Social exclusion and social solidarity: Three paradigms

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The changes affecting the poor were changes in kind as well as degree, in quantity, in ideas, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, values. They were changes in what may be called the "moral imagination". (Gertrude Himmelfarb, referring to England circa 1760, in: The idea of poverty: England in the early industrial age, pp. 18-19.)

Since the mid-1970s, the advanced capitalist democracies have been undergoing a process of profound economic restructuring. As a consequence, new social problems have emerged that appear to challenge the assumptions underlying Western welfare states. While universal social policies still insure against risks predictable from a shared life-cycle, career pattern, and family structure, a standardized life course can no longer be assumed. More and more people suffer insecurity, are dependent upon "residual" means-tested programmes, or are without any form of social protection. In the countries of the European Union, 50 million people live below a poverty line set at one-half the national median income; 16 million people (10.5 per cent of the workforce) are officially registered as unemployed, of whom more than half have been unemployed for over a year (EC Commission, 1994).

How are we to understand these developments? As Himmelfarb noted, earlier economic and social upheavals brought about a shift in the "moral imagination", giving us the concepts of "poverty" and "unemployment". Similarly, today's transformations are giving rise to new conceptions of social disadvantage: the "underclass", the "new poverty", and "social exclusion". This article traces the evolution of the term "exclusion" over time, notably

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but not exclusively in France. It focuses on definitions of the term indicating its numerous connotations, and distinguishes three paradigms within which social exclusion is embedded (solidarity, specialization and monopoly), presenting the theory underlying each, with clarificatory remarks. Finally, the economic dimensions of the three paradigms are discussed. In conclusion, questions regarding the significance of exclusion in politics and social policy are raised.

The exclusion discourse

Exclusion became the subject of debate in France during the 1960s. Politicians, activists, officials, journalists and academics made vague and ideological references to the poor as les exclus (e.g. Klanfer, 1965). However, the exclusion discourse did not become widespread until the economic crisis. As successive social and political crises erupted in France during the 1980s, exclusion came to be applied to more and more types of social disadvantage (Paugam, 1993; Nasse, 1992) and the continual redefinition of the term to encompass new social groups and problems gave rise to its diffuse connotations.

The identification of exclusion as a social problem occurred just as France was belatedly completing its system of standard social provision and as postwar economic growth was slowing down. The coining of the term is generally attributed to René Lenoir (1974), who was then Secretary of State for Social Action in the (Gaulist) Chirac Government. He estimated that "the excluded" made up one-tenth of the French population: the mentally and the physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, drug addicts, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, marginal, asocial persons, and other "social misfits". All were social categories unprotected under social insurance. Since the mid-1970s, France has introduced numerous policies designed explicitly to combat exclusion of these sorts so that today, the handicapped and single mothers, for example, tend to fall outside both the rhetoric of exclusion and the purview of commissions on "integration" and "insertion".

During the 1970s, the French Left also began to distinguish between objective and subjective exclusion. The latter, drawing upon the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre and the participatory ideology of Catholic social action, referred to alienation and the loss of personal autonomy under advanced capitalism. In stressing subjective exclusion, the discourse moved away from political expressions of class conflict towards the struggles of mass urban and social movements. Exclusion meant being treated as an object – a condition which could apply to virtually any individual or group (Verdes-Leroux, 1978).

If exclusion and "insertion" were used as ideological terms during the 1970s (Paugam, 1993), economic recovery from the oil crisis soon made it clear to the public that some were being excluded from economic growth. As Lionel Stoléru (1977) observed, poverty was a problem that economic
growth could not resolve. Thus, during the late 1970s, the excluded referred
to "the ones that economic growth forgot" (Donzelot and Roman, 1991). By
the early 1980s, the use of the term "insertion" in political discourse shifted
from a focus on the handicapped to young people leaving school without the
adequate skills to obtain a job (Paugam, 1993). Bertrand Schwartz, who
wrote a report, L'insertion professionnelle et sociale des jeunes, for Prime
Minister Pierre Mauroy in 1981, headed a new policy for locally based
programmes for the "insertion" of young people into employment. Over the
next decade and a half, and after street demonstrations by young people
protesting against reforms of church schools and education (1984),
universities (late 1986), and minimum wages (1994), the State instituted a
wide variety of "insertion" policies to help young people in difficulty.

By the mid-1980s, both the Right and the Communist opposition were
blaming the Socialist Government for rising unemployment and what was
being called "the new poverty" (Paugam, 1993). In symbolic politics, the
power to name a social problem has vast implications for the policies
considered suitable to address it. Thus, in response to the opposition's
emphasis on the new poverty and inequality, the Government took to
speaking of "exclusion". The term referred not only to the rise in long-term
and recurrent unemployment, but also to the growing instability of social
bonds: family instability, single-member households, social isolation, and the
decline of class solidarity based on unions, the labour market, and the
working-class neighbourhood and social networks. There were not only
material but also spiritual and symbolic aspects to this phenomenon. As I
will show, this exclusion discourse drew upon the rich Republican rhetorical
tradition of France to describe the difficulty of establishing solidarity
between individuals and groups and the larger society. The prototypical
definitions of social exclusion can be found in the publications of the
Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP) [general planning commission] which
has recognized the State's responsibility to nourish "social cohesion"
(Fragonard, 1993). The current Planning Commissioner, Jean-Baptiste de
Foucauld (1992a, b), argues that preventing exclusion requires a conception
of social justice different from the one underlying the postwar social
consensus which simply insured the population against predictable risks. The
welfare state must bind itself to the ethical and cultural values that define
citizenship not only in the form of rights, but as a particular relation to "the
other". A more personalized, participatory welfare state should rest on new
principles of social cohesion, sharing, and integration. This new citizenship
"enables us to reconcile our tradition of solidarity with the rise of
individualism" (pp. 264-265). In another CGP account (Nasse, 1992),
exclusion is used as a metaphor for the "social polyphony of post-modern
society", for the lack of communication between individuals and groups or
for their mutual incomprehension which prevent them from negotiating on
mutual recognition and a sense of belonging.

The long review by Martine Xiberras (1993) of the sociological
literature upon which this diagnosis was based defined exclusion as the result
of a gradual breakdown of the social and symbolic bonds — economic, institutional, and individually significant — that normally tie the individual to society. Exclusion entails a risk for each individual in terms of material and symbolic exchange with the larger society. In the terms of Durkheimian rhetoric, exclusion threatens society as whole with the loss of collective values and the destruction of the social fabric.

So in this particular case, integration means solidarity, that is, the ability to re-establish mutual recognition by all parties in society. For the regulating State, this would mean the ability to handle the expression of a multitude of beliefs and values (Xiberras, 1993, p. 196).

The emphasis on "insertion" and integration as the appropriate responses to exclusion is reflected in the titles of a wide variety of new social programmes introduced in France during the 1980s. For example, the social activists who advocated the revenu minimum d'insertion (RMI) [minimum income for social integration] adopted the Republican rhetoric of "solidarity", "cohesion", "social bonds", and a "new social contract" in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's sense. One analyst, after claiming to strip away the multiple and ideological meanings of "insertion", then went on to define it as a form of regulation of the social bond and a response to a perceived threat to social cohesion (Paugam, 1993). The discourse was so compelling that, by the 1988 presidential campaign, the electoral manifestos of both Right and Left included proposals for a minimum income to promote "insertion".

However, subsequent political crises served to expand the meanings of exclusion and "insertion". Since in Republican France the Nation and the State are one, les exclus came to mean the "pariahs of the nation", in the words of Paul-Marie de la Gorce. Political and social developments in the 1980s in which the term exclusion came to acquire further nuances of meaning include the rise of xenophobia, open political attacks on immigrants and restrictions on their rights; the consequent emergence of new anti-racist movements like SOS-Racisme and France-Plus, which mobilized mass demonstrations; and the ongoing public debate about integration and Republican values occasioned by some Muslim girls wearing headscarves at their state, non-denominational schools. In January 1990 came the establishment of the Secrétariat Général à l'Intégration [general secretariat for integration], an indication of the sense of crisis in French Republican values.

