as biological 'facts'. Although it is likely that this practice will present itself more subtly in contemporary US foreign policy discourse, classification of various actors on the global stage may be an important component of their constructed identities.

Negation (ibid.: 11) refers to the process of portraying certain actors as being without their own histories, filling the void with Western/Eurocentric/Northern concepts such as modernization, progress or democracy. The histories of other societies are thus understood only with reference to our own experiences. For example, Said demonstrates that Egypt was considered a desirable addition to a colonial power's territory during the 19th century because it was understood to be historically important owing to its connections with great philosophers and leaders such as Caesar. '[I]ts role was to be the stage on which actions of world historical importance would take place'; Egypt's history was superseded by a European one (1995: 84 – 85). It will be revealing to see whether US discourse towards the nuclear powers of the global South employs such devices. These practices together entail the positioning of subjects within discourse; their relative position vis-a-vis each other is constructed within discourse via the representational practices identified above (Doty, 1996: 11).

My reading of foreign policy texts will be informed by Said's idea of Orientalism (1995). Doty's methodology is specifically tailored to North-South relations, and Said's work carries evidence of the representational practicices identified by Doty. Additionally, Das (2012) points out in her up-to-date study of US-India nuclear discourse that both orientalism and feminisation of subjects are prominent 'othering' techniques that distance countries from the US, and this is fertile
ground for further exploration. ‘[M]asculinity as a gendered identity is about structuring relations of power’ (ibid.: 95); both India and Pakistan have colonial histories, and Das finds that post-colonial identities are used to subordinate and feminize India to the US in post-9/11 nuclear discourse (ibid.: 102). I will therefore follow Das in adopting ‘the feminist post-colonial lens' (ibid.: 104) when searching for representational practices, focusing in particular on how India and Pakistan are attributed feminised and oriental identities which inform their subject positions relative to the US.

4 Findings and analysis

The data table in appendix 1 is collected from documents dating between 11th May, 1998 – the date of India’s nuclear test – and the beginning of the Bush administration in January 2001. The aim is to explore how the discursive constructions of the actors and the representation of nuclear threat operated during the immediate post-test period, which coincided with the final half of the second Clinton administration. The table in appendix 2 contains data from the second Bush administration, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In each case, I begin by studying the use of predication across each period and how it contributes to the representation of the US, India and Pakistan. I then examine the use of presupposition, classification and negation, which will further demonstrate how each state is represented. In turn, this should reveal the processes by which conditions of nuclear threat and instability in South Asia are constructed.

I have decided to divide my analysis into two parts in order to observe any changes in the dominant discourse that might coincide with the change in administration or 9/11. It would simply not be appropriate to analyse the two periods together, because 9/11 marked ‘a significant shift in the dominant discourse on nonproliferation’, with the US administration focus turning to the threat of terrorism, both conventional and nuclear (Carranza, 2006: 491). The Bush administration treated nuclear proliferation differently and had very distinct relationships with India and Pakistan, and a two-part analysis is better able to reflect any changes in how the nuclear threat was constructed. As Hall notes, the Foucauldian understanding of discourse recognises that knowledge about subjects, objects and the wider world differs across time (1997: 46), so any differences between the two discourses will serve to demonstrate the unfixed and socially constructed nature of identities of international actors and geopolitical 'realities'.

1998 – 2001
The table in appendix 1 tallies each instance of *predication*, which attaches particular traits and characteristics to the US, India and Pakistan, in US foreign policy discourse between May 1998 and January 2001. Already, it is possible to see how distinct identities are constructed for each actor. The US in particular is quickly established as the dominant actor, with India and Pakistan constituted with reference to the US's 'superior' qualities. The US is understood as a benevolent, responsible and patriarchal figure, which acts to protect the security of India, Pakistan and the world at large. It is repeatedly cast in a role of grave responsibility to protect other nations (which presumably are not capable of protecting themselves), achievable by promoting adherence to the NPT and placing pressure on them to disarm (see Talbott, 1999: 119; Holum, 1998b; Clinton, 1998b).

It is also cast as courageous and pioneering, by taking steps to promote non-proliferation abroad and by cutting its own nuclear arsenal (Clinton, 1998b) and intends 'to remain at the forefront of these efforts' (Bureau of Nonproliferation, 1999). By virtue of its 'unrivaled supremacy' in military terms (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001) the US is responsible for the nuclear security of the world. It is cast as a firm enforcer of nuclear regulations and norms. It will 'increase the pressure on and isolation' of nations testing nuclear weapons and imposing swift punishment on those that do (Clinton, 1998a), and refuse to 'relent' in its pursuit of universal compliance with its aims (Talbott, 1999: 119), which it is 'determined' to achieve (Albright in Lantos, 2000). As evidenced in the table, these devices are constantly recurring throughout the US discourse on India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons during the period, representing the US as a strong and firm hand which will exercise its full capability to fulfil its objectives.

