

Incentives in Secondary Schools: The Impact of the Performance Threshold

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Abstract

This paper reports the results of interviews with the head teachers of 25 English secondary schools, designed to elicit their perception of the Threshold's impact in schools. One of the stated objectives of the Performance Threshold was to provide a financial incentive for teachers to increase their effort. The Threshold's effectiveness in meeting its objectives depends partly on whether its design is consistent with the characteristics of schools, including their use of team working and their incentive structures, and whether it measures the outcomes that are important. Most of the head teachers in our sample believed that team working is important in schools and that changes in pupil attainment are the result of a team effort. None had observed divisive behaviour as the result of the individual-basis of the Performance Threshold, but a number recognised the risk. Heads were divided over how they would use financial incentives to motivate teachers, with some believing they cannot be used to motivate teachers directly. Others believed that financial incentives can be used to motivate teachers, but that the Threshold may not be effective because of its flaws in design. Some, but not all, heads believed that the Threshold's definition of success creates targets that are too narrow, and which may therefore generate perverse incentives. Others believed that the targets were constructive, promoting a broad focus on factors that are important in good teaching.

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1. Introduction

In 2000 the UK Government introduced a form of performance-related pay for teachers, called the Performance Threshold. One of its objectives was to motivate existing teachers to greater effort in a number of areas, including pupil attainment. There is, however, only a small evidence base about the impact of performance-related pay in the public sector, and that which exists suggests that to have intended consequences, incentive schemes for public sector workers have to be carefully designed (Burgess and Metcalfe, 1999). The evidence base about the likely impact of performance-related pay in schools, and the nature of incentive structures in schools is also small (Hanushek et al., 1994).

This paper reports the results of a study into the likely impact of the Performance Threshold in UK secondary schools. The study was conducted by investigating head teachers' views about the Threshold, expressed in interviews conducted in 2000/2001. We explored heads' views about the nature of schools' incentive structures and the methods they use to motivate teachers. We did this by investigating schools' internal organisation before the reforms: their Performance Management systems, the extent of team working, and the use of financial incentives by individual heads to motivate teachers. We then investigated heads' views about the impact of the Threshold in each of these areas. We paid particular attention to whether they believed the Threshold is likely to promote one of its stated ends: motivating teachers to greater effort in the area of pupil attainment.

Section 2 of the paper briefly surveys relevant literature on incentives in schools. Section 3 outlines the nature of the Performance Threshold, and empirical work relating to its impact. Section 4 outlines the method used in this study. The results are presented in section 5, and comprise subsections describing extant Performance Management systems, the impact of the Threshold on Performance Management systems, the nature of team working in schools, the impact of the Threshold on team working, the use of financial incentives by heads prior to the Threshold, and the impact of the Threshold on teacher effort. The paper concludes with a section summarising and discussing the main results.

2. Incentives in schools

There is extensive debate about the introduction of performance-related pay for teachers, and the efficacy of financial incentives in motivating teachers. Critics argue that the characteristics of education as a product and teachers as professionals are likely to make financial incentives at best ineffective, and at worst to generate unintended consequences. Most advocates identify the same characteristics as critics, but argue that they mean that financial incentive schemes have to be carefully designed rather than meaning schemes will necessarily be ineffective. Advocates believe that carefully and appropriately designed incentive schemes can improve performance in schools (Hannaway, 1996; Hanushek et al. 1994; Hanushek and Jorgenson, 1996; Kemmerer and Windham, 1997; Odden and Kelley, 1997).

These commentators argue that education is characterised by team work, with improvements in pupil attainment dependent on the inputs of a number of teachers. A number of US schemes introduced in the 1980s have been criticised for being based on individual teacher performance, thereby engendering competition between teachers and failing to recognise that student attainment in any one class depends on their experience in all classes (Clotfelter and Ladd, 1996; Jacobsen, 1992; Moore Johnson, 1984). The problems with linking measures of attainment and rewards to individual teachers is argued to have stimulated the rise, in the US in the 1990s, of group schemes based on school-level performance.

Education is also characterised by multiple tasks, multiple principals, and it is difficult to measure some of its important outputs (Dixit, 2000). Teachers have to meet a number of different objectives. There is no consensus about the factors leading to effective teaching, and how they should be measured (Murnane and Cohen, 1986). There is a risk that perverse incentives will be created if effort in only a subset of areas is rewarded. Targets based on pupil attainment, for example, might distort effort towards that which is measured, manifest as 'teaching to the test', as teachers focusing on only the subset of pupils with the highest marginal gain in test scores, or cheating (Hannaway 1996, Kovetz 1996, Ladd 1996).

Some commentators argue that teachers are motivated by intrinsic rather than extrinsic financial rewards, rendering performance-related pay ineffective (Moore Johnson, 1986). However, others argue

that although teachers are motivated by both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, the former can be used to enhance rather than necessarily undermining overall motivation (Odden and Kelley, 1997).

Some commentators have argued that the design of merit pay schemes must be such that they are integrated with other aspects of the school environment, including its existing Performance Management structure. As noted by Storey (2000), performance-related pay is not an "independent variable which, when introduced into a situation, produces a predictable set of effects. Performance pay has to be managed and it forms merely one part of a wider set of factors in a reward system" (p.516). A number also argue that financial incentives will motivate teachers only if they are perceived to be fair, and if the goals are believed by teachers to be legitimate (Hanushek et al., 1994).

Studies investigating teacher motivation and the impact of incentive schemes on teacher effort and behaviour

A number of empirical studies have been conducted in recent years in the US, most focusing on school-level, group schemes. Most qualitative studies have addressed teachers' attitudes to financial bonuses in interview or questionnaire studies. Most of these studies find that teachers believe financial rewards to be appropriate and that they believe them to have a positive but limited impact on motivation. The findings of different studies differ in the relative weight respondents give to financial (i.e. 'extrinsic') rewards as opposed to peer esteem, satisfaction and other 'intrinsic' rewards, and in the mechanism by which financial rewards are believed to affect behaviour.