Finally, exclusion encompassed the issue of the banlieues, the deprived outer suburbs. It became possible to associate the related rhetorics of integration of immigrants, youth problems, and economic exclusion in a spatial sense after a series of violent incidents in suburban housing estates during the 1980s and early 1990s. Residents of these deprived suburbs were increasingly described as "excluded". Through ongoing state decentralization and reform of social and housing services, policies to combat juvenile delinquency, the neighbourhood social development programme (DSQ), and the creation in 1991 of a fully-fledged Ministry for
Urban Affairs, the State sought to combat "urban exclusion" (see Linhart, 1992). Again, programmes were couched in Republican terms: *prêts locatifs aidés d'insertion* [housing loans to assist integration], *fonds de solidarité logement* [solidarity housing funds], and *programme développement-solidarité* [solidarity and development programme], to name but a few.

From France, the discourse of exclusion rapidly spread across the rest of Europe. In 1989, the Council of Ministers of Social Affairs of the then European Community passed a resolution to fight "social exclusion" and to foster integration and a "Europe of Solidarity". The European Commission's 1994 White Paper, *Growth, competitiveness, employment*, called for fighting exclusion and "the poverty which so degrades men and women and splits society in two". Today, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Portugal, France and Belgium in particular, have introduced new institutions to take action on social exclusion (Kronauer, 1993; Kronauer, Vogel, and Gerlach, 1993; Yépez del Castillo, 1993; EC Commission, 1994, 1992, 1991; Room et al., 1992, p. 32; Carton, 1993).

US President Clinton himself took up the rhetoric of exclusion in late 1993 when, speaking of inner city problems, he remarked, "It's not an underclass any more. It's an outer class." But an attentive ear discerns some differences of meaning across the Atlantic. In October 1994, the President remarked, "to rebuild a society that has been pressured both in our inner cities [and] our isolated rural areas is going to take a concerted effort that starts with parents, churches and community groups and private business people and people at the local level. The Federal Government cannot be the salvation of that. We have to rebuild the bonds of society."

**Defining exclusion**

Given the varied usages of the term, one might justifiably ask what precisely is meant by exclusion? The remainder of this paper seeks to answer this question by distinguishing three paradigms within which the notion of exclusion is embedded.

By all accounts, defining exclusion is not an easy task. One European Union document conceded that "it is difficult to come up with a simple definition" (EC Commission, 1992, p. 10). Similarly, a recent review of sociological theories of exclusion concluded:

> In fact, observers agree on only one point: the impossibility of having a single, simple criterion with which to define exclusion. The numerous surveys and reports on exclusion all reveal the profound helplessness of the experts and responsible officials (Weinberg and Ruano-Borbálan, 1993).

Indeed, the CGP in France, although responsible for designing and evaluating policies to combat exclusion, also recognized how difficult it is to define the term and to synthesize existing theories (Nasse, 1992). The CGP's Commission on Social Cohesion and the Prevention of Exclusion concluded that:
Every attempt at establishing typology is inevitably reductionist, and all the more so in cases of excluded population groups or those facing exclusion. The factors bringing about exclusion—whether originating in individual, family or socio-economic circumstances—are numerous, fluctuate and interact in such a way that, often, they end up by reinforcing each other (Fragonard, 1993).

Thus, exclusion appears to be a vague term (Mongin, 1992, p. 8), loaded with numerous economic, social, political, and cultural connotations and dimensions. Despite attempts at official definitions,

... in the end, the notion of exclusion is permeated with both sense and nonsense and is liable to misinterpretation: after all the concept can be made to express pretty well anything, including even the pique of someone who cannot get everything he wants (Julien Freund, in Xiberras, 1993, p. 11).

Clearly, the expression is so evocative, ambiguous, multidimensional and elastic that it can be defined in many different ways.

Yet the difficulty of defining exclusion and the fact that it is interpreted differently according to context and time also can be seen as an opportunity. The discourse of exclusion may serve as a window through which to view political cultures. This paper argues that exclusion is polysemic, i.e. it has multiple meanings and therefore requires extensive semantic definition (Riggs, 1988). The different meanings of social exclusion and the uses to which the term is put are embedded in conflicting social science paradigms and political ideologies.

Thomas Kuhn describes a paradigm as "a constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given community" (1970, p. 175). Paradigms "specify not only what sorts of entities the universe does contain but also, by implication, those that it does not" (p. 7). In effect, they are ontologies that render reality comprehensible and that mingle elements of what "is" and what "ought to be". When paradigms conflict, practitioners speak from incommensurable viewpoints using the same language to mean different things.

In what follows, I introduce three paradigms of social exclusion and indicate how each accounts for economic disadvantages like poverty and long-term unemployment.

Exclusion in French Republicanism

Whereas poverty and inequality have become accepted concepts in social science, it is more accurate to consider the term "exclusion" as a

1 They also refer to "concrete puzzle-solutions which, when employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175). From such exemplary studies or scientific practices spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research. They are sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity and sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the new group of practitioners to resolve (p. 10). Paradigms provide a criterion with which to select for consideration problems that, so long as the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions (p. 37). In brief, they guide a scientific community’s research.
"keyword", in Raymond Williams' sense (1985), in French Republican discourse. It not only originated in France, but is deeply anchored in a particular interpretation of French revolutionary history and Republican thought. From this perspective, "exclusion" is conceived not simply as an economic or political phenomenon, but as a deficiency of "solidarity", a break in the social fabric (CGP, 1992).

The moral discourse of "social solidarity" rejected both liberal individualism and political representation (or citizenship) as sufficient bases for defining social integration. Rather, it sought a "third way" that would reconcile individual rights with state responsibility and socialist rejection of exploitation (Procacci, 1993; Ruano-Borbáлан, 1993; Berstein and Rudelle, 1992). The concept of "poverty" which originated in the United Kingdom was discredited in France by its association with Christian charity, the ancien régime, and utilitarian liberalism. Socialists incorporated "poverty" into the broader category of "inequality", making it a labour issue. Republicans, however, rejected both liberal individualism and socialism in favour of the distinctively "social" idea of "solidarity", which legitimized the Third Republic.

Seeing the State as the embodiment of the General Will of the Nation and the moral duties of citizens, Republican solidarity justified the establishment of public institutions to further social integration. Under that banner, French "social policies became parts of a more general rationalization of collective authority" (Ashford, p. 48). In France, social security did not result from working-class struggles or from the overwhelming rise in poverty and urban misery, as it did in the United Kingdom (Hatzfeld, 1971). Rather, social reform expressed the perfection of Republican democracy and the collective responsibility for any citizen suffering from the failures of the State. The idea of social solidarity allowed the State to assume responsibility for social aid. In the Revolutionary rhetoric, equality meant that the Republic must promise citizens subsistence or assure them a right to work. In return, assisted citizens have a duty to work and to participate in public life.

Solidarity mingled notions of Catholic charity with Revolutionary rhetoric on fraternity and nineteenth-century working-class mutual aid. In contrast to traditional Christian charity, solidarity had a philanthropic or humanist element based on compassion, equality, and a more secular morality. Coined by Pierre Leroux and propagated by Léon Bourgeois, the term solidarity was more humanist than it was organic in its reconciliation of the feeling of belonging to the collectivity with the demand for individual fulfilment. Thus, solidarity had both a subjective aspect in individual experience, borrowed from liberalism, and an objective component.

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2 Individualism characterizes both neo-classical economics and liberal political doctrine. Just as Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a seminal Republican thinker, so John Locke and other liberal contract theorists made seminal contributions to liberalism. As I indicate below, "social liberalism" developed later in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and includes John Stuart Mill, L. T. Hobhouse and American Progressive thinkers among its early theorists.
grounded in socialism and expressed in principles of social and political organization. The mutual aid movement contributed the notion that solidarity comes from the society, justifying social protection policies. From the sentimental vision of the social bond as sympathy, solidarity developed into a logical, secular moral system of rights and duties underlying future social policies. The work of Emile Durkheim was “the climax of a long intellectual struggle to demonstrate the interdependence of social solidarity” (Chevallier et al., 1992, p. 39).

Indeed, reconciling the needs of State and society was a constant preoccupation of nineteenth-century French political philosophers (Ashford, 1986). Since that time, the Republic sought to create a “social bond” (lien social) with the poor, a bond which is central to the Republican concept of solidarity. In Revolutionary thought, the social bond created a “quasi-contract uniting the individual to the species and to the collectivity of his peers” (see Berstein and Rudelle, 1992, p. 193). Rousseau, who coined the term lien social in Chapter 5 of the Manuscrit de Genève, saw the social bond as natural and, hence, communitarian. The Law and the General Will would bring about a distinctively “social” conviviality that went beyond formal, civil or legal equality (Farrugia, 1993). As Rousseau argued in The social contract, the State is composed “of morality, of custom, above all, of public opinion”. Over time, Republican solidarity came to encompass cultural as well as political criteria of citizenship (Nicolet, 1982; Berstein and Rudelle, 1992; Roy, 1991).