Alongside these qualities of strength, and coercive and protective capacity, the US is also established as a peace-loving and deliberative actor which encourages reconciliation whilst respecting the sovereignty of India and Pakistan. This softens the US's image whilst preserving its dominance, and reinforces its characterisation as a benevolent actor; one which 'reach[es] out' to other countries even when they have done wrong (Albright, in Lantos, 2000), wants to 'help [India and Pakistan] resolve their differences' (Clinton, 1998b) and generally favours dialogue as an approach to the situation (Bureau of Nonproliferation, 1999; Einhorn, 2000). Therefore, whilst powerful, the US acts calmly and rationally without resorting to force.

India and Pakistan are predicated in a very different way. Usually referred to as a duo, rather than separately, they are represented as a pair of pariah states who, through their irresponsible
actions, have isolated themselves from the international community (Underwood, 1998; Holum, 1998a). By being lonely and isolated in their noncompliance, India and Pakistan are cast as pariahs who are unable to abide by rules. Moreover, both of them are unaware of their own interests, and lack the necessary restraint themselves to act rationally (Einhorn, 2000; Burton, 1998). This is emphasised in US pronouncements which portray the nuclear tests as bad choices, or as Clinton (1998b) puts it, 'self-defeating, wasteful and dangerous'. They are represented as ignorant and childish, lacking the faculties of western nuclear states to sufficiently take care of their nuclear weapons and provide security for their people. To this end they are also characterised as unpredictable and liable to resort to violence at short notice and with little provocation, launching weapons 'when the wind blows' (Holum, 1998a). Although not usually represented as deliberately violent actors, they threaten each other, themselves and regional security by virtue of their irresponsibility and occasional dishonesty.

To paraphrase Doty (1993: 310), one can see a 'family resemblance' between the predicates used to describe the US, and those attached to India and Pakistan. For instance, whilst 'responsibility' and 'encouraging dialogue' do not mean the same thing, there is a coherence between them in that they contribute to a particular identity of the US. The same process is at work with India and Pakistan, with different predicates clustering to construct a certain character for the two countries; the US as a strong, responsible and benevolent facilitator of peace, and India and Pakistan as irresponsible, ill-informed, unrestrained and dishonest threats to international security. This demonstrates that a 'dominant discourse' (ibid.: 312) works across the foreign policy texts, assigning related attributes to each country. Particularly interesting are the underlying orientalist and gender assumptions which imbue these characteristics with meaning. I will now use the representational devices of presupposition, classification and negation to demonstrate how the US, India and Pakistan are positioned into a gendered and orientalist hierarchy and their 'essential' natures taken as fact.

Presupposition entails statements which assert what naturally 'is', such as artificial binary oppositions which merge actors with characteristics (Doty, 1996: 10). Presupposition underlies the characteristics ascribed through predication by creating background knowledge, on which the entire discourse is based. The main presupposition which structures this particular discourse is the binary opposition of rationality/irrationality. It is presupposed that there are two opposing mindsets in international politics; that of rational, calculated decision-making which benefits the conduct of peaceful politics, and irrationally acting in ways which are detrimental to ones own interests as well
as those of the wider world. As Crawford (2000) argues, traditional international relations theory conceptualises states as rational actors, although potentially corruptible by irrational and emotional factors, such as fear. India and Pakistan are linked with 'irrational' attributes; most importantly, they are both taken to be unaware of their own interests, and thus incapable of acting rationally. They both lack restraint and control, and are liable to use violence without good reason or reliable intelligence. In this way, India and Pakistan together are substituted into the binary opposition as the embodiment of irrationality. Conversely, the US – by virtue of its condemnation of India and Pakistan's irrational actions and its prescriptions of dialogue and disarmament – is assumed to know these interests itself. In this way, 'rationality' is substituted for the US.

This constructed dichotomy has important implications. It contextualises other assumptions implicit in the discourse; Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons are taken to be dangerous whilst the US's nuclear policy is rarely scrutinised, because the US is a rational actor and therefore 'safe'. India and Pakistan are irrational, and their behaviour cannot be explained in rational terms. They are therefore unpredictable, and their nuclear programs are a threat. Furthermore, rationality 'is the higher, regulative ideal to which [irrationality] is derivative and inferior, and a danger to the former's existence' (Campbell, 1992: 72). The US's policies of pursuing disarmament, adherence to the NPT, dialogue and sanctions are rational and subsequently superior to other courses of action. By extension, the US is positioned as a superior and 'higher' power, and must be the ultimate resolver of the threat posed by India and Pakistan.

There are also gendered implications to these presuppositions. Campbell notes that international politics is understood through 'a discursive economy in which reason, rationality and masculinity are licensed as superior to unreason, irrationality and femininity' (1992: 10). These traits are clustered together, and the rationality/irrationality opposition is closely linked to that of masculinity/femininity. As Blanchard explains, following Tickner, conventional international relations scholarship values rationality on a par with strength and power as a quintessentially masculine trait (2003: 1296). India and Pakistan are thus feminised in relation to the US's rational masculinity, denigrated as weaker and less capable states in need of a masculine guiding influence; as noted by Campbell, this dichotomy sees femininity as 'derivative and inferior' to masculinity. Their predeliction to knee-jerk actions based on fear or nationalism are read as emotional responses, or feminine traits which go against the 'harsh realities' of international politics, which must be guided by calculation and rationality (ibid.: 1292). This is indicative of a US viewpoint implicitly influenced by realist theory, which is used to subjugate India and Pakistan as feminised and
irrational actors, whose actions cannot be predicted and must be reined in.