Kelley (1999) found that only 20% of teachers viewed the possibility of a salary bonus as a primary motivator for changing their teaching practice; the remainder believed they were motivated primarily by intrinsic rewards, including the satisfaction of seeing pupils succeed, public recognition, and the opportunity to work collaboratively. However, this study also found that most teachers believed bonuses were desirable and, when offered a choice, they preferred to receive a reward in form of a bonus rather than have it given to the school improvement fund. Heneman (1999) also found that teachers believed bonus payments to be appropriate, although they believed themselves to be motivated primarily by a desire to help pupils to learn. Heneman and Milanowski (1999) found that when faced with 17 alternative motivators, two sets of teachers rated financial bonuses as among the top three or top five motivators. In an interview-study conducted before the introduction of a scheme, Carter and

Roberto (1992) found that teachers supported the introduction of monetary incentives, and believed that a performance-related pay scheme would increase their effort and have a positive effect on pupil attainment.

Kelley (1999) concludes that financial awards affect behaviour, but indirectly since teachers strive for the public recognition associated with the award, rather than the financial reward itself. Heneman (1999) also found that subjects believed that they were not motivated directly by the financial rewards, but by the recognition, the “thank you”, implied by a bonus payment.

There are only a small number of studies analysing the impact of incentive schemes on teacher effort and behaviour (Burgess et al., 2001). In quantitative studies controlling for a number of other variables, Ladd (1999) and Clotfelter and Ladd (1996) found that a school-level bonus scheme had a positive but limited effect on pupil attainment. The results of a similar study of the impact of incentive schemes on pupil attainment conducted by Cooper and Cohn (1996) were inconclusive. Teachers interviewed by Elmore et al. (1996), after the introduction of a scheme, believed that the scheme had led to an improvement in student writing. Kelley (1998) identified a behavioural effect, in that successful schools had altered their internal organisation, affecting teacher behaviour, to increase the likelihood of getting school-level bonus payments.

A number of undesirable effects following the introduction of incentive schemes have also been identified, including stress and additional pressure, conflict between members of staff, gaming, cheating on exam scores, ‘teaching to the test’, and focusing on particular students to improve results (Cless and Nabors, 1992; Clotfelter and Ladd, 1996; Kelley and Protisk, 1997; Kelley, 1998; Kovetz, 1996).

Murnane and Cohen (1986) found that successful schemes were not designed to nor had they had the effect of altering teaching quality. Rather, their impact had been to enable districts and schools to meet other goals, such as increasing teachers’ incomes, supporting teachers, encouraging dialogue between administrators and teachers about issues relating to quality, and building community support for additional funding. Murnane and Cohen found that some heads used performance-related pay schemes to encourage and to motivate by, for example, awarding higher ratings than warranted by current performance.

3. The UK Performance Threshold

The Performance Threshold was one of a number of education reforms introduced in 2000 (DfEE, 1998). It was designed to affect teacher effort, as well as recruitment into and retention within the profession, by giving teachers a financial incentive to perform well in the classroom.

Prior to the introduction of the Threshold, teachers were paid on a single scale, with nine basic increments. Under the new scheme, teachers who have reached the ninth increment will be eligible to apply to pass the Performance Threshold. To achieve this, teachers have to demonstrate that they have reached acceptable standards in each of five areas: knowledge and understanding of teaching; teaching management and assessment; wider professional effectiveness; professional characteristics; and pupil progress (DfEE, 2000a). If successful, they receive an annual bonus of £2000 (which they will continue to receive until the end of their career, without needing to reapply), and move on to a new, upper pay scale where they will in the future be eligible for further performance-related increments (School Teachers' Review Body, 2000).

The Performance Threshold was introduced alongside other education reforms relevant to its implementation and to this study, including a national compulsory Performance Management system based on a system of annual reviews, and a system of School Achievement Awards (DfEE, 1999). The School Achievement Award is an annual competition, with schools paid awards according to their exam results. Schools are required to distribute the awards to teachers as bonuses (DfEE, 2000b).

A number of UK commentators were critical of the design of the Threshold and believed that it would not motivate teachers to greater effort. Richardson (1999a,b, 2000) argued that, in common with performance-related pay introduced in other parts of the public sector, the Performance Threshold would not motivate teachers to better performance since there are too many different goals, they are not all under the control of individual teachers, and it does not have legitimacy with teachers. Thompson (2000) argues that performance-related pay *per se* is inappropriate since teachers are not motivated by extrinsic rewards but by altruism, by affiliation and by personal growth. In a study of submissions made during the Threshold consultation process, Storey (2000) found widespread opposition to the Threshold based on perceived problems with measuring that which is important in high quality

teaching, perceived practical problems with assessing pupil attainment and concern about its effects on teamwork in schools.

There is very little direct empirical evidence about the impact of performance-related incentives on UK teachers. Two studies have surveyed teacher attitudes to the Performance Threshold scheme. Marsden (2000) surveyed teachers in January 2000, after the scheme had been announced but before details had been published. Most respondents disagreed with the principle of PRP, although it is notable that a minority believed that the proposed salary increase (£2000 per year) would stimulate increased effort. Marsden included questions designed to elicit respondents' 'type' with respect to their commitment to their organisation. He found that most respondents have a high level of commitment, and argues that employees of this 'type' are not likely to be motivated by extrinsic rewards. A second survey of attitudes to the performance threshold was conducted by Purslow (2000) on behalf of a teacher union, the Association of Teachers and Lecturers, shortly after teachers had completed their applications in mid-2000. This survey found that most of the teachers who applied for the Threshold did so to obtain the salary increase or an increase in pension entitlement (71%), and only 16% applied to gain recognition for their work. (This result is contrary to the US results reported above, where teachers stated that they wanted financial rewards for recognition rather than desiring the money.) 41% of the respondents believed that the Threshold standards accurately described good teaching. Marsden and French (1998) conducted a survey of head teachers' perceptions of their own PRP scheme, in existence since 1991. They found that heads valued both monetary and non-monetary rewards. They also found that heads were more positive about the principle of PRP if they had actually received an award, and if their school had engaged in a formal performance review. Most respondents did not believe it had affected their motivation, many because they believed their work was already of an "appropriate standard". Wragg et al. (2001) surveyed head teachers after they had completed the first tranche of Threshold applications, about their views of and experience in implementing the Threshold. They found that most heads believed that it was likely to encourage teachers to keep better records, but was unlikely to have an effect on teaching. 60% of the heads responding to this survey were opposed to the use of performance-related pay in schools, and although 39% were in favour of the principle, this group expressed reservations about the Threshold, since they were concerned about its potential divisiveness and the problems with finding adequate performance indicators.