Indeed, the State defends the superior interests of the Nation – the General Will – over those of the communes and ethnic groups (Nicolet, 1982). According to Republican values, les moeurs republicaines, individual citizens are less bearers of rights than participants in a communal civil life, a public life of fraternity (Rosanvallon, 1992). Such moral unity and equality demanded abolition of feudal representative bodies that competed with the State for citizens’ loyalty and in fact oppressed individuals. Throughout the nineteenth century, the laws on association were a major preoccupation in France until the passage in 1901 of the law on associations which created public bodies that shared the legal and moral authority of the State in return for registering and then submitting to state regulation (Ashford 1986). The law officially recognized religious and voluntary associations partly in order to control and relegate them to the private sphere. Whereas social integration under the old regime rested on the Estates (les états), the State (l’État) became the new basis for social integration (Nicolet, 1982). This “Jacobin” State – strong, unitary, centralized, egalitarian, universalist, and secular – actively sought to assimilate regional, national, and religious cultures into a single, distinctive conception of citizenship and national civilization. The State incorporated mediating institutions in order to reconcile and synthesize separate interests and memberships (Rosanvallon, 1992).

The term “social bond” is most fully discussed in Durkheim’s Division of labour in society where the term “solidarity” specified two sorts of social
bond, the organic and the mechanical, that morally regulated individual behaviour. Solidarity referred to distinctively "social" relations, in contrast to political or market relations. Thus, Durkheim rejected liberal, individualist, utilitarian, or "Anglo-Saxon" notions of the social contract, in which social relations are economically motivated, commercial, and competitive, the State is minimal, and interested free exchange and cultural and political pluralism are valued (Farrugia, 1993).

Three paradigms

In contrast with these distinctive French Republican conceptions, challenges to Republican ideology and the adoption of exclusion discourse in other national contexts imparted meanings to the term more properly considered within other paradigms of social disadvantage. For example, liberal reconstructions of exclusion concentrate on various forms of discrimination, isolation, and the cross-cutting or cumulative personal characteristics of excluded individuals which are often generalized into the idea of an "underclass". The European Union increasingly uses an evolving, social democratic notion of exclusion based on T. H. Marshall's idea of social citizenship, recentering the term to notions of inequality and the discourse of social rights.

For this reason, the threefold typology of the multiple meanings of exclusion presented here distinguishes between different theoretical perspectives, political ideologies, and national discourses (see table 1). Based on different notions of social integration, I call these types the solidarity, specialization, and monopoly paradigms. Each paradigm attributes exclusion to a different cause and is grounded in a different political philosophy: Republicanism, liberalism, and social democracy. Each provides an explanation of multiple forms of social disadvantage – economic, social, political, and cultural – and thus encompasses theories of citizenship and racial-ethnic inequality as well as poverty and long-term unemployment. All three paradigms are cast into relief when contrasted with conservative notions that present social integration in organic, racial, or corporatist terms and with neo-Marxist conceptions of the capitalist social order which deny the possibility of social integration to begin with.

Exclusion not only varies in meaning according to national and ideological contexts. Another reason it is difficult to define is that the empirical referents of the idea of exclusion are not always discussed in that terminology. The concept – if often conflated with the new poverty and inequality, discrimination and the underclass – is also expressed in such terms as superfluity, irrelevance, marginality, foreignness, alterity, closure, disaffiliation, dispossession, deprivation, and destitution. This means that exclusion must also be analysed "onomasiologically", defining the same concept with reference to more than one term (Riggs, 1988). Identifying the many synonyms of exclusion makes it possible to delimit the term conceptually and empirically.
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<th>Table 1. Three paradigms of social exclusion</th>
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The multiple, often contradictory, connotations and synonyms of exclusion transform it into an “essentially contested concept”. in that the proper use of it “inevitably involves endless disputes” (Gallie, 1956). Essentially contested concepts are usually appraising, complex, open in meaning, and explicable in terms of their parts, so that selecting from among the mutually exclusive meanings of exclusion necessarily entails the adoption of particular values and world views. Prior to recasting social exclusion as a general phenomenon or a scientific concept transcending national and political contexts, the values underlying its usage should be made explicit in order to clarify the implicit objectives of anti-exclusion policies.

Indeed, the use of the term exclusion to denote the changing nature of social disadvantage in the West may have important political implications. On the one hand, by highlighting the generalized nature of the problem, the idea of exclusion could be useful in building new broad-based coalitions to reform European welfare states. On the other hand, exclusion discourse may also ghettoize risk categories under a new label and publicize the more spectacular forms of cumulative disadvantage, distracting attention from the general rise in inequality, unemployment, and family dissolution that is affecting all social classes. In fact, by recasting the rationale for social solidarity, it may inadvertently undermine consensual support for older welfare state schemes, much as distinguishing the unemployed from the poor created two-tiered welfare states in the United Kingdom and the United
States. Thus, just as the idea of exclusion reflects different notions of social integration, solidarity, and citizenship, it can also serve a variety of political purposes.

Exclusion and integration

Those unfamiliar with the term exclusion often ask the question "exclusion from what?" since virtually any social distinction or affiliation excludes somebody. In the United States, for example, the term calls to mind exclusionary immigration policy, exclusionary zoning, and exclusionary social clubs. But, by comparison with France, the English-speaking countries use the rhetoric of exclusion relatively rarely. Yet consider just a few of the things the literature says people may be excluded from: a livelihood; secure, permanent employment; earnings; property, credit, or land; housing; the minimal or prevailing consumption level; education, skills, and cultural capital; the benefits provided by the welfare state; citizenship and equality before the law; participation in the democratic process; public goods; the nation or the dominant race; the family and sociability; humane treatment, respect, personal fulfilment, understanding.

At the heart of the question "exclusion from what?" lies a more basic one, the problem of social order during times of profound social change in society. Just as the ideas of poverty and unemployment emerged from the great transformations of earlier centuries as did the first sociological accounts of social order to address them, so under contemporary conditions the notion of exclusion calls for an account of social inclusion. In this case, theories of "insertion", "integration", "citizenship", or "solidarity" provide points of reference, making it possible to identify three paradigmatic approaches to exclusion: solidarity, specialization, and monopoly.

Solidarity

In French Republican thought, as mentioned, exclusion occurs when the social bond between the individual and society known as social solidarity breaks down. Adumbrated by Rousseau and exemplified by Durkheimian sociology, the "social" order is conceived as external, moral, and normative, rather than grounded in individual, group, or class interests. A national consensus, collective conscience, or general will ties the individual to the larger society through vertically interrelated mediating institutions. The

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1 Conventionally, solutions to the problem of order come under one of two perspectives. In the first, social integration is externally imposed on individuals; in the second, social integration grows out of voluntary interaction between individuals. This distinction between the coercive and the voluntaristic nature of social integration corresponds to other dualisms in the social sciences (see Alexander, 1992; Lamont and Fournier, 1992). These basic dualisms are reflected in two of the paradigms I propose (exclusion as a basis of monopoly and as a basis of specialization): exclusion as a consequence of solidarity represents the French attempt to steer a "third course" between these two polarities.
approach lays heavy emphasis on the ways in which cultural or moral boundaries between groups socially construct dualistic categories for ordering the world.

Like deviance or anomie, exclusion both threatens and reinforces social cohesion. The inverse of exclusion is thus "integration" and the process of attaining it, "insertion". In a Durkheimian sense, this implies assimilation into the dominant culture; however, most recent uses of the term are post-modernist in that they incorporate multicultural notions about how the basis of solidarity is reconfigured, as the dominant culture adjusts to the minority culture as well as the reverse (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration. 1992. 1991).

This paradigm draws heavily on anthropology, sociology, ethnography, and cultural studies generally. It focuses attention on the exclusion inherent in the solidarity of nation, race, ethnicity, locality, and other cultural or primordial ties that delimit boundaries between groups. Yet applications go beyond analyses of Republican citizenship, ethnic conflicts, and deviance to include discussion of cultures of poverty and long-term unemployment and of trends toward "flexible specialization" in political economy.