Alongside these gender roles, the discourse also contains orientalist assumptions. The authors of the texts engage in a distinctly American form of 'othering' India and Pakistan. The use of binary opposition has the effect of polarising the US and the oriental 'others', echoing colonial viewpoints which 'divide[d] the world into large general divisions, entities that coexist in a state of tension produced by what is believed to be radical difference' (Said, 2003: 45). The rational West faces the irrational, oriental other which proves itself to be incapable of responsible government, necessitating diplomatic intervention and sanctioning by the US – remarkably similar to the colonial attitudes explored by Said (Nayak and Malone, 2009: 256). For instance, John Holum, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, speaks of India and Pakistan's 'surrender of self-control' and the need for the US to initiate 'sober thinking' on the issue (1998a). This is based on the rationality/irrationality opposition and Holum explicitly refers to the US's capability to think in a different way, and 'save' India and Pakistan from their own self-destructive mentality. Doty (1996: 89) notes how a similar conception of Western-versus-Oriental thinking can be used to infantilise the non-Western other, and in this case India and Pakistan are denigrated as cognitively under-developed and child-like actors in need of guidance.

The practice of classification is also at work within the discourse, and analysis reveals how the US, India and Pakistan have been placed into hierarchical positions according to pre-formed conceptions regarding where they 'belong' (Doty, 1996: 10). The most prominent is the artificial division constructed between 'nuclear' and 'non-nuclear' states, with the US taken to be a legitimate nuclear state whilst India and Pakistan only have 'self-declared status as a nuclear power' (Talbott, 1999: 116), which arises a number of times. Closely related is the separation enforced between India and Pakistan and the 'international community'; that the two nations are 'isolated' and their actions 'condemned' (Clinton, 1998a; 1998b). Both of these classifications are based on unquestioned assumptions about the 'natural' and rightful positions of the actors and cement the position of the subjects in particular gendered and orientalist hierarchy.

The status of 'nuclear weapons state' is defined within the NPT as 'one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967' (UN, 2010). This rhetorically separates nuclear states into the categories of legal and legitimate proliferators such as the US, and creates a non-nuclear group of outsiders, which India and Pakistan must 'naturally' belong to as they are not covered by the treaty. These categories are treated in the
discourse as concrete and inflexible, when in fact they are socially constructed 'norms', part of 'the ideational structures which lead states to define their identities and interests in conflictual terms' (Shafique, 2011). India and Pakistan are repeatedly referred to as 'self-declared nuclear powers' (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001), 'non-nuclear weapon state[s]' (FAS, 1998) or simply states that have 'exploded nuclear devices' (Albright, 2000). A discursive separation between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states is always maintained, and a contrast drawn between the 'legal' nuclear weapons of the US and India and Pakistan's illegitimate weapons.

By positioning India and Pakistan as non-members of the 'nuclear club', their lower position in the international hierarchy is determined in opposition to the US's identity as a law-abiding and responsible superpower which, as one of the key promoters of the NPT, acts as a gatekeeper to legal nuclear status. They are further represented as outsiders in relation to the 'international community'; whilst they are not 'rogue states' (Einhorn, 2000), India and Pakistan are 'at odds with the international community' (Clinton, 1998a), which at large is 'moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons' (FAS, 2000). Repeated references to the international community and its position regarding India and Pakistan's actions discursively construct a community of states with a unified conception of what constitutes good state behaviour, rather than a collection of autonomous actors. By delineating 'in/out' categories in this way, India and Pakistan are represented as isolated pariah states, incapable of abiding to the norms of the international community, and the only way of improving their status is 'to move toward the international mainstream' (Talbott, 1999: 119).

Das emphasises the feminist international relations claim that 'masculinity as a gendered identity is about structuring relations of power' (2012: 95), and by positioning itself hierarchically above India and Pakistan through discourse the US adopts a distinctly masculine identity. The US is the moral arbiter that leads the international community, a guiding hand for India and Pakistan and the world's one remaining – and therefore uniquely masculine – superpower (Hooper, 2001: 226). This positioning mirrors 'traditional' social gender roles, whereby masculinity is expressed through power, leadership and access to prominent public positions, while femininity is confined to the domestic sphere. Cohn et al (2005) argue elsewhere that it is necessary for the US to 'subordinate and emasculate' challengers to this position of global masculinity by controlling access to nuclear weapons and their 'emblem of power'.

Whilst this is a separate line of inquiry in its own right, it demonstrates the importance of masculine symbols such as stewardship of the NPT, the 'global proliferation regime' and the legal
control of nuclear weapons in maintaining the gendered structure of the international hierarchy. By
denying India and Pakistan positions of international prominence in the 'mainstream' and classing
them as nuclear-incapable (Bureau of Nonproliferation, 1999), the US feminises them.
Simultaneously, positioning the two countries at the bottom of or even outside international
hierarchies further entrenches their status as oriental 'others'. Abraham (1998) and Nizamani (2001)
have both examined the importance of nuclear status to the post-colonial identities of India and
Pakistan, as expressions of independence and technological prowess.