4. Method

Our study comprised interviews with 25 head teachers in English secondary schools. Head teachers were interviewed since they are in a position to have an overview of the impact of the Threshold in their school, and since they have good information about the nature of the Threshold. In order to address the research question, the impact of the Threshold, the interviews elicited information about schools' internal organisation and incentive structure prior to the Threshold. We asked heads for information about their pre-existing Performance Management system, about the extent and importance of team work in the school, and about how they used financial incentives before the Threshold was introduced. In the light of this baseline, we explored heads' views about the design and likely impact of the Threshold on teacher effort. Because we were interviewing heads, we did not investigate teachers' objectives directly, but instead sought insight into this by focusing on the methods heads used to motivate teachers, including their use of financial incentives. One of the stated aims of the Threshold was to motivate teachers to improve pupil test scores, and this was an area we explored directly and indirectly with head teachers.

The study reported here formed part of a larger study about the impact of the Threshold on pupil attainment (Burgess and Croxson, 2001). We approached heads to participate in the broader study, which required that they supply data as well as being interviewed. By March 2001 we had approached 970 schools, of whom 36 agreed to take part in the full study. We interviewed the first 25 who agreed to take part. Details of the way schools were approached and how the sample was selected are given elsewhere (Burgess and Croxson, 2001).

To gain insight into the reasons for the low response rate we analysed the comments of a self-selected group of non-participants who made comments when they replied. Most of these heads said that they were unable to participate because they did not have the requisite data, because of staff changes because they did not have time (Burgess and Croxson, 2001).

Our sample is likely to be biased towards schools with reasonably good data systems, given the requirements of the broader study. These schools may have particular forms of internal organisation: it is, for example, plausible that they were more likely to have effective Performance Management

systems before the reforms. Comparison with national averages suggests that our sample is typical with respect to the total number of pupils, the number of pupils with special needs, overall achievement in GCSE exams, and selection policy (Burgess and Croxson, 2001). Foundation (formerly Grant Maintained) schools are, however, over-represented in our sample, which is consistent with it having a bias towards schools with particular forms of internal organisation.

Interviews were conducted between September 2000 and March 2001 (one interview was conducted in June 2000). Interviews were therefore conducted after the introduction of the Threshold but, in most cases, before final decisions had been made about whether specific teachers would pass. Pilot interviews were conducted with five schools to explore the context and relevant issues. The results of these interviews were used to construct a semi-structured questionnaire, administered to the rest of the schools. Most interviews were conducted in person, although four were conducted by telephone. Subjects were assured that anything they said would be non-attributable, and confidential. All interviews were transcribed, and analysed using QSR NVIVO. Analysis was conducted after categorising each transcript using categories based on the factors identified as important in determining the impact of financial incentives, outlined in section 2 above. Within each category, major themes and issues were identified, and the responses of each head with respect to these themes compared.

5. Results

The organisation of schools before the Threshold: Performance Management

We explored with heads the nature of their extant system of Performance Management, since it forms an important part of a school's explicit incentive structure. Five schools did not have what their own heads viewed as an effective system of Performance Management when the Threshold was introduced. Four of these heads had deliberately let a previous system lapse in anticipation of the DfEE's Performance Management scheme. Most of the rest of the schools in the sample had a system based on the observation and appraisal of individual teachers. Only five of these schools set teachers targets based on pupil attainment scores as part of the appraisal system. Most of the remainder employed

departmental targets based on exam scores, and in some schools these were devolved to individual teachers although this sometimes varied within schools, by departments.

In most of the schools in our sample the pupil attainment targets used for departments and, in those which set them, for individual teachers', were based on some form of value-added data. Only one of the schools in our sample did not collect and disseminate some form of value-added data, although one other head felt that their information was not in a sufficiently "digestible form" to be useful and another did not feel that all departments collected useful data. Several heads felt that insufficient use was made of the data they did have available, in most cases because it was left to individual departments to determine how it was used.

Most schools set individual teachers 'soft' targets in their appraisals. Schools which set teachers 'hard' pupil attainment targets employed them alongside 'soft' targets to ensure better coverage of relevant outcomes. In two of these schools, heads gave the following examples illustrating targets:

"So we would say every child would take part in some sort of debating competition during a year and every staff had to find a way of doing that." (22)

"It may be something to do with teaching and learning, to widen the style of learning, it could be something perhaps to do with differentiation. It could be something to do with assessment." (29)

Many of the heads who used only 'soft' targets believed they were inadequate, often because they were set by the teachers themselves and heads did not view them as challenging.

"They were fairly bland I suppose. They were comfortable targets: 'I'm going to re-write my departmental handbook'. 'I'm going to introduce this new scheme of work'. And the fact is they were going to do that anyway." (152)

"very very wishy washy. You know 'I'm looking after the stock cupboard'." (12)

A number of heads said that they did not use the Performance Management system to punish poor teachers, noting that this would have been contrary to their system's spirit and would have made it unacceptable to teachers.

“The issue was you didn’t want people to be able to say appraisal was any way threatening. It was meant to be much more supportive.” (4)

“In fact I don’t think we’d have ever got an appraisal system in if we’d done that. It was meant to be wholly supportive.” (50)

Some heads said that although the Performance Management was not used to *punish* poor performing teachers, it was a useful means of identifying and addressing areas of weakness with teachers.

We had in place a system of what we called Team Review but it was supportive Team Review. It was something that was developed with the staff whereby ... departments first of all got together and looked at their agenda for the coming year, set their targets for the coming year, senior managers and heads of department saw every teacher teach twice, reports were made, outcomes were then discussed. The finger wasn’t pointed at individual teachers at the end of that process, but there were departmental targets. And out of it certainly informally some staff received help and support for areas of weakness and that happened.” (29)

“ ... teachers who are not performing as well as they should be or not performing as well as we’d like them to be often know they’re not and need sometimes just to be helped to realise it and helped to overcome it. There are some who confidently believe they’re doing a wonderful job, and if you can prove to them they’re not that’s a useful process. But as I say yes it will be [useful in identifying poor performing teachers], it is going to be, and it has already started to be as in so far as lesson observations have raised questions which people are then interested to try and talk about, discuss and work through.” (4)

Explicit, tangible rewards for meeting targets were not generally part of the Performance Management system. Only one head teacher said that meeting targets was financially rewarded, and they did this for only one year:

“We gave points for excellence on GCSE results. If anyone had outstanding GCSE results they got a one year, one increment.” (45)

Some heads said that they were unable to pay rewards, since they did not have sufficient resources.