Specialization

In Anglo-American liberalism, exclusion is considered a consequence of specialization: of social differentiation, the economic division of labour, and the separation of spheres. It assumes that individuals differ, giving rise to specialization in the market and in social groups. It is thus individualist in method, although causation is situated not simply in individual preference but also in the structures created by cooperating and competing individuals – markets, associations, and the like. Liberalism thus conceives of the social order, like the economy and politics, as networks of voluntary exchanges between autonomous individuals with their own interests and motivations.

Specialized social structures are comprised of separate, competing, but not necessarily unequal spheres, which leads to exchange and interdependence between them. Social groups are voluntarily constituted by their members, and shifting alliances between them reflect their various interests and wishes. This gives rise to cultural and political pluralism. Liberal models of citizenship emphasize the contractual exchange of rights and obligations and the separation of spheres in social life. Thus, exclusion results from an inadequate separation of social spheres, from the application

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1 Nasse (1992) maintains that liberal individualist conceptions of society use "insertion" to mean making room beside others or placing them side by side, while Durkheimian cultural and normative conceptions use the term "integration" to mean "assimilation". However, a content analysis of ten years of the French press found that the term "integration" was used synonymously with "insertion" and "adaptation", with little reference to who was being integrated into what (Barou, 1993). "Insertion" also has multiple meanings (Paugam, 1993; Commissariat Général du Plan, 1993). For example, a CGP committee on "insertion", realizing that the term was never clearly defined in law, fell back on an admittedly unsystematic classification of a "pluridimensional concept" (Commissariat Général du Plan, 1993).
of rules inappropriate to a given sphere, or from barriers to free movement and exchange between spheres.

Because of the existence of separate social spheres, exclusion may have multiple causes and dimensions. The same individual may not be excluded in every sphere. Nor are social spheres and categories necessarily ordered hierarchically in terms of resources or value. Specialization protects liberties and may be efficient, as long as excluded individuals have the right to move across boundaries. Individual freedom of choice based on diverse personal values and psychological motives for engaging in social relations should give rise to cross-cutting group affiliations and loyalties contributing to the integration of society. To the extent that group boundaries impede individual freedom to participate in social exchanges, exclusion is a form of "discrimination". However, group and market competition and the liberal State's protection of individual rights impede the operation of this form of exclusion.

In social science, liberal individualism is often reflected in methodological individualism which treats group characteristics as individual attributes. Liberal individualism underlies neo-classical economics, theories of political pluralism, rational and public choice theories, and mainstream sociology. It encompasses two streams of thought: libertarian or neo-liberalism and social or communitarian liberalism.

**Monopoly**

Finally, the third paradigm, influential on the European Left, sees exclusion as a consequence of the formation of group *monopoly*. Drawing heavily on Weber and, to a lesser extent, Marx, it views the social order as coercive, imposed through a set of hierarchical power relations. In this social democratic or conflict theory, exclusion arises from the interplay of class, status, and political power and serves the interests of the included. Social "closure" is achieved when institutions and cultural distinctions not only create boundaries that keep others out against their will, but are also used to perpetuate inequality. Those within delimited social entities enjoy a monopoly over scarce resources. The monopoly creates a bond of common interest between otherwise unequal insiders. The excluded are therefore simultaneously outsiders and dominated. Exclusion is combated through citizenship, and the extension of equal membership and full participation in the community to outsiders.

These processes of social closure are evident in labour market segmentation. The particular boundaries of exclusion may be drawn within or between nation-states, localities, firms, or social groups. Whatever the nature of the boundary, the overlap or coincidence of group distinctions with inequality — "the barrier and the level", to adopt Gobelot's (1925) terms — is at the heart of the *problématique* of this paradigm.
Clarification

A number of remarks are in order, before applying these paradigms to the question of economic exclusion set in the context of these paradigms. The paradigms are, of course, ideal types – in reality, different societies and cultures define "belonging" in their respective ways. For this reason, defining exclusion with reference to its opposite can pose its own problems. This is not simply because social integration necessarily coexists with exclusion, both being relative concepts (Xiberras, 1993, p. 25). If this were the only issue at stake, the relationship between exclusion and integration might seem to be zero-sum, by definition. In fact, only the monopoly paradigm posits that integration makes it easier to exclude others – through greater social control or state power (Touraine, 1992). Rather, the problem with considering the reverse of exclusion is that such a concept implies that a clear political consensus exists within nation-states as to the nature and bases of citizenship, integration, and membership of society.

I wish to argue, on the contrary, that fighting exclusion means different things to different people. Moreover, at various times, national debates have emphasized some aspects of exclusion and not others:

Sometimes the emphasis is on migration and refugees (e.g. Belgium, Germany), sometimes on long-term or extremely long-term unemployment and exclusion from the labour market (e.g. Denmark, France, the Netherlands); or on the problem of low income (Portugal). Discussion is sometimes directly linked to specific policy-making, as is the case with the guaranteed minimum income (France, Spain) or it can be part of a more general consideration of the functions of the welfare state (United Kingdom: Citizens' Charter) or be used in policies discouraging the passivity engendered by certain forms of social protection (Denmark, the Netherlands, United Kingdom). It is sometimes fuelled by campaigns run by associations or the media, which focus on particularly visible problems or those which in any case catch the public eye, such as the homeless (France. United Kingdom), drugs (Italy), child labour (Portugal), and inner-city crisis (France) (EC Commission, 1992, p. 32).

Although the cultural embeddedness of the concept of exclusion makes the development of legitimate cross-national indicators more difficult than those of the development of similar indicators for measuring poverty or unemployment, the paradigms do illuminate the reasons underlying the contested and selective meanings of the term. Choosing one definition means accepting the theoretical and ideological "baggage" associated with it.

Second, as is appropriate for a sociological analysis, each of these paradigms presents exclusion as a social relationship between the included and the excluded. That relationship may derive from social action, from the activity of excluding, thereby calling attention to the actors responsible. But does exclusion refer only to a change in the condition of those who were integrated, or can it refer to the constant condition of excluded people who wish to be included? In so far as exclusion is a process, analysts should specify its beginning as well as its end.
Observers who insist that exclusion is only a dynamic process (rather than an identity or a condition) miss the structural outcome of the process. The institutionalization of exclusion may create a social boundary or a permanent division between the “ins” and the “outs”. It may take the form of social distancing over time or of social distance at any one point in time. The action of exclusion becomes structural when it is repeatedly confirmed through social relations and practices. Turnover among the individuals who are excluded does not alter the structural existence of the social boundary. Indeed, its social reality is confirmed when movement across the boundary provokes reactions like distancing, fear, or new legal barriers. Collective reactions like these properly belong in any study of exclusion. To be sure, the excluded themselves need not constitute a social group with common consciousness, goals and activities. In fact, the very differentiation and isolation of the excluded may be responsible for their collective inability to demand inclusion on their own. In this respect, as in others, social exclusion can also be a condition.

Nevertheless, exclusion should not be confused with social differentiation *per se*. If the existence of social groups necessarily implies the existence of boundaries, it is less clear that every difference or distinction implies exclusion. Exclusion may be based on virtually any social difference, but the extent to which differences produce exclusion depends on such issues as the permeability of boundaries, the extent to which membership is freely chosen, and whether, as in John Rawls’s principle of difference or Adam Smith’s division of labour, distinctions have any social benefits (Wolfe, 1992). Indeed, some marginal or deviant individuals may not want to be included; they can deliberately choose to be social drop-outs (Room, 1992; Xiberras, 1993). These issues should be explored rather than defined out of the scope of scrutiny.

Third, exclusion can be viewed macro-sociologically or micro-sociologically. Achille Weinberg and Jean-Claude Ruano-Borbálan (1993) distinguish between macro and micro causes in contrasting exclusion from “above” and “below”. “Top-down” perspectives may view exclusion as an employment crisis, or as a crisis of ineffective immigration and social policies, or as a crisis in the integrative social institutions of the nation generally. They emphasize macro-sociological phenomena like modernity, cosmopolitanism, and individualism, or increasingly global, mobile labour markets, and technological innovation. In contrast, local and communitarian “grass-roots” perspectives cast exclusion as a crisis of community solidarity and social regulation, with micro-sociological processes of assimilation, downward mobility, or social isolation as a person is gradually excluded from a job and other social relations.