Isolating them from the 'international community' and stressing the condemnation of
Western countries, the G-8 and NATO (Clinton, 1998b; Holum, 1998b) may be read as attempts to
regulate resurgent Indian and Pakistani identities, marginalising and containing them to the South
Asian subcontinent. For instance, the statement that India's door to the UN Security Council is
'locked, bolted and barred' (Holum, 1998a) sends a message that compliance with Western non-
proliferation norms is the only way to mainstream acceptance. Categorising India and Pakistan as
non-nuclear states reiterates their status as an inferior ‘other’, and reinforces the US's unique
position at the top of the international hierarchy (Said, 2003; Nayak and Malone, 2009). Moreover,
given that compliance with the legal frameworks of nonproliferation is the established norm of
'responsible' state behaviour, India and Pakistan's activities are implied to be dangerous by virtue of
their illegality and threatening to US policies of weapons regulation.

The final representational device identified in the text is negation. Non-Western countries
are represented as 'blank spaces [in which] the West may write such things as civilization, progress,
modernization, and democracy' (Doty, 1996: 11). These nations' own 'indigenous' interpretations of
their histories – of which there may be many – are discounted in favour of Western measures of
progress. The dominant US nuclear discourse during this period displays one very prominent
instance of negation; the idea that India and Pakistan are 'on the wrong side of history' (Clinton,
1998a). The tests were 'a historic mistake' (Albright, 2000), and an indication of 'Cold War
brinksmanship' (Talbott, 1999: 117) between the two powers which 'cannot be the road to peace'
(Underwood, 1998). They have 'pushed to the forefront weapons that the world has left behind'
(Holum, 1998a), whilst the US works to reduce its own arsenals of weapons.

The US discourse is based on a distinctly Western account of history and idea of progress. In
Said's terms, 'the West is the spectator, the judge and jury of every facet of Oriental behavior' (2003:
109). Western history supersedes the history of the other, disregarding what nuclear weapons, for
example, may mean in Indian or Pakistani post-colonial narratives. Abraham (2006) notes that the US discourse of non-proliferation and control of weapons is based on the US’s own national history. India’s nuclear program, by contrast, is often domestically interpreted as an expression of peaceful technological advancement as well as a show of destructive potential – although this meaning is ‘atypical’ from the viewpoint of early nuclear powers like the US (ibid.: 64). Instead relations between the two powers are understood as a repeat of the Cold War, which negates the very different histories of India and Pakistan’s relations compared to the US and Russia, as well as carrying strong connotations of threat to Western audiences. The dominant nuclear discourse examined here consists of ‘realism peppered with moral undertones’ (Nizamani, 2001: 31) and is based on a thoroughly Western understanding of international relations. The meaning of India and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons – dangerous, anachronistic and primitive – results from these Western norms and has been ‘written over’ indigenous narratives of nuclear history.

Post-9/11

The second table of predicates (see appendix 2) contains each instance of predication used in a sample of US foreign policy texts relating to India-Pakistan nuclear relations between September 11, 2001 and the end of the Bush presidency. This is a broad time period, but nevertheless several subtle differences are revealed. This is in line with the expectation that the dominant discourse may change given the reconfiguration of US security policy following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Carranza, 2006; Das, 2012). A coherent discourse emerges which constructs the India-Pakistan nuclear threat somewhat differently. However, the US is represented in a broadly similar manner, cast as a neutral and benevolent overseer which facilitates dialogue and co-operation. Its aims are ‘to facilitate co-operation’ (Semmel, 2005) and to ‘prevent ... actions that would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and regional stability’ in South Asia (Wolf, 2004). Donald Rumsfeld emphasises the US’s neutrality, pointing to the ‘very good’ and ‘developing and maturing’ relationships the US has with both countries (in Rhem, 2002). The US ‘extend[s] its good offices’ to both countries and ‘want[s] the best future for [its] friends ... in India and Pakistan’ (Armitage, 2002). Similar predicates emphasising the US’s peaceful promotion of dialogue and protective intentions in South Asia are repeated throughout the discourse, as the table indicates.

As in 1998 – 2001, the discourse simultaneously represents the US as protective and strong. Whilst it favours dialogue and peaceful means of resolving conflict, it is predicated as a firm and
authoritative power. Strengthened relationships with India and Pakistan 'should not ... be taken to suggest that we have "accepted" the status of either country as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT' (Wolf, 2004); and despite co-operation on civil nuclear technology, the US 'has not accepted India as a nuclear weapons state' (Office of the Press Secretary, 2006). It will ensure 'that states outside the NPT regime [India and Pakistan] use nuclear technology responsibly' (Ford, 2008) and that India 'play[s] by the rules' (Burns, 2007), suggesting that it remains willing to back up its non-proliferation goals in India and Pakistan with coercive measures. Thus, there is continuity between the Clinton and Bush discourses on India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons, with the US's character traits retaining the same 'family resemblance' (Doty, 1993) even as the focus moves away from total compliance with the NPT.