“Only the eternal thank you very much you’ve done a great job type of reward. There were certainly no financial rewards; it was not possible.” (114)

“No financial rewards because you know no school has money available.” (22)

“I think the only advantages that ever came out of appraisal as it was, was that somebody who was appraising you would say nice things about you. ... I don't think being made to feel warm and cosy is enough.” (4 – *in this school the scheme had lapsed.*)

Although financial rewards did not usually form part of the Performance Management system, as will be discussed below, a number of schools did employ financial instruments outside the Performance Management system to reward or to motivate teachers.

The impact of the Performance Threshold on school's Performance Management systems

The DFEE introduced a new, compulsory national system of annual Performance Management at the same time as the Performance Threshold. The heads in our sample were able to distinguish the impact of the two, and discuss the impact of the Threshold system on their internal management and incentive systems.

Some heads found that the Threshold process helped them to overcome teacher resistance to goals that they had been working towards for some time, notably routine classroom observation and the introduction of Performance Management. Two heads said that they had used teachers' desire to meet Threshold requirements to overcome their resistance to being monitored.(3) A large number said that it had forced staff to focus on the collection and use of pupil attainment data.

“ I think it has probably highlighted areas that we've already been dealing with in terms of staff development and training within the school. And it's been perhaps a means of ... how can I put it? It's re-introduced awareness, it's raised awareness again of the areas that we already have been looking at.” (29)

“So I suppose it's sharpened up a little bit the individual teachers' knowledge of using data to set targets and to evaluate performance.” (10)

“And suddenly they'd got their brain into gear about the data. Whereas of course it's been quite hard to get some staff to deal with data. So that was very valuable.” (39)

“Yes there have been one or two benefits. It has certainly sharpened up people’s minds with the data. Whilst we’ve been using it for a long time and very extensively I think it’s probably the single thing that has really got everybody on board now.”(7)

One head noted that the Threshold system gave their Performance Management system “a much harder edge” by, in effect, associating funding with a range of targets. She/he said that it would enable them to force gifted teachers to make broader contributions to the school:

“It’s going to be helpful because it’s going to cause these people who perhaps in the past have been sort of charismatic teachers in a certain area but thought that they could not bother with anything else ... you know if you’re going to improve school and continue to improve, there’s got to be consistency right across the board.” (71)

These benefits were not, however, experienced by all schools, notably those with well established Performance Management systems. Some heads in this group said that the Threshold’s design might actually undermine what they had been trying to do with Performance Management in their school. One said that they had been trying to monitor and to improve poor performing teachers by improving their confidence, “without actually saying, you know ‘Your teaching is crap’.”(10) Conversely, another head noted that the DfEE’s message that everyone should pass “doesn’t help us in terms of Performance Management.” (71)

Many heads criticised the way in which the Threshold was introduced before the new Performance Management system was properly established, and argued that the two initiatives should have been fully integrated. They felt that the early introduction of the Threshold was premature, since it meant that staff were poorly prepared for it, and had not had sufficient time to build up portfolios of evidence about their performance. Moreover, they felt that if there were to be financial rewards they should be properly and fully integrated into the Performance Management cycle.

“the logic would be to say we ought to have built up a system of appraisal and teacher interview and target setting, and then looked at whether putting in some sort of barrier which managed to extend the payment for teachers of a certain age, which is what it is, or a certain experience, would have been useful.”(4)

Team-working

The heads of all except one school believed that team-working was important. In some schools team working was the result of a deliberate formal process usually initiated by the head. In one school, for example, the head had been training people to work in teams using a specific management model. In others, it was the result of informal links and relationships between staff, for example:

“it’s a actually small school of course and quite close friendships... someone is getting married and some one is making the dress, someone else is making the cake, someone is organising the printing, you know its like that really. Very, quite, quite a close-knit team.”(152)

It was apparent that heads viewed schools as a whole as teams, as well as recognising that various ‘sub-teams’ existed within schools. The view that schools as a whole were teams was apparent in the answers give when we asked heads how they would allocate funds they might receive under the School Achievement Award, a DfEE scheme under which a lump sum is given to schools with good exam results, which has to be given to staff as bonuses. All said that they would give equal bonuses to all staff since to pay staff unequal amounts would be divisive, although one head said that he/she might be able to justify paying staff different amounts if it was “within an official structure” so that “nobody could argue with it”. A number of heads said that they would include non-teaching staff in any bonus distribution.

“So it’s part of the structures of building up a good team and making sure that everybody’s engaged in what’s goes on. So again, that’s why in a school you have it for the non teaching staff as well as the teachers so that everybody feels that they’re part of the process.” (22)

Heads believed that staff identified with the school as a whole, manifest in the view expressed by some that staff felt collective responsibility for and collective pride in exam results. The head of one high performing school felt that teachers like to be associated with the school’s “visible achievement.” Another said:

“It’s the feel-good factor isn’t it? ... If you have your football divisions, we’re in the Premier Division. And staff like the Premier Division, you know there is among the staff in this school you know there’s a pride.”(26)

The nature of the 'sub-teams' operating within schools varied between schools and between departments. Some subjects in some schools were taught in teams; even without team teaching some heads believed that teams operated mainly within departments. Others believed that they existed across departmental boundaries, sometimes for the provision of particular services, for example, pastoral care.

"They (routinely work together) here. We're a fairly small school and sometimes they're singleton departments so its quite important for people to work together."(102)

The impact of the Performance Threshold on team working in schools

A number of heads were concerned that the Performance Threshold posed a risk to team working in schools, since it was based on individual teacher performance when they felt that pupil attainment was the result of team efforts.

"The difficulty is that teaching and schools are very much team systems. And once you say that a teacher is 'the best' teacher, that says that the next one is second best and the next one is third best, and so on. And I would far rather have a system going forward where all teachers were improving. And even if we looked at a system whereby we were regarding teams - I would have welcomed that more than individuals and rewarding teams for performance. Because they are team efforts. And I think things which come into school which are divisive are not helpful.(29)

"I must say yes, I think there is a risk, but I would hope that management teams in schools can encourage staff in a way that you don't lose the positive aspects of team work and all the rest of it that you had before. Try to get across the message that you know everybody is going to benefit if you still continue to work together. But I don't think there's no risk, I think there is a risk." (71)

Some were concerned that the Threshold would be divisive if some staff passed and others failed, however, one head felt that the risk of internal divisiveness was minimised by the likelihood that most staff would pass the Threshold.

