

EFTHYMIOS SMYRNIOTIS

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EDUCATION

University of Bristol
PhD in Economics
Department of Economics

October 2018 - Present

University of Warwick
Msc Economics

September 2017

University of Athens
Bsc Economics

February 2016

REFERENCES

Prof. In-Uck Park,
University of Bristol, Department of Economics
i.park.@bristol.ac.uk

Prof. Tai-Wei Hu
University of Bristol, Department of Economics
taiwei.hu@bristol.ac.uk

Prof. Nikolaos Kokonas
University of Bath, Department of Economics
n.kokonas@bath.ac.uk

ACADEMIC INTERESTS

Economic Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Political Economy, Environmental Economics.

WORKING PAPERS

Coordinating Climate Action Under Uncertainty [job market paper]

This paper studies the strategic interaction between two agents/countries deciding whether to take climate action. Depending on the unobserved state of the environment, modelled as the critical mass of agents needed to take action, successful climate action provides a public good creating free riding incentives. If one agent's action is sufficient to restore the environment actions exhibit strategic substitutes. If the state is critical though, both agents need to coordinate and actions exhibit strategic complements. We extend the global games to environments where agents' actions change between strategic substitutes and complements discontinuously in the underlying parameter. We show that risk-dominant actions can be strictly dominant at signals around the parameter value of such discontinuity, even if they are nowhere strictly dominant in the underlying parameter, and iteratively strictly dominant in the whole range of signals at which they are risk-dominant. We provide conditions on agents' utilities that warrant this outcome. This result applied to climate action implies that for a range of policies that climate action is not strictly dominant in the complete information game, it is so in the incomplete information environment. Taking into account the strategic interactions and incomplete information may offer new tools for policymakers to coordinate climate action.

Global Games without Solvable Games (joint with In-Uck Park) [link] :

We extend global games a la Carlsson and van Damme (1993) to environments where the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected even if there is no dominance solvable game in the underlying class of games. Strict dominance can emerge in the global game from discrete payoff changes of the underlying game at some state, and we provide sufficient conditions on payoff changes that warrant iterated dominance of the risk-dominant equilibrium. Thus, strategic uncertainty creates strictly dominant actions as well as fostering iterated dominance, in contrast to global games hitherto where strategic uncertainty does only the latter. Discrete payoff changes tend to arise, in particular, in situations where a public good can be provided with varying degrees of coordination depending on the state, so that coordinating actions can be strategic substitutes and free-riding incentives present. We illustrate our findings in a stylized regime change model.

Suboptimal inflation volatility and Central Bank communication (joint with Nikolaos Kokonas and Michalis Rousakis)

WORK IN PROGRESS

Strategic Bankruptcy: A Game of Coordination and the effects of Stress Tests

HONOURS AND AWARDS

2018-2022 School Bursary, School of Economic, University of Bristol, full scholarship (Ph.D.)

SOFTWARE SKILLS

Matlab, Stata, Python, Latex, Microsoft office.

WORK EXPERIENCE

University of Athens 2016
Research Assistant

University of Bristol 2018-present
Teaching Assistant

REFEREEING

RES Symposium of Junior Researchers 2019

ACADEMIC PRESENTATIONS

University of Warwick PhD seminars (May 2017)
University of Bristol PhD seminars (2018/2019/2020/2021/2022)
University of Bath PhD seminar (2021)
MiMa University of Warwick (2021)
9th PhD conference(2021), University of Warwick
Theories and Methods in Macroeconomics, King's college university, London (2022)
RES Junior Symposium (2022)
University of Bath Macro day (2022)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Mathematical and Statistical Methods (2019) - Undergraduate Unit
Probability, Statistics and Econometrics (2020) - Undergraduate Unit
Intermediate Microeconomics (2020-2021)- Undergraduate Unit
Intermediate Macroeconomics (2020-2021, 2021-2022, 2022-2023)- Undergraduate Unit
Growth and Development (2021)-Undergraduate unit