Representations of India and Pakistan, however, diverge from the largely homogenous identities they are ascribed in the 1998 – 2001 discourse. Burns (2007: 135) explicitly notes that the US intends to 'de-hyphenate' its South Asia policy, and India and Pakistan are indeed represented as distinct entities with different traits. There are elements of similarity; both countries are friends of the US, co-operate with US interests and fight terrorism (Powell, in Rediff, 2004; Armitage, 2002; Rhem, 2002; Wolf, 2004; Bush and Thiessen, 2009). Despite continued non-compliance with the NPT, then, and little change in nuclear stance from both countries, they are discursively constructed as co-operative and responsible in the face of the regional terrorism, now identified as a more serious security threat than nuclear proliferation. However, a closer reading of foreign policy texts during this period reveals several subtle differences in representations of India and Pakistan, characterised in particular by the creation of 'subordinate masculinities' for India and Pakistan in relation to the US (Das, 2012).

Underlying representations of India and Pakistan is a presupposition of a core/periphery opposition - the taken-for-granted background knowledge that US objectives are central to how other countries define their own interests. Doty (1996: 2) notes that the core/periphery binary opposition is arbitrary, and in this case is based on an orientalist assumption that the core – the US – is constructive of the interests and identity of the peripheries, India and Pakistan. This presupposition is manifested in the discourse, in which India's good behaviour is defined only with reference to the US's superior and dominant interests. It is predicated as democratic, peaceful, regionally powerful, with legitimate goals and shared values with the US (in particular see Burns, 2007; Joseph, 2005; Bush and Thiessen, 2009). It is also represented as a responsible nation, capable of making independent policy decisions and 'play[ing] by the rules' of nonproliferation,
despite its previous misdemeanours (Burns, 2007: 136). It has 'clearly demonstrated over the past several years its desire to work with the United States' (Joseph, 2005), making it suitably responsible and aligned with US values such as democracy for the US to provide assistance to its civil nuclear programme (Office of the Press Secretary, 2006). Despite ongoing tensions with Pakistan, India’s nuclear ambitions are no longer constructed as a direct security threat. Instead, with the realignment of US security discourse which is increasingly concerned with terrorism in the region, India is subsumed as a compliant ally and its nuclear programme partially legitimated.

The US guides and supports India in its efforts to realise co-operation with Pakistan, democracy and, from 2005, nuclear power. Foreign policy discourse assumes Indian efforts towards 'progress' therefore depend on the politically and militarily superior US. While India is favourably represented as a strong regional power – particularly in terms of its size and wealth relative to Pakistan – and a US ally, it is kept in thrall to the dominant US. Applying the concept of hegemonic masculinity to the US's post-9/11 nuclear discourse regarding India and Pakistan, it is possible to examine how the dominant discourse changes and reconstructs their gendered identities by presupposing the structure of their power relations with the US. Hegemonic masculinity is a 'culturally idealized' configuration of masculine traits, which becomes dominant by persuading people of its validity and 'normality' through the control of social institutions, media and other devices (Donaldson, 1993: 645). Hegemonic masculinity becomes relevant in the post-9/11 discourse, since it is a device by which India and Pakistan can be subsumed as US allies into the campaign against terrorism, yet still feminised and subordinated.

In an international relations context, a hegemonic masculinity may be defined by military strength and technological prowess, or political-economic development (Blanchard, 2003: 1304). The dominant discourse establishes the US's hegemonic masculinity by emphasising its international influence, military power, legitimate nuclear status and commitment to combating terrorism; values which are widely accepted and reproduced on the world stage (Niva in Blanchard, 2003). To emulate this masculinity, India must 'catch up' with the US by 'collaborating with the hierarchically-situated United States' (Das, 2012: 100). Represented as a complicit US 'policeman' in the South Asian region India is ascribed a subordinate masculinity, derivative of the US's hegemonic one, whereby it is 'us[ed], control[led] and infantiliz[ed]'. India is not represented in such extremely feminine terms as in the discourse dominant before 9/11, but it is still ultimately dominated by the US through international norms, proliferation laws and the imperative to fight terrorism – institutions which cement the hegemony of the US masculinity (Donaldson, 1993: 645).
Though India is submissive to the US, it retains a form of masculine identity by through its constrained nuclear programme, adherence to the hegemonic values of the US, and its own dominance over Pakistan.

The discourse across the texts analysed also constructs a gendered identity for Pakistan. Imbued with the authority of the US, India's size and power relative to Pakistan is emphasised. In turn, Pakistan is seen as militarily vulnerable to India. It is still compliant in the US war on terror, co-operates in US efforts to mediate conflict and participates in dialogue with India; however, the US's 'de-hyphenation' of its policies towards India and Pakistan is evident. Colin Powell (in Rediff, 2004) insists that 'Pakistan is a sovereign country and we don't want to interfere in the sovereignty of Pakistan', acknowledging Pakistan's independent status and implicitly accepting its capability to act without US guidance. However, such declarations are qualified by 'forceful police-like comments' (Das, 2012: 99) which emphasise the importance of Pakistan's continued compliance with US policies. The US will not afford Pakistan the same nuclear concessions as India, since 'Pakistan does not have the same non-proliferation record as India ... we do not intend to employ a similar civil nuclear co-operation initiative with Pakistan' (Office of the Press Secretary, 2006).