"I mean think of the morale now in a school like this if there were perhaps three or four teachers who failed to get through the Threshold who were not bad teachers, who had not been considered the need to go onto capability procedure and so on, that could have quite a damaging effect on the school." (29)

“If you’ve got all staff in the department on point nine and all apply and it’s perceived as a good department and only four out of the five get through then you will destroy that team.” (18)

“Depends how people respond when the decision is made. Some people have got it and some people haven't got it. Whether there is then going to be a lot of the kind of, you know 'He shouldn't have got it, he doesn't deserve it, I deserve it'. Or whether people feel that the decision's basically the just one. And I think that's also going to depend on numbers. The fact that it looks as though, whatever it is, 80, 90% of teachers put in for it and 80 or 90% of those are going to get through it, I think that won't produce that kind of negative competitive spirit. Because it's not about doing down your neighbour, it's about demonstrating what you do right.” (199)

One head was also concerned that it would reinforce a trend towards secrecy, with teachers not sharing information or ideas.

“We’re seeing this I feel myself with schools and the league tables are brought out ... ‘Well I’m not telling you what I’m doing because I’m better than you’. And the sharing of good practice stopped.”(18)

One head felt that having to identify their individual contribution to pupil attainment had been difficult for some teachers, who were used to seeing themselves as part of a team, and that it may even have been destructive to those team relationships.

“And I think teachers often put themselves down. And I think they found it quite stressful to sort of say ‘I did this’ and ‘I did that’. You know what I mean? You spend a lot of time building team ethos. And then to come along and say ‘I did it’ rather than saying ‘We as a group did it’.”(4)

Although noting the risk, no heads had observed internal divisions, competition, or free-riding in the form of one teacher trying to take undue credit for pupil progress that actually resulted from a team effort. One head noted that the School Achievement Award had helped to maintain the school-wide team:

“I don’t think it’s been divisive in the school so far. I mean it’s helped that we’ve just got the School Achievement Award which actually helps the team bit.” (7)

Other heads protected their school teams by including all staff in the process of preparing for the new systems, including those not yet eligible to apply for the Threshold and, in some cases, non teaching staff (Croxson and Atkinson, 2001).

“I wanted the staff who were not old enough to actually know what the process was – at least for this year so that they would not feel that they were being – that things weren’t being hidden from them. Because I think that its very important that staff don’t feel that there are things going on behind their back.” (114)

“The other thing that we did all the way through was to make sure that we had a Performance Management policy for the non teaching staff in tandem with the teaching staff even though there's no legislation or money for it. But it was a matter of again thinking of the possibility that that might come at some point and keeping them engaged in the school rather than suggesting they were second class citizens in some way. If we were prepared to invest in the teaching staff we should be doing that for the other people.” (22)

Some schools formally organised the Threshold application process by departments, encouraging teachers to go to their Head of Department for advice. A departmentally-based process also operated at an informal level in some schools, with teachers in some departments assisting each other in filling in the forms. This sometimes occurred informally, and sometimes occurred as the result of deliberate action within particular departments, often maths or science, to use particular formats for the application forms and the presentation of data.

“Some departments were set out at the outset to operate on a much more collegiate basis so they were helping each other with the forms. Other departments - or other individual departments because some departments are just one or two anyway - didn't have the opportunity to share expertise or discussion points- were much more individual in the way they approached the forms.” (114)

“Certain departments just kinda got together and you know like: ‘come on folks lets spend a few lunch times kicking ideas around’. It depends where the kettle is where they have their meeting hole. Science department meet in one place and they spent lunch time kicking ideas around - in other departments people went away and did it on their own without really discussing it with their colleagues.” (152)

Many heads said that the fact that pupils are taught by more than one teacher had caused problems during the application process for teachers trying to report pupil performance data, and for them in trying to assess applications. They felt that problems occurred both when pupils were taught by teams of teachers, as was often the case in science, and when they considered that pupil performance in any one year reflected the input of teachers over a number of years.

“That was one of the concerns all the way through, you know if you look at these results, are they due to the teacher who had them this year or the hard work done by the teacher last year?” (152)

“Well that was quite hard, because what impact did an individual have when there may be four teachers, or two teachers with a large number of pupils? And especially if you have no numerical outcomes at Key Stage 4 certainly, then you have some real issues.” (3)

“I don't think (distinguishing teachers' inputs is) possible, apart from a discussion of what goes where. But that's not easy to do. I mean I'm thinking particularly in Science where I can't even identify one pupil with one member of staff because they run on a circuit.”(45)

Some heads responded to this problem by encouraging all teachers having contact with particular groups of pupils to take credit for their results. In the case of explicit team teaching, some schools used internal tests making it possible to identify the performance of pupils in particular subjects.

“Well I just said ‘Put it down. Just put down the information you've got and include it in. I mean if those kids actually did well at the end of the thing you made some sort of contribution towards it so put it down, claim it yourself’, sort of thing.” (10)

“I mean I can see that it might [cause problems] in a situation possibly where there are many teachers who contribute to a child's progress, but mostly even in Science they were still able to say ‘Well I teach this part of’ let's say, ‘Key Stage 4 Science. I teach the Biology aspects of it. And I've got my results for the Biology bits’. And another teacher would be teaching physics bits and would have test results and so on to reflect that.” (12)

The use and effectiveness of financial incentives in schools

Heads in our sample divided into two almost equal groups, depending on whether or not they agreed with the principle of using financial incentives in schools.

Two of those in the first group, who did not agree with the use of financial incentives, held this view because they believed that schools, as non-profit organisations, could not in principle fund performance-related pay.

“We’re not like a commercial firm. If you turn out 20 more widgets then there’s an income source for that to be recycled.” (18)

Most of the heads in this group, however, believed financial incentives to be inappropriate, since they believed that teachers are not directly motivated by financial objectives. As stated by one of these heads:

“I think there's something about the psychology of teaching. People come into teaching for non-financial reasons. So they enjoy being a teacher, and that's more about having a different set of priorities in life. So in some ways they're hard wired... it's easy for a Head Teacher to say this, but I'm sure the rewarding thing for staff is having recognition. So the idea that they would have their worth acknowledged improves the way that people work quite obviously.”(22)

Heads in this group believed that teachers could be motivated by recognising their efforts and making them feel valued, by improving their work environment and by addressing the factors causing them to experience stress or to feel under pressure. Prior to the introduction of the Threshold, some of these heads had been able to mobilise resources to these ends. One had purchased the services of a supply teacher for three days a week, to give staff a degree of flexibility. One had improved the quality of the staff room, believing that morale was improved by giving staff “a decent room to relax in” (12). Another had focused on the quality of support services:

“One of the changes which has occurred in here is we make every effort to use IT or non-teaching staff to take away administration and bureaucracy from staff. So when you go into the classroom everything's working, the IT equipment ... you don't touch it, you go on and do your job and technicians make sure

that it's working... And you know that's been enabled by extra resources and careful planning and not wasting money.” (22)

Heads without surplus resources had taken more modest steps, including providing refreshments on training days and allowing staff to leave early, and sending letters to staff acknowledging their efforts in an endeavour to make them feel “valued”.