Fourth, the distinctions between paradigms should not be confused with institutional classifications, like types of welfare state. Institutions are

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5 For example, Jean-Baptiste de Foucauld, the current Planning Commissioner in France, argues that “being excluded is not a form of identity but the result of a process” (in Nasse, 1992, p. 6).
historical accretions that bear the imprint of past conflicts between ideologies and paradigms. To say, for example, that the French Republic institutionalized Republican ideas implies that during a given period of institution-building a popular coalition was formed around a particular ideological consensus. However, other coalitions contested these ideas and, to the extent that they too had influence, the law, the welfare state, and other social institutions incorporated their different ideas as well.

Fifth, all three paradigms must be distinguished from organic approaches to social integration. The solidarity, specialization, and monopoly paradigms of social integration fall within the spectrum of mainstream sociological thought which attributes greater scope and autonomy to civil society relative to the State and market than do other paradigms. Indeed, the discipline of sociology (and its central concern with integration) developed to provide an alternative explanation of the social changes brought about by the democratic and industrial revolutions to those offered by utilitarian liberalism and socialism, as well as reactionary thought. However, where democracy and industrialization came late, as in Germany, Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and many less developed countries, other less sociological conceptions of social integration took hold. In some places, traditional conservative, pre-industrial, and corporatist notions of integration degenerated into justifications of authoritarianism and fascism. In the postwar era in particular, Christian Democracy and societal corporatism tempered organicist thought with a recognition of individual rights and tolerance of ideological and religious rivals. Indeed, some analysts classify France in this category, merging Republican ideology with Christian Democratic or neo-corporatist thought (Esping-Andersen. 1991). Finally, some "plural societies" developed a form of stable consociational democracy in which elites compromise and check one another's power on behalf of distinct social segments. These alternative notions of social integration took hold in both European and Third World contexts.

Organic models of social integration are often contrasted with liberal and Marxist paradigms, whose pitfalls – extreme individualism or extreme collectivism – they seek to avoid. Yet, like those paradigms, organic models are empirical, normative, and methodological; they describe social reality, provide conceptions of what a good society should be, and offer a selective strategy of analysis (Stepan, 1978; Lijphart, 1977). Although organicism is often considered conservative, these paradigms may in fact call for state intervention to restructure the established society and institute changes in the pursuit of social justice. Thus, organicism and Catholicism in a context of entrenched privilege may actually be radical.

What most distinguishes organic approaches is less their politically conservative or centrist tendencies than their seeking to construct a social order based on groups, be they functional, regional, or primordial (on ethnic, religious or linguistic bases). Within this broad range of thought, three streams can be identified: Christian Democratic (societal or neo-corporatist); state corporatist; and consociational. Although they differ
in the emphasis they accord to individual rights and group autonomy, all reflect to some degree the principles of "community" and "subsidiarity".

The vision of a harmonious community is classically expressed in Leo XIII's encyclical, *Rerum Novarum* (1891), in which it is denied that class conflict is necessary. Liberalism and capitalism encourage class struggle because of insufficient state intervention, while socialism entails an overreaching of the State into autonomous spheres. Subsidiarity is the term used in Catholic social thought for the notion that "it is an injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies" (Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, 1931). While Protestant Reform churches speak of "sovereignty in one's own circle", thereby emphasizing the separate and exclusive (if limited) responsibility of the individual and small group, the Catholic formulation stresses "the inclusion of these small units of society in greater wholes, within which, however, they have a sphere of autonomy on which they have a right to insist. The responsibility for what can be done at lower levels must not be allowed to gravitate to the top" (Fogarty, 1957, p. 41).

Christian principles of social integration imply a particular perspective on the issue of exclusion. On the one hand, the State has the responsibility to ensure personal development and thus social, political, and civil rights for all. On the other hand, the inequality inherent in horizontal pluralism is also justified. Thus, if the pre-labour-commodification "corporatist-statist legacy" — feudal paternalism, patronage, and clientelism; corporativism of cities, guilds, and friendly societies; and Bismarckian statism — justified the earliest welfare states, it also shaped the tendency of Christian Democratic welfare states to preserve differentials between social classes, occupations, and status groups as well as to support the traditional family (Esping-Andersen, 1991). Thus, this paradigm recognizes the exclusion of those not organically integrated into the various smaller, autonomous units of society that make up the greater whole — families, communities, classes, nation-states, and so on — but is less cognizant of gender and economic inequality as causes of exclusion.

By contrast, Roman law recognized no individual freedom of association. The only legal organizations were those officially recognized by the State on the basis of *lex specialis*, or "privilege" (Stepan, 1978, p. 38). Thus, the State legitimately shapes the structure of civil society so that functional parts are integrated into an organic whole. In return for a corporate charter, associations have an obligation to the State to perform a public service. In this, organic statism differs from Republicanism. Indeed, in the second preface to *The division of labour in society*, Durkheim rejected state corporatism because controls on worker and other associations made them part of the official administration, restricted meaningful participation, and implied coerced integration rather than integration through the collective conscience.

Several weaknesses in the organic-statist model produce what might be called "social exclusion". First, there is no clear justification for recognizing
some groups rather than others. For example, the paradigm privileges functional groups over groups based on primordial (e.g. ethnic, religious, regional, or linguistic) identities, which are thus excluded. Second, it is unclear why vertical functional associations, with elite representatives, are privileged over horizontal, decentralized, participatory and membership organizations, like community groups, which can be considered as excluded. Third, if functional groups are indeed granted autonomy, there is little to prevent some groups – particularly those with the initial hold on power – from gaining control over others, thus undermining the presumption of organic harmony. This inequality in civil society can also produce social exclusion. Finally, while the State’s concern with the integration of parts of society can lead to top-down control of functional groupings, undermining their autonomy, dependent States may find it difficult to integrate multinational capital within national corporatist structures. In such a case, workers in the export sector would be “excluded” from bargaining rights.

In sum, unlike liberalism, Christian Democracy is “personalist” rather than individualist and, unlike socialism, is “pluralist” rather than collectivist. Similarly, consociationalism, by checking the power of majorities, guarantees groups the autonomy to run their internal affairs within nation-states. And corporatism (organic statism, to use Stepan’s terminology), rests upon official state recognition or “chartering” of mediating associations which are thus centrally coordinated and controlled for the public good, which contrasts strongly with their free, competitive, interest-based operation in liberal pluralism or their suppression under command socialism.

Finally, each paradigm addresses more than one dimension or aspect of exclusion: economic, sociological and interactional, cultural and political. Thus, the paradigms cut across the social sciences. This interdisciplinary approach differs from prior classifications of theories of exclusion, which focus on conditions in one country, usually France, or on one discipline, especially sociology (Nasse, 1992; Xiberras, 1993; Weinberg and Ruano-Borbálan, 1993). Although each paradigm includes theories drawn from economics, political science, and anthropology, I also stress sociological theories because the concepts of exclusion and integration are central to that discipline.

Even when social exclusion is defined in global terms, research tends to be more sectoral, focusing on a specific population identified as being at risk of exclusion. Thus, empirical studies of exclusion may draw on more than one paradigm, although they tend to emphasize one over the others. The research literature on exclusion includes studies of the following specific social categories: the long-term or recurrently unemployed; those employed in precarious and unskilled jobs, especially older workers or those unprotected by labour regulations; the low paid and the poor; the landless; the unskilled, the illiterate, and school drop-outs; the mentally and physically handicapped and disabled; addicts; delinquents, prison inmates, and persons with criminal records; single parents; battered or sexually abused children, those who grew up in problem households; young people; those lacking work experience or qualifications; child workers; women;
foreigners, refugees, immigrants; racial, religious, and ethnic minorities; the disenfranchised; beneficiaries of social assistance; those in need, but ineligible for social assistance; residents of rundown housing or disreputable neighbourhoods; those with consumption levels below subsistence (the hungry, the homeless, the Fourth World); those whose consumption, leisure, or other practices (drug or alcohol abuse, delinquency, dress, speech, mannerisms) are stigmatized or labelled as deviant; the downwardly mobile; the socially isolated without friends or family.

These absolute and relative social disadvantages may occur simultaneously. Indeed, the extent to which these dimensions overlap is a frequent subject of research on exclusion. Some find very weak correlations between the types of exclusion (Wuhl, 1992). But others conceive of exclusion as the accumulation of such disadvantages, as the last stage in a process of social disqualification (Paugam, 1993). For example, those born into certain groups, with a particular upbringing, education, family or work history may in a sense be doubly or triply excluded. However, the disproportionate representation of people with these social characteristics among the “excluded” does not imply that these characteristics determine whether any given individual is excluded. One needs to examine the incidence of these attributes in the included population as well. Some individuals with such characteristics do make their way into secure, well-paid employment, stable families, political participation, and the like. Provided turnover is ensured, there need be no “hard-core” group of excluded people.