Pakistan has been put under 'intense diplomatic pressure' and 'urged to improve the climate for talks' with India (Gupta and Leather, 2002).

Such statements serve to reinforce the US's dominant masculinity over Pakistan, emphasising the US's controlling influence. However, they also subordinate Pakistan in relation to India's already subordinate masculinity which depends on US co-operation and approval. Pakistan's different relationship with the US is made explicitly clear by statements of intent to provide unique aid to India, but also by a lack of shared values with the US, such as democracy and other 'common interests'. Pakistan is co-operative with the US, but its strategic importance is derived primarily from its instrumental geographic location in the war on terror (Gupta and Leather, 2002; Powell, in Rediff, 2004) as opposed to a 'strong strategic partnership' between the 'world's two largest democracies' (Bush and Thiessen, 2009) as enjoyed by India. Pakistan suffers a 'conventional weapons inferiority vis a vis India' (Gupta and Leather, 2002: 9) and 'weak laws and weak enforcement' (Wolf, 2004) have allowed illegal proliferation activities to take place, necessitating further US assistance. Pakistan conforms to some parts of the US's hegemonic masculinity by aligning with it, but also expresses some weakened, feminised characteristics in relation to both the US and India.
Hooper (2001: 72) argues that men ‘find themselves aligned with hegemonic masculinities in some respects [and] subordinated in others’. This is also the case with 'manly states'. The more distinct representations of India and Pakistan in the post-9/11 foreign policy discourse results in a complex process of gendering, where the respective countries' masculinities are defined not only in relation to the US, but to each other. Their subordinate masculinities are no longer defined by irrationality and unpredictability, but compliance and at least partial subscription to dominant norms of international behaviour. The nuclear threat posed by India and Pakistan is therefore negated; their gendered identities are regulated as the focus of US hegemonic masculinity shifts from controlling proliferation to fighting terrorism.

The representational practice of classification further entrenches these gendered identities. 'Nuclear club' status continues to position each country into hierarchical categories relative to one another. Nuclear weapons status remains particularly important, although references to 'nuclear states' as defined by the NPT diminish in line with the more flexible stance taken by the Bush administration and its willingness to allow 'good' proliferation. Nonetheless, the government maintains that 'the United States has not recognised India as a nuclear state' (Office of the Press Secretary, 2006), and that the US ‘will not reward either country for their decisions to acquire nuclear weapons' (Wolf, 2004). The discursive separation between the US as a nuclear state, and India and Pakistan as states holding nuclear weapons under 'certain obligations' (Powell, in Rediff, 2004) from the US to manage their weaponry, ensures that both nations are kept hierarchically subordinate to the US despite their increasing technological and military prowess. This artificial distinction, coupled with India's representation as a compliant ally, allows the US to permit the Indian civil nuclear programme and simultaneously entrench its own dominant status. Additionally, US assistance with India's civil nuclear programme further denigrates India's standing as a 'nuclear state' by denying complete Indian autonomy over its nuclear technology; autonomy and control, Abraham (2006) argues, being central to India's postcolonial status as a modern power.

In addition to gendering India and Pakistan, the post-9/11 US discourse remains strongly orientalist, and the practice of negation regulates and domesticates India and Pakistan's postcolonial identities. Although the ‘wrong side of history' trope prevalent in US discourse immediately after the 1998 nuclear tests does not appear, Indian and Pakistani postcolonial histories are negated through the assertion of US authority which echoes the colonial past. For instance, Muppidi documents India's treatment by the US during the 1960s while receiving food aid: 'India was dictated to, pressure was applied, the United States refused to recognize the right of the Indian state
to disagree or to have an independent judgement on domestic or international issues, aid was tied to immediate concessions, and so on' (1999: 141). In this way, India was discursively treated as a colonised subject. Strikingly, all of these rhetorical strategies are still present in post-9/11 discourse, which negate Indian and Pakistani postcolonial histories, instead writing over them an orientalist narrative of control.

Both India and Pakistan's subordinate hierarchical positions are defined by their cooperation with US objectives. India's regionally dominant position over Pakistan and 'unique partnership' with the US is constructed by emphasis on its democracy, responsible proliferation and relative influence in South Asia. Muppidi's study of the US's Cold War relations with India notes that India was discursively 'hailed' as a colonial subject, and that the resulting 'colonizer-colonized relationship ... contravened the postcoloniality of the Indian security imaginary', and the US representation of India 'negated [India's] dominant self understandings' (1999: 143). Put simply, the US continued to treat India as an oriental, colonial nation, ignoring the meaning of any indigenous postcolonial identities. This practice continues. Nuclear assistance to India is closely tied to conditions of 'responsible' use of the technology, as defined by the US (Semmel, 2006), and India's validity as a world power is only recognised through its similarities and ties with the US and a Western 'international community' (Semmel, 2005; Burns, 2007; Bush and Thiessen, 2009). India's nuclear programme as a symbol of postcolonial modernity, scientific prowess and independence is negated (Abraham, 1998) and closely monitored by the US.