A number of the heads in this group said that they had, in the past, given staff extra financial payments. They distinguished, however, between these payments which they said were to reward effort or to redress inequity, and payments designed to motivate staff to better performance, which they disagreed with in principle. Some had used management points to reward staff for excellent performance. One head had used surplus resources to give staff a bonus:

“I think that they have always realised if people do take on additional responsibilities or work hard, or harder than one would anticipate, then we do try to reward them. I think that has always been the culture of the school. I mean when we were grant maintained it was actually possible to give them a Christmas bonus of £100 each.”(71)

“I've got one member of staff who for the last two years has had a point for excellence because of her examination results. I mean she is an outstanding teacher and she's just coming up to Point 9.” (45)

A second group of the heads interviewed for this study did agree with the principle of using performance-related pay to motivate teachers, and believed that properly designed financial incentives could be used to motivate teachers. As stated by two of the heads in this group:

“So I'm not opposed to performance-related pay, per se ... the notion of reward for good behaviour, that's how you motivate children I think. And I don't think adults are any different.”(199)

“I think everybody in life is motivated by money ... so I don't think that teachers are any different.”(67)

Most had used, or would like to have used, financial incentives to motivate teachers. One had recently given a double increment to two teachers, “to motivate them and reward them for hard work and high performance” (199). Like members of the first group, some of these heads described these payments as rewards.

“Well we can reward them ... I mean before we had more flexibility ... when we were a grant maintained school there was more flexibility there. But we tend to reward enterprising teachers now who want to take on additional responsibilities.”(50)

A number of heads said that they had been unable to do use financial incentives because of financial constraints. One head, for example, said that he/she had been unable to use retention points because “I inherited a quarter of a million pound deficit” (114). Another used a business metaphor to describe what she/he would have liked to be able to do:

“What I need to do is pack into that somewhere some sort of ability not only to give them perhaps an in-service, but a reward for their successes, and that’s what we do with other industries, do you know what I mean? You get a bonus ... we’re not talking about stockbroker monies but we’re talking about some sort of way of saying ‘Look, your department’s been successful, you’ve been a very successful value-added member of that department’.” (4)

Heads in this group did, however, argue that to be effective, financial incentives had to be carefully designed, taking into account the constraints existing in schools. They also felt that the design of incentive schemes should take into account other factors that are important to teachers, such as feeling valued and having decent school accommodation. They noted that teachers cannot be motivated to greater effort if they are already working as hard as possible. As stated by one head:

If you say to me ‘do I think the exam results in this school will improve if everybody is paid another £10,000 a year?’, the answer is directly ‘No’, because there is so much that you can do. You know, there is only so much lesson preparation and only so much marking. You know, I mean if I answer it for myself ... if you pay me another £20,000 a year or even £10,000 a year I actually cannot physically do any more work. I don’t have any time in which I can do it, and therefore I won’t do it any better.”(67)

The differences between the two groups of heads do not appear to be substantive. Members of both groups recognised the importance to motivating staff of making them feel valued, of reducing stress, and of improving school accommodation. Members of both groups have used carefully designed financial instruments, in conjunction with other methods, to reward and to directly or indirectly motivate staff. The difference between the groups appears to be in whether they see financial payments as a means of directly motivating staff, or as a means of doing so indirectly, by making them feel valued or rewarded.

The impact of the Performance Threshold on teacher effort

The Performance Threshold is an instrument designed in part to give teachers' a financial incentive to increase their effort and thereby to generate improved pupil attainment. Although some were prepared to wait and see, none of the heads we interviewed was certain that the Threshold would be effective in altering teacher effort in the area of pupil attainment. For some heads this reflected their belief that direct financial incentives are an ineffective means of motivating teachers. They felt that if the government wished to motivate teachers, it should do so by improving morale in the profession, which could be achieved by giving teachers more time for lesson preparation, shorter working hours and improved school buildings and equipment, and of reducing their stress. (The heads did not believe that the Threshold would attract sufficient new recruits to reduce workload.)

“I mean my personal view is that I think in some ways the DfEE and the government have misread the situation because in schools today what we're looking for is more time for in-service training, more time for meetings and so on. And my personal view would be that if there were money around to the tune of £2,000 for each teacher we would have been far better off looking for a package whereby we were looking at pay and conditions, and in fact giving more time for teachers to do preparation or marking or in-service training and holding meetings and so on, rather than going through a Threshold.” (29)

“I mean I think if you asked a teacher what the most frustrating thing is it's not their pay, it's the workload. And I think if the government could do something about workload to put the money in to decrease the workload ... I mean it's a totally unreasonable workload for teachers to deliver what the government want us to deliver.” (7)

A number of those from the group who were positive about using financial incentives to motivate teachers, were critical of the Threshold's design, arguing that it would not motivate teachers to increase effort and to improve pupil attainment, because it did not discriminate sufficiently sensitively between teachers, the assessment is made once-and-for-all, and a number felt that £2000 was not a sufficiently large sum to motivate teachers. Like members of the first group, some members of this group felt that improving pupil attainment requires that the government address issues relating to work conditions rather than teachers' motivation.