Economic exclusion

The three paradigms may be illustrated with theories addressing the economic dimension of exclusion. Although the discipline of economics is less prone to paradigm conflicts than the other social sciences, it still has a number of “schools” which differ along the lines already delineated. In so far as economists address “social exclusion”, as distinct from poverty, inequality, or unemployment per se, it is probably more precise to say these are schools of political economy.

Readily available quantitative indicators of poverty and unemployment, and job statistics are often used in discussions of economic exclusion. In the United States, where there has been low-wage job growth, the focus has been on poverty and the underclass, whereas Europe has emphasized long-term unemployment. But on both sides of the Atlantic, the development of new socio-economic indicators has highlighted the novelty of the concept of social exclusion. The new measures not only offer insight into new thinking, but reflect existing paradigm assumptions as well.

Because the paradigms provide three different ways of linking economic and social concerns, social scientists other than economists have addressed the economic dimensions of exclusion. Thus, one can also glean analyses of economic exclusion from the literature on the underclass, the culture of poverty, and informal economies.
Solidarity

As mentioned, the French idea of solidarity drew upon the nineteenth-century working-class mutual aid movement and syndicalism. Through this influence, assumptions central to the solidarity paradigm can be found in the flexible specialization school of political economy. In addition, the French regulation school shares with the flexibilization school several important components of Republican and Durkheimian thought, especially the role of institutional, legal and normative regulation. However, I shall show that regulation theory more properly belongs in the monopoly paradigm, which treats exclusion more narrowly as either a social control mechanism or a barrier to competition. In any case, both schools of contemporary political economy depart from the liberal specialization paradigm’s assumption of self-regulating markets.

As is typical of the solidarity paradigm, the “flexible specialization” approach rejects the assumption of classical political economy that the economy is separate from society. Flexible specialization rests upon “microregulation” – compatible institutions that instigate and coordinate innovation – in which family, school, and community ties are tightly intertwined with economic organization. Flexibility refers to the continual reshaping and rearranging of the components of the productive process, while specialization reflects limitations on the possible rearrangements and the ends to which they are put. Unlike liberal specialization that does not recognize constraints on economic organization beyond those of markets (e.g. transaction costs), flexible specialization is grounded in social solidarities. Productive decentralization and the “reinvigoration of affiliations that are associated with the pre-industrial past” (Piore and Sabel, 1984, p. 275) enable relatively autonomous, skilled workers to deploy modern technology successfully. However, organizations and communities of flexible specialization have boundaries that limit entry, and “outsiders . . . cannot be permitted to lay claim” to local public services or the system will be overburdened (p. 270). Relationships fostering cooperation and coordination beyond the workplace wed politics to markets. A system based on honour and pervasive trust is the foundation of community institutions that temper but do not eliminate economic competition. “The recognition of common interests and mutual obligations does not guarantee that all members of the community are treated equally” (p. 270). Indeed, limited competition on the basis of products rather than labour costs promotes innovation, productive flexibility and, thereby, economic growth. Thus, the approach differs from the liberal specialization paradigm in restricting competition and from the monopoly paradigm in promoting group boundaries and accepting moderate inequality.

Because it focuses on the advanced industrialized countries, the implications of flexible specialization for Third World economic development are ambiguous. On the one hand, developing countries may be specializing in mass production, while the advanced countries shift to flexible
specialization. However, small-scale enterprises, community norms, and
informal economies might provide the basis of flexible specialization in the
Third World, as well (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991; Putnam, 1993).

Despite its strong Marxist orientation, the French regulation school
contains elements that recall the solidarity paradigm. Key to the regulation
school is the concept of "regimes of accumulation", stable configurations that
wed economic institutions to social regulations and norms. Such regimes are
governed by institutionalized rules and social conventions which constrain
collective and individual behaviour. Regulation adjusts production to social
demand so that there develops a relative compatibility between income
distribution and growth in the means of production and consumption. Another
key concept for this school is the rapport salarial, one that also recalls the
solidarity paradigm's social bond: this refers to the legal and institutional
conditions regulating the use and reproduction of wage labour under
capitalism. Wage relations differ according to the production norm, labour
process, organization, consumption norm or way of life (Boyer, 1987, pp.17-18).

For example, the Fordist regime of the post-war Golden Age was based
on a social pact which gave corporations control of mass production in
return for high wages to fuel mass consumption. Unlike an earlier regime of
competitive capitalism, Fordism administered the economy through
Keynesian economic policy, collective bargaining, Taylorism, and economies
of scale. However, there are differences of opinion within the school as to
the likely course of global capitalism since the crisis. It is not clear whether
the emerging regime will pursue high-quality employment in a post-Fordist
regime of flexible regulation or revert to a competitive strategy of
externalizing market uncertainties through low-quality, low-wage jobs
subject to numerical flexibility. Most regulation theorists do support the
further development of a social pact within the European Union.

Regulation theory has also influenced post-Marxist thinkers like André
Gorz (1989), who advocate worksharing and the development of socially
productive and democratic activities outside the capitalist workplace. French
"insertion" policies, however, epitomize the solidarity approach. The
minimum income for social integration (RMI) was based on the idea that
"insertion" is a form of regulation of the social bond and a response to a
perceived threat to social cohesion (Paugam, 1993). Thus, in return for a
minimum income, beneficiaries must sign a contract agreeing to pursue
either a "social" or an "employment" activity, be it a subsidized job,
training, community activity, or a personal project that enhances the ability
to form social relationships and function in society. These functions are also
the aim of French schemes for deprived young people as well as many urban
revitalization schemes. Even schemes officially directed at "insertion"
through economic activity combine social and business rationales. The
entreprises d'insertion (enterprises established for the purpose of helping the
excluded to rejoin society through work), for example, draw upon an older
tradition of the crafts guilds and conceive of the work group as a community
with social as well as economic functions (Hatzfeld, 1993; Delahaye, 1994).
Although the flexible specialization and regulation schools both emphasize historical contingency, national variation, and institutional and normative regulation, there remain important differences between them (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991). Regulation theory tends to emphasize macroeconomic phenomena, the form of competition, and employment or class relations, which the flexible specialization school considers too deterministic. Rather than seek a new international economic regime, the latter school emphasizes the microeconomic and holds that many different types of political economy may coexist.

Moreover, a careful reading of the regulation school indicates that it is best classified under the monopoly paradigm, especially when the framework is applied to developing countries. For example, Alain Lipietz (1986, p. 26) argues that Fordism, the postwar intensive regime of accumulation based on mass consumption, rested upon a "monopolistic mode of regulation". A network of institutions stabilized the growth in workers' income and created "monopolies in a productive structure that allows the big firms of leading sectors to administer their price independently of fluctuations in demand". By exporting mass production goods, the regime also "excluded" less developed countries from capital accumulation. However, the contradictions setting off the crisis of Fordism produced a series of changes in the developing world. First, "bloody Taylorization" integrated Third World labour into competitive, exploitative mass production. Then, in the 1970s, attempts at import substitution and the growth of internal markets allowed a form of "peripheral Fordism" to take hold, especially in the newly industrialized countries. However, the collapse of Fordism and Keynesianism encouraged monetarist policies that withdrew investment capital and exacerbated the indebtedness of less developed countries. In sum, Western advantages in the world economy were preserved by maintaining forms of monopolistic regulation.

As the discussion of the monopoly paradigm will show, the regulation school's approach dovetails with labour market segmentation approaches to productive flexibility. However, economists are not the only ones to address the issue of economic exclusion from the perspective of the solidarity paradigm.

Recall that the solidarity paradigm sees exclusion as a necessary by-product of group solidarity, cultural cohesion, and hence, social ties. It draws upon Durkheimian thought in which Republican concepts like social bond, organic solidarity, moral density, and collective conscience play a central role. The Durkheimian school of sociology concentrates on the problem of human solidarity, particularly moral and normative integration, that entails classification of people and ideas into sacred and profane, conforming or deviant. This tradition influenced cultural anthropologists who emphasize the binary oppositions or dualisms inherent in symbolic representations. For example, in *Natural symbols*, Mary Douglas introduced a distinction to explain how cultural codes control individual behaviour and social organization. "Group" refers to the external boundaries that differentiate collectivities from "the outside world". "Grid" refers to the
other internal distinctions and delegations of authority used to limit social interaction. Cross-classifying these two dimensions provides a classification of individual behaviour in daily interaction and the ways in which social institutions constrain and channel individual behaviour. In this view, the moral order divides the world into categories which are continually recreated by primordial sentiments, essential identities, and institutional enforcement of the norms and values that define group boundaries.