Pakistan is similarly hailed as a colonised subject, recognised by virtue of its capability to aid the US in fighting terrorism (Gilmore, 2002) and importance in 'ensuring that nuclear weapon related material not be obtained by terrorists or other organizations that would be contrary to counterproliferation efforts' (Gupta and Leather, 2002). It is also consistently urged to resolve its dispute with India, since poor relations between the two countries would be damaging to US regional interests (Armitage, 2002; Ford, 2008). Control over fissile materials is represented as a 'mutual goal' for Pakistan and the US (Powell, in Rediff, 2004), and the US discourse aligns Pakistan's interests with its own. It negates the importance of indigenous nuclear discourses in constructing Pakistan's postcolonial national identity which encompasses Islamic nationalism, resistance to the external enemy India, and nuclear weapons 'as guarantors of national security' (Nizamani, 2001: 42).

This is symptomatic of an 'American orientalism' (Nayak and Malone, 2009) whereby the
US regulates postcolonial identities, domesticating India and Pakistan by replacing indigenous narratives with its own. In this way, the India-Pakistan nuclear threat is represented as diminishing. Dominant US norms of nonproliferation and the US's position as a legitimate, nuclear-armed superpower which polices the region are not directly challenged by their activities, but bolstered. The US discursively asserts its dominance and has successfully controlled the 'danger' posed by India and Pakistan, through the strategies of regulation and domestication justified by its orientalist representation of the two non-Western countries (ibid.: 263).

**Concluding remarks**

A close analysis of US foreign policy texts surrounding the India-Pakistan nuclear threat, sensitive to the effects of administration change and 9/11 on US security discourses, reveals a complex process of representation and subject positioning which changes over time. Using the representational practices approach, I conclude that the possibility of nuclear war between India and Pakistan is initially constructed as an urgent and direct threat, to the countries themselves and to US nonproliferation interests. After 9/11 and during of George W. Bush's two terms as US President, the condition of threat is downplayed as India and Pakistan are hailed into compliant, controlled positions, and the focus of US foreign policy in the region is redirected towards fighting terrorism. Practices of gendering and orientalism, however, are present in both discourses and used to represent the states concerned in a way which preserves US dominance and masculinity.

The dominant discourse between the Pokhran and Chagai nuclear tests in 1998, and the end of the Clinton administration and subsequently the 9/11 terrorist attacks, sees the rise of an imminent and direct Indo-Pakistani nuclear threat. India and Pakistan are both assigned roles of infantilised, feminised, oriental others, whose irrationality, irresponsibility and lack of restraint means their possession of nuclear technology is a clear and present danger to international security. India and Pakistan are simultaneously sites of US identity-building. Said suggests that orientalism does not only denigrate the 'others'; it also reinforces Western dominance and identity by creating a 'flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of relationships with the Orient without him ever losing the relative upper hand' (2003: 7). By constructing India and Pakistan in such a manner, the US justifies its own intervention and police-like behaviour, regulating interactions between them and coercively imposing the NPT and sanctions which form a US regime of control. Until co-operation is achieved, however, the dominant discourse makes it clear that India and Pakistan will remain dangerous, if not 'rogue', pariah states.

The post-9/11 discourse, studied up to the end of the second Bush administration, reconfigures the US view of the proliferation terrain and casts India and Pakistan in different, more
complex subject roles than straightforward threats to international security. Carranza notes that the 9/11 attacks had a profound effect on US proliferation concerns, as focus shifted to allowing 'good' proliferation whilst preventing nuclear technology being provided to terrorists (2006: 514). Concomitantly, the dominant discourse which previously identified India and Pakistan as a threat began to soften its tone towards the two proliferators. Before 9/11, the US was able to reinforce its masculinity and dominance through the enforcement of the Western nonproliferation regime. However, the post-9/11 moment necessitated a 'hypermale' project to 'save US state identity' (Nayak, 2006: 43), since attacks on US soil threatened to topple the US's dominant status as a strong and inherently 'right' superpower. Nonproliferation efforts were no longer sufficient to sustain this project, and so India and Pakistan became discursively co-opted into the 'war on terror' as subordinate US allies – rather than threats that the US could police and neutralise to cement its dominant status.

India and Pakistan are still used to reinforce a hegemonic US masculinity, but represented as compliant allies instead of dangerous and irresponsible proliferators. Discursively infantilised as irrational, oriental others in the pre-9/11 dominant discourse (Nayak, 2006: 49), they are now regulated and co-opted into the Western bloc of 'rational' and even 'democratic' 'allies' of the US, re-aligned in opposition to the new oriental 'others' of terrorist organisations and the states that support them. The discourse nonetheless maintains India and Pakistan's subordination to the US by qualifying their newly-assigned masculinities with orientalist assumptions about their nuclear status and emphasising their instrumentality in US objectives against terrorism. In many respects they are represented similarly to colonial subjects. Although continually feminised, orientalised and subordinated, India and Pakistan's nuclear behaviour ceases to be constructed as a viable security threat to regional, international and US security.