“I personally am a supporter of performance-related pay. But I do have some major misgivings about the Threshold Assessment component of it. Because my personal view is that isn't performance pay ...the

system that exists at the moment I feel doesn't discriminate adequately enough. It's discriminatory measure is: is the teacher competent or is the teacher incompetent? For example, you know, if the outcomes of your last evaluation from OFSTED are that your teaching is unsatisfactory then clearly you wouldn't go for a threshold. If you're under current competency procedures then you wouldn't go for the threshold. But other than that it's hard to see who isn't going beyond the threshold. Because everybody seems to be."(26)

"We need to find a way of funding teachers who are in classrooms to stay in classrooms if that's what they want to do. And I know there was an argument that this (PT) might do this for us, I'm not sure it will unless I can see how the next increment points become available. You know this two year delay and whatever else goes on. Because we haven't found a way of making the kudos of staying in the classroom sufficient." (4)

"Because in a sense the money was given before the delivery ... it seems to me that there is no financial incentive to make any progress." (45)

"And, as long as this is not attributable, there are some teachers who don't work very hard, a very small minority don't. And I don't think £2,000 a year will make them work any harder, those people." (199)

"I feel quite passionate about how you could raise achievement and ways of raising achievement. And I think sadly ... they don't have political capital ... a teacher at this school who is a main grade teacher would be in front of classes in a 30 grade week for 27 lessons... Well I think you know if teachers had more time to prepare I think certainly the quality of teaching would improve without any shadow of a doubt." (26)

The criticisms made by heads included criticisms of the way that pupil attainment was defined in the Threshold. Some heads argued that success should be defined broadly, in terms of the development of the pupil as a whole person. They felt that this was particularly the case in subjects such as physical education and for special needs children. Moreover, a number described difficulties in measuring pupil progress in subjects without quantitative indicators of pupil attainment, and in subjects where pupils are taught in teams. One head teacher noted that this problem arises in Art, where there are no exams, but where "they do lovely paintings I think". (49) Some were concerned that targets based on pupil attainment might create perverse incentives.

“I think it sometimes concentrates the mind on the wrong thing in the sense that ... for example if I said ‘Right, I’m expecting 70% of your group to get Grade Cs’, then it might well focus them on Grade Cs at the expense of youngsters who are getting Grade Es up to Grade Ds, or Bs up to As. And I’m a bit concerned that setting targets ... I mean there’s a lot of evidence nationally that setting targets actually skews all of the data for things like 5A-C because people concentrate on that at the expense of pupils with other grades.”(7)

“And this is rewarding, perhaps yes, the good classroom teacher to actually stay in the classroom. But then you’re into the business of actually picking out ‘the best’ teachers, as I said earlier. And so on. And it’s quite subjective, the best classroom teacher. And it depends what the criteria are you’re basing it on. Because some of the things that ... put it like this, you shouldn’t perhaps always value those things which can be measured. There are some things which you cannot measure which are very, very highly valued, as far as I’m concerned.” (26)

Some heads responded to the problems in measuring that which they believed to be important by supporting staff who used ‘soft’ indicators to present pupil progress information in their Threshold applications.

“Now what I would look at there is to say ‘Can we find some other way of measuring what is success in those areas?’ and I think I’d be fairly ... I’ve tried to be fairly open and liberal about what I believe the interpretation of those areas has been. And I’m waiting on my consultant to tell me whether I’ve been too liberal.”(4)

“And I was prepared to accept and I think I have really got no option otherwise, to look at almost what you might describe as anecdotal performance. For example there was one of my staff who teaches PSE [Personal and Social Education] and PE, so in neither case really do they have benchmarks ... as anecdotal evidence of progress, one child who in Year 7 was not prepared to stand up and say anything, but by the time they'd got to Year 9 was prepared to stand up and give a full account of themselves, you know what they like, what they didn't like, where they lived - all this sort of thing. Very good. And this is progress.” (45)

“It’s going to be very, very difficult for people who work largely with pupils with special education needs to demonstrate as much pupil progress. But if that pupil who is being very difficult is now able to manage their behaviour in a more positive and constructive manner, if they’re able to take part in social

activities within the school, if they you know gain in confidence such that they perhaps are prepared to stand on the School Council ... I made it quite clear I was looking for that sort of evidence.” (71)

These critical views of how attainment was measured were not, however, universally held. As noted above, a minority of heads did not have trouble associating value-added with individual teachers, even in subjects with team teaching. One head explicitly stated that she/he thought the Threshold criteria included the right standards; another that although she/he did not think the Threshold would on its own raise attainment, it would promote focus on pupil achievement; and another that it would force staff to focus on students who might previously have been neglected.

“I think it’s helped to focus people’s minds on what is really important in the job. Because I mean whatever else you say about the Threshold Assessments it is looking at the right things. Particularly the standards that look at the classrooms and so on. So there’s a high focus on the right things within the jobs. I think they’re good standards in that sense. And I think the breadth is good. I mean the last standard is a difficult one to measure. But it is looking at the right things within the job.”(7)

“Pupil achievements is on every body’s lips and in every body’s heart as well and there’s obviously a bit more focus because there’s pounds and pennies there now as well.” (52)

“And I think there was even a nugget of truth to say that some people didn’t think real serious school started till you got to GCSE. You know what I mean? That we didn’t really sort of wind up the heat until then. It is now impossible for a teacher not to have ... in fact part of what we expect them to do is to carry a bank of data about students in their mark book, telling what they’d previously achieved and to be looking at targets throughout the year about how a child’s progressing.” (4)

Most heads felt that there were likely to be short run changes in pupil attainment, but they believed that these would be due to factors other than the Threshold. A number felt that any change was more likely to be due to new Performance Management systems than to the Performance Threshold.

“So there’s all sorts of really powerful change agents going on along in there apart from just putting a few more quid in it.” (22)

“Performance management and target setting and that will change things more.” (102)

“Yes. I think so but ... sorry there’s a ‘but’ there in the sense that I think Performance Management is just as likely to without the Threshold ... I don’t think the money itself is that much of an incentive.” (7)

“But I think teachers will constantly strive to improve (attainment) I don't think Threshold will be a major factor in that.” (4)

Some of the heads who did not think the PT would change teacher behaviour in the area of pupil attainment did, however, say that they expected or had observed a behavioural response to the existence of a financial incentive. As stated by one head:

“They're going to want that salary increase, so they will do what they can to get the salary increase.” (39)

One said that she/he had observed some teachers who “worked backwards from the form”, and cited the example of a teacher who started a film club in response to the criterion requiring wider involvement in the school. Others noted that teachers would do what was necessary to pass the threshold, such as keeping better records. A few noted that it might affect the behaviour of teachers not yet eligible for the threshold as they tried to move more rapidly up the scale towards eligibility.