The cultural solidarity approach to exclusion is based upon primordialist/essentialist, rather than constructivist, instrumentalist, or materialist approaches to culture (see Young, 1993). The primordialist school maintains that, unlike class and interest group conflicts, cultural conflicts have a peculiarly intensive, affective or emotional nature because they touch on primordial identity. Cultural boundaries enclose a social space behind walls where social life is orderly and people feel they "belong" and are "safe". Outsiders thus threaten this social order. They may provoke a reaffirmation of in-group solidarity or, if the bases of group solidarity expand to encompass those once considered as outsiders, inclusion and integration can be achieved. Essentialism may also underlie the cultural solidarity of excluded or minority groups who demand self-determination, cultural autonomy, separatism, political decentralization, or multiculturalism.

While the essentialist approach is most frequently used to analyse ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, and other forms of cultural exclusion, it can also be applied to those excluded for economic reasons. For example, Godfried Engbersen et al. (1993) applied Mary Douglas's (1966) group/grid framework to the question of whether the long-term unemployed in the Netherlands have developed a monolithic culture. Cross-classifying cultures by group and grid, they arrive at five ways of life among the unemployed: egalitarian, hierarchical, individualistic, fatalistic, and autonomous. Hence, Engbersen et al. conclude there are in fact multiple cultures of unemployment and not a monolithic Dutch "underclass."

Exclusion was most evident in the fatalistic culture of unemployment, which Engbersen et al. consider a sort of "culture of poverty". Older, poorly educated persons were more likely to experience an isolated, dependent existence – a "shrinking of the social and geographic world they lived in". Long-term unemployment led to:

... exclusion from social institutions and networks and had made them completely dependent on the Government ... The negligible success on the labour market, the high social costs that continual job-seeking behaviour entails and the reduction or disappearance of social frameworks can all serve to account for this shift from conformist to retreatist behaviour, and the longer the unemployment lasts, the more this is the case (1993, p. 178).

It is important to note that proponents of the solidarity paradigm often reject the term underclass. For example, one CGP publication explicitly

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translates *les exclus* as *outsiders* in Howard Becker’s (1963) sense of deviants, rather than as underclass (Nasse, 1992). Nevertheless, as the Dutch study illustrates, the literature on the underclass does touch upon the issue of exclusion.

It might appear that some “conservative” theories of the underclass fall within the solidarity paradigm, given their strong emphasis on the deviant behaviour of the poor and their use of dominant consensual values as a point of reference. Empirical studies that use single motherhood, school-leaving, or welfare receipt as “behavioural” indicators of the United States underclass essentially treat the poor as deviants. For example, Ken Auletta (1982, p. xiii) says the underclass “generally feels excluded from society, rejects commonly accepted values, suffers from behavioural as well as income deficiencies. They don’t just tend to be poor; to most Americans their behaviour seems aberrant.”

The reference to mainstream culture is also found in the work of David Ellwood (1988), a major proponent of American welfare reform in the Clinton administration. He has argued that the proposed reform embodies the contradictory American values of individual autonomy, the virtue of work, the primacy of family, and community. Because Americans want all of these, policy has reflected the trade-offs found in three “helping conundrums”: security vs. work, assistance vs. family structure, and targeting vs. isolation. Ellwood finds exclusion in the third conundrum – the more services are targeted at the most needy,

... the more you tend to isolate the people who receive the services from the economic and political mainstream ... Targeting can label and stigmatize people ... When people see the most support and services going to those who are doing worst, it appears to the non-poor and possibly to the poor that the needy live by different rules than does everyone else ... Targeting tends to isolate politically the “truly needy” from the rest of society (pp. 23-25).

This implies that welfare reform should reflect the consensual values underpinning social solidarity.

However, truly conservative underclass theories more appropriately fall within the *organic* paradigm of social integration. They assume that preserving the moral order is a state responsibility and that policy should coerce people into appropriate behaviour. Just as some members of the British Conservative Party have recently been proposing a “Back to Basics” ethic, American neo-conservatives have been insisting on “family values”, sexual probity, and the individual responsibility to work. For example, Lawrence Mead (1986) argues that the idleness of the underclass reflects moral failure, not insufficient job creation, so the State should force able-bodied citizens to participate in workfare programmes. To become full citizens, the poor must balance their entitlement to social support with the exercise of moral obligations.

In contrast, Charles Murray (1984), who is conventionally considered a conservative, more properly belongs in the specialization paradigm because he views joblessness as a rational, self-interested reaction to the work
disincentives in welfare policies. As the next section indicates, liberal theories of the underclass attribute persistent poverty and unemployment to perverse welfare state effects, market imperfections, or supply-side and human capital variables. These concerns differ from the moral emphases in the organic and solidarity paradigms.

Specialization

It is banal to note that liberalism underpins neo-classical economics. In the specialization paradigm of separate spheres, markets work best when States and institutions intervene least. Generous government income supports create perverse work disincentives that engender long-term dependency. The traditional solution to poverty and unemployment is to create jobs and raise productivity by lowering wages and eliminating rigid employment regulations.

It is no accident that both liberal political economy and the idea of "poverty" emerged from the Great Transformations of late eighteenth-century Britain. Just as exclusion is now being distinguished from poverty, so during this earlier period of dramatic social change did new distinctions set the poor apart from the rest of society. This new concept of poverty, culminating in the Poor Law reforms and exemplified by the workhouse spread quickly, especially to the United States. It is the origin of the principle of "least eligibility" in means-tested schemes, one which continues to stigmatize recipients as undeserving or morally unworthy.

These early liberal assumptions are also reflected in measures of poverty as such. The narrow conception of poverty is reflected in the myriad thresholds of absolute poverty used by Western governments to determine eligibility for means-tested schemes. Not only are poverty lines often pegged to subsistence levels, but income support levels are pegged to minimum wages so as to eliminate work disincentives and preserve union-negotiated wage standards.\footnote{Even measures of absolute poverty contain some acknowledgement of social relativity. Poverty levels are often adjusted for family size, inflation and geography. They may also reflect transfers in kind, changes in cost of living, and the duration of poverty (for a review, see Ruggles, 1990).

While the distinction between the undeserving and the industrious poor persisted, over time further distinctions were refined with which to measure the poor (Himmelfarb, 1984, p. 21). By the end of the nineteenth century, persons suffering from the effects of economic dislocation came to be distinguished from undeserving paupers who rarely (if ever) worked, lived on alms, and lacked direction and self-respect (Patterson, 1981; Katz, 1989, 13). The "respectable poor" were distinguished from the "residuum" (Morris, 1994, p. 21). During the 1880s in the United Kingdom:

For the first time unemployment became a political issue, perceived as a problem distinct from poverty, caused by factors other than moral failings,
deserving of public sympathy and remedial action by the State ... Much attention was subsequently focused on the need to separate the efficient unemployed, who could and should be helped into the labour market, from the "unemployables" or "inefficients" who should be removed from it (Burnett, 1994, pp. 145-8).

If early mutual aid associations and social insurance schemes served the "aristocracy of labour" and excluded the unskilled and casual worker (Stedman-Jones, 1984; Morris, 1994), workers of all kinds were soon covered by universal welfare state schemes.

With the rise of this Anglo-American "social liberalism", rights to social insurance were legitimated on the basis of contributions made during employment. Unlike means-tested schemes, insurance implied an obligation of the able-bodied to work when economic conditions allowed. Thus, liberals still insist that even contributory unemployment coverage be accompanied by job search requirements and policing against fraud (Morris, 1994). Pauperism was slowly restricted to a small segment of the poor unable to work – the Fourth World, as Father Wresinski, a French activist priest, has called them. Since the poverty addressed by means-tested benefit schemes came to be regarded as a residual problem, its meaning gradually narrowed to denote simply an insufficiency of income.