My findings illustrate vividly the fluid nature of discourse, and how seemingly fixed meanings and statements of 'fact' can evolve over time. The Foucauldian concept of discourse holds that all knowledge is historically and culturally specific, susceptible to change and 'radical breaks' in history which can drastically alter perceptions of fact (Hall, 1997: 47). For US understandings of international relations and mainstream foreign policy discourse, 9/11 was a radical break which altered the discursive relationships between the US and other international subjects. At once, the borders of the international security landscape were redrawn. Fukuyama's (2003) proclamation that 'we may be witnessing ... the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy' was called into question. The reshuffle of nonproliferation discourse in the wake of 9/11 demonstrates that seemingly fixed
relationships and political 'facts' may be challenged, reshaped or nullified in any number of ways.


accessed 30/03/13.


Office of the Press Secretary (2006) 'India civil nuclear co-operation: responding to critics' (online),


## Appendix 1

Table of predicates, 1998 - 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has a responsibility/obligation to combat other countries' proliferation challenges (13)</td>
<td>Has set itself against/isolated itself from the international community and its norms (11)</td>
<td>Has set itself against/isolated itself from the international community and its norms (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leads the way for other countries by taking steps to counter proliferation (9)</td>
<td>Is unaware of/threatening its own interests and requirements – the US knows these interests better (8)</td>
<td>Is unaware of/threatening its own interests and requirements – the US knows these interests better (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting an example for other nations to act responsibly by cutting its own nuclear arsenal (9)</td>
<td>Is (or should be) a natural friend/partner to the US (6)</td>
<td>Is liable to resort to violence with little or no provocation (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is determined to secure cooperation from other countries (7)</td>
<td>Is on the wrong side of history (5)</td>
<td>Is on the wrong side of history (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is in dialogue with India/Pakistan (5)</td>
<td>Is a rising democracy (5)</td>
<td>Lacks self-control/acts irresponsibly (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has taken swift measures to punish nuclear testers (4)</td>
<td>Is liable to resort to violence with little or no provocation (5)</td>
<td>Is wasting potential and opportunities by testing weapons (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will not accept/disapproves of India/Pakistan’s decisions (4)</td>
<td>Has acted dangerously/threatened security (4)</td>
<td>Is potentially a great country, member of the international community (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is progressive, promotes progress towards peace (3)</td>
<td>Lacks self-control and restraint/acts irresponsibly (4)</td>
<td>Feels threatened by India (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Page Reference</td>
<td>Additional Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respects the independent decisions of other countries</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Threatens democracy, freedom or other values (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Its nuclear status is self-declared (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is encouraging and mediating dialogue between the two countries</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Is wasting potential and opportunities by testing weapons (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Has acted dangerously/threatens security (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a strong partner and desirable ally</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Its nuclear status is self-declared (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is receiving/requires US assistance and guidance (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the world's only superpower</td>
<td></td>
<td>Is potentially a great country, member of the international community (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Has broken promises/been less than truthful in its dealings with the US or India (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Has broken promises/been less than truthful in its dealings with the US or Pakistan (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is repeating the mistakes of the Cold War (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is repeating the mistakes of the Cold War (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is violent (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is receiving/requires US assistance and guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Has a rich history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is primitively nationalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is cowardly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is cowardly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2

Table of predicates, Post-9/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is working to mediate/ diffuse tensions between India and Pakistan (11)</td>
<td>Is a democracy (11)</td>
<td>Is a US friend or ally (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognises other countries' sovereignty/decisions (6)</td>
<td>Co-operates with the US (10)</td>
<td>Must resolve issues with India itself (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is willing to provide guidance/ assistance to India/ Pakistan on nuclear issues (5)</td>
<td>Is a US friend or ally (8)</td>
<td>Is combating terrorism (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wants to co-operate with India/ Pakistan (5)</td>
<td>Must resolve issues with Pakistan itself (7)</td>
<td>Co-operates with the US (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will not reward or help proliferation activities (4)</td>
<td>Has a unique partnership with the US (5)</td>
<td>Its importance comes from influence in War on Terror (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not accept India/ Pakistan’s nuclear status (3)</td>
<td>Is a part of global non- proliferation norms (5)</td>
<td>Has previously been isolated from the international community (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is protecting the region from terrorism/ instability (2)</td>
<td>Is powerful (4)</td>
<td>Is a young democracy (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is in dialogue with India/ Pakistan on nuclear issues</td>
<td>Shares goals/ interests with the US (3)</td>
<td>Has a responsibility to prevent illegal proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Traits</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is not looking for India or Pakistan to comply with the NPT</td>
<td>Shares US values (3)</td>
<td>Is inferior to/in the shadow of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has set an example by reducing its own nuclear arsenal</td>
<td>Is regionally dominant (3)</td>
<td>Has a different relationship with the US than India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can aid US War on Terror (2)</td>
<td>Shares goals/interests with the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has a good record of non-proliferation (2)</td>
<td>Is a great country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is peaceful (2)</td>
<td>Has not complied with the NPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has not complied with the NPT (2)</td>
<td>Is not a nuclear weapons state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Needs help to manage dispute with Pakistan</td>
<td>Needs help to manage dispute with India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plays by the rules</td>
<td>Is a weak state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is a great country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is a stabilizing force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is not a nuclear weapons state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is culturally/historically different from the US</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Needs US assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>