“It may well change the record keeping of teachers if they take advice and start thinking well I might need this piece of evidence in a years time two years time or whatever. They might well improve or change their record keeping process. Whether it will actually change what they're recording as opposed to the fact that they're recording it is one that I'm not so convinced about.” (102)

“And there's no doubt in my mind that the pressure for people to get the increments is going to be on over the next few years because people will say 'Well you know I want to get to that point quicker'. 'If you won't give it to me I'll go to another school that will', that'll be the game.”(199)

Some believed that the way the Threshold was introduced and the stressful process of applying for the Threshold had undermined teacher morale (Croxson and Atkinson, 2001). One head was concerned that this might actually lead to a reduction in teachers' effort.

“Well I think there's bound to be that risk, bound to be. Because if people feel it's not fair or if they feel that it's overly bureaucratic, or if they feel that you know that the wrong people are getting it or that people are getting it for the wrong reasons, all those kind of things will make people cynical and then people will spend more time chuntering about it than actually doing the job. It's back to all the kind of management processes. If people don't feel they're being well treated they're not going to work for you, I don't think.” (199)

By contrast, four heads felt that the additional income, when it was received, would boost morale amongst teachers, because it might make teachers feel “a little bit more rewarded for the work that they're doing.” (3) Two of these noted that this would be the case only if teachers perceived it to be fair, in other words, only if it is neither “one, too hard to get or two, if there’s a view that anybody can get it, therefore it doesn’t matter...” (4)

A number of heads felt that the Threshold was unfair to junior teachers, and that these teachers resented not being able to apply for the Threshold, especially if they felt that they were as good as and working as hard as those teachers who were eligible.

“I just feel that the Threshold Assessment system is unfair in that if it is about access to a higher pay scale, you know, it’s saying that the only way you can gain access ... the only way you can get it is by serving your time. And that, I think in a profession that the central tenor of the profession is student learning, that how can you say that a person who’s been in the profession 5 years isn’t eligible for it. It doesn’t make sense to me.” (26)

“I think they felt aggrieved... Well I've not got many staff in that situation, but I've got one member of staff who for the last two years has had a point for excellence because of her examination results. I mean she is an outstanding teacher and she's just coming up to Point nine... Now I've either got to go down a different route and look at some other way of awarding her, or giving her another management point. In fact what I decided to do was give her another management point, temporarily, so she's eligible to go through the Threshold... its not fair.” (45)

Heads did not, in general, believe that this would demotivate these teachers. Nonetheless, some took active steps to rectify the perceived unfairness, by giving staff who were not eligible to apply for the Threshold additional payments. In one school the governors decided that a teacher who was not eligible should fill in PT application forms, and that she would then be given an additional £2000 per year from the school budget, as if she had crossed the threshold. (152) A number of heads in other schools gave teachers who were not eligible to apply for the Threshold additional discretionary or management points.

6. Discussion

One of the stated objectives of the Performance Threshold was to provide a financial incentive for teachers to increase effort, affecting among other things, levels of pupil attainment. For this to result directly from Threshold payments, teachers would have to be motivated by financial incentives and the *post*-Threshold incentive structure would have to promote constructive effort, in other words it would have to recognise and reward team work where it occurs and it would have to measure the correct outcomes.

The Threshold was not introduced into a vacuum, but rather into schools with existing incentive structures. The nature and effectiveness of these structures varied between schools, evident in the variety of Performance Management systems. It is notable that few used 'hard' targets, none used financial rewards as part of the Performance Management process (although some would have liked to do so), and most viewed their system as a means of "supporting" staff rather than being a way of identifying and penalising poor performers. This suggests that heads viewed their Performance Management systems as a means of sustaining the school as a team. In some schools, heads believed the Threshold complemented their aims for developing their internal systems, by legitimising Performance Management, by promoting the collection and use of attainment data and, in one case, by providing "hard edged" rewards and targets. Other heads, however, felt that the Threshold undermined their own systems.

Most heads viewed the individually-based rewards in the Threshold as posing a risk to team working. None had, however, observed internal conflict resulting from the Threshold. This lack of divisiveness was attributed by some to the fact that most teachers were likely to pass the Threshold. Moreover, heads did not force individual attribution of team-based attainment scores: had they done so they may have engendered competition or free-riding. A number of other factors were active in supporting team working, including the incentives of the School Achievement Awards, supportive Performance Management systems and, as pointed out by one head, careful management.

Heads were divided over whether they believed that financial incentives could be used explicitly to motivate teachers. Some heads believed that teachers were not motivated by financial rewards. Members of this group had, nonetheless, in the past given staff financial rewards which they viewed as a means of redressing unfairness or of recognising effort, in other words, as indirect means of

motivating teachers. This is consistent with the characteristics of “successful” performance-related pay schemes identified in the US by Murnane and Cohen (1986), which gave financial incentives under the guise of meeting other objectives, including rewards for additional effort. Other heads, however, believed that properly designed financial incentives could and should be used to motivate teachers directly. Members of the second group also recognised the importance of addressing factors identified by the first group as motivating teachers, such as feeling valued, minimising stress and adequate school accommodation. It appears, therefore, that there is consensus among heads in our sample that money matters to teachers, but that it is not the only factor that motivates them, although heads differ in whether they would use explicit *ex ante* financial incentives.

The heads were not certain that the Threshold would increase teachers’ effort and, thereby, pupil attainment. A number felt that pupil attainment was likely to change in the short run, but that this was more likely to be the result of other changes, including new Performance Management systems. Some believed the Threshold’s ineffectiveness would result from the ineffectiveness of financial incentives *per se*, others from its design flaws. A number of heads identified problems with the way success was measured in the Threshold criteria, and with the quantification of that pupil attainment. However, it is notable that some heads agreed with the measures of success and had no problems in attributing pupil attainment to individual teachers or with measuring progress. Heads had observed, and expected to observe, some behavioural changes in response to the Threshold. As found by Wragg et al. (2001), heads in our sample did not expect classroom behaviour to change, but they did expect record keeping and the use of data to improve. Some of the heads in our sample thought that behavioural effects might be greater among younger teachers: “Thatcher’s children”.

All of the heads in our sample had reservations about some aspect of the Thresholds as a financial incentive. However, most believed that its true purpose was not to give teachers an incentive to increase effort, but rather to give teachers a payrise in a politically acceptable form. As stated by one head:

“I don’t think the Performance Threshold is anything other, if I’m being crudely honest, to sum it as being an interesting political way of giving teachers 2000 quid on the basis they’re probably Labour voters.” (4)

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