Yet, the liberal conception of exclusion does not reduce it to an economic phenomenon any more than do the other paradigms. Because individuals have diverse personal values and psychological motives for engaging in social relations, specialization arises not only in the market but also among social groups. Specialized social structures are comprised of separate, competing, but not necessarily unequal spheres which lead to exchanges and interdependence between them. Much as market competition erodes discriminatory practices, individual freedom to choose group affiliations and competition between groups for members create cross-cutting loyalties that break down tendencies toward social closure. Conversely, exclusion results from "discrimination", that is, from the inappropriate exercise of personal tastes or the enforcement of group boundaries that individuals are not free to cross. Thus, it may have multiple causes and dimensions, depending upon the social sphere in question.

Yet not all social differences are the consequence of deliberate exclusion or discrimination. Unlike organic models reliant on a strong State, liberalism allows for voluntary deprivation. Simply granting rights to assistance does not mean that free individuals will choose to accept it. As long as there is free access to information and people are not shamed, stigmatized or coerced, the take-up rates of welfare benefits may vary widely. The liberal State is under no obligation to bring the excluded in.

Nor do specialization and interdependence of separate social spheres necessarily imply social inequality. Liberalism considers social differentiation to be a horizontal dimension of social structures, rather than a vertical one. Like the division of labour, specialization may have positive outcomes: economies of scale, skill enhancement, reduced transaction costs,
diversification of choice, and the preservation of liberty. On the grounds of efficiency or freedom, liberals may justify social distinctions that the other paradigms may consider exclusionary.

For example, efficiency wage models assume that some firms find it profitable to pay above-market wages because they raise worker productivity more than enough to offset additional labour costs (for a review see Katz, 1989). If higher wages increase the cost of losing a job and lower the costs of supervision, recruitment, and training new workers, then shirking and turnover can be reduced and work effort increased (Bulow and Summers, 1986). Thus, firms with high monitoring costs (such as large corporations) might find it easier to trust their workers when they reward them amply. Efficiency wages may also improve workers' morale and loyalty to the firm because they are perceived to be "fairer" than market wages. Indeed, industrial wage differentials are related to job tenure and quit probabilities (Krueger and Summers, 1988).

To some, this may suggest workers in high-wage industries are earning rents that they do not want to lose. Indeed, inter-industry wage dispersion rose between 1970 and 1987, partly because workers in more productive industries enjoyed increased rents (Bell and Freeman, 1991). Thus, from a monopoly perspective, exclusion would appear to benefit "insiders". Yet, efficiency wage models also show how excess labour supply can become a structural feature of the labour market in equilibrium. Over and above the wage effects of union threats, minimum wage laws, large firms' internal labour markets, or "imperfect" competition produced by other institutions, long-term structural unemployment may be consistent with market efficiency.

In so far as exclusion constitutes "discrimination" – the drawing of inappropriate group distinctions between free and equal individuals which deny access to or participation in exchange or interaction – it is construed as an individual experience. In social science, liberal individualism is often reflected in methodological individualism which treats group memberships as individual attributes. In contrast to the solidarity paradigm, these studies do not emphasize the dualism between insiders and the excluded but, rather, perceive the latter in all their rich diversity.

Neo-classical labour economists often associate the duration of poverty, dependency on welfare, and unemployment with the personal characteristics of the poor, rather than with economic or political conditions (e.g. Duncan, 1984). These "supply-side" studies, based on survey analysis, usually find that the poor, unemployed, or underclass population is socially heterogeneous (Wuhl, 1991; Jencks, 1991). For example, the Centre for the Study of Costs and Income (CERC) found that no single characteristic (e.g. difficulty in childhood, living in a single-parent household) could be identified as the principal cause of poverty or receipt of RMI in France.

Most scholarly research in the United States (Schlozman and Verba, 1979), United Kingdom (Morris, 1990), the Netherlands (Engbersen et al., 1993) and Germany (Kronauer, 1993) reports that those unemployed for at
least a year are also socially heterogeneous. Because there is so much
turnover among the unemployed over time, long-term unemployment affects
virtually all categories of French workers (Reynaud, 1993). The National
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) found that those
unemployed for under a year are no different socially from newly hired
workers. While those unemployed on the way to becoming excluded tend to
be older, to lack qualifications, skills, or experience, and to be more likely to
have an immigrant background or handicap, even these individual
characteristics do not predict well who will regain employment. Sometimes,
even school-leavers are hired in preference to their experienced and
educated elders. An additional reason why some categories of worker
remain unemployed longer is that hiring is based not only on whether the
worker’s skill fits the job, but also on whether the worker will integrate into
the work group (Vincens, 1993). Indeed, a wide range of social characteristics
may be hindrances to regaining employment. In addition to cyclical and
seemingly permanent unemployment, France faces a problem of recurrent
unemployment – chômage d’exclusion – in which many move back and forth
between idleness, internships, training courses, and short-term jobs (Wuhl,

In contrast to labour economists, sociologists have a long research
tradition on the social psychology and behaviour of the unemployed on
which to draw (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeisel, 1971; Bakke, 1940;
Komarovsky, 1940). These micro-sociologists found that unemployment is
usually experienced as humiliating, causing the jobless to withdraw from
friends and family. For example, Newman’s (1988) study of downwardly
mobile Americans identified both general and particular responses to
unemployment. Most workers felt anger, dismay, and a sense of injustice, as
if a social contract had been broken. Unemployment challenged personal
identities, disrupted the life trajectories of entire families, and undermined
cultural values, like loyalty and the work ethic. Managers, with their
individualist, meritocratic creed, tended to blame themselves, whereas
workers who share their sense of identity with others in a union or a
community, tended to blame outside forces for unemployment. Groups
based on a shared experience of unemployment helped the unemployed
retain some dignity, as well as providing an explanation for their fate.
Nevertheless, a common sense of victimization did not overcome feelings of
helplessness.

Even French sociologists who use solidarity rhetoric have treated
exclusion as a process of individual disaffiliation (Castel, 1991) or
disqualification (Paugam, 1991, 1993). The longer people are unemployed,
the more personal problems they develop, the more they appear
unemployable to potential employers, and the more discouraged and
isolated they become. The defining characteristic of exclusion is thus gradual
withdrawal from face-to-face social relations. The micro-sociological causes
of exclusion are located in the individual’s immediate social environment,
life course, or personal attributes. One sees in these studies an emphasis on
individual characteristics, micro-sociological interaction, and psychological effects, even if they are considered as outcomes of economic restructuring. Indeed, it is no accident that micro-sociology and "the curious importance of small groups" (Silver, 1990) arose in liberal America.

In these studies, exclusion is neither a problem of macro-social integration nor an absolute categorical condition resulting from having crossed over some boundary line. Rather, it is a multidimensional process that individuals undergo. In a person's life trajectory, exclusion occurs at different paces and in different social spheres. For example, Serge Paugam (1993, 1991) defines exclusion as a process of "social disqualification" that occurs in three consecutive stages: fragility (under/unemployed but retaining links with society), dependence on social aid (discouraged from working but filling other social roles), and then complete breakdown of social bonds. At each stage, people renegotiate their identities and may find a way of regaining their previous status. But if individuals travel the full course of disaffiliation, they lose most of their social ties — job, housing, relations with the social support system, and the most elementary form of solidarity, a stable family. Accumulating handicaps and failures, they come to feel useless, uncared for, hopeless, and may turn to drugs or alcohol or become hostile to the welfare system. Without social relations of any kind, they lack the resources to find a way back into society.

Robert Castel (1991) also argues that there is a dynamic, three-stage process running from full integration through precarious, vulnerable employment and fragile relations to disaffiliation or exclusion. Castel argues that although the new poor are socially heterogeneous, the overrepresented social categories share a particular mode of dissociation of the social bond that he calls "disaffiliation". It is an effect of the conjuncture of two vectors, one economic, the other social. The first axis runs from integration (stable employment) through forms of precarious, intermittent, or seasonal occupations to the complete loss of work which he calls "exclusion". The second axis runs from "insertion" in stable socio-familial networks of sociability to total "isolation". When cross-classified, these dimensions identify a zone of integration (guaranteed permanent work and solid relational support) which assures social cohesion, and a zone of disaffiliation (the absence of work and social isolation) which provides little or no cohesion. Between the two extremes is a zone of vulnerability in which work is precarious and relations are fragile. Although integration in one sphere may compensate for exclusion in another, vulnerability puts one at risk of both kinds of exclusion. For example, 77 per cent of RMI beneficiaries lack jobs and 76 per cent lack a stable marital relationship. Thus, "insertion" measures must go beyond distributing aid to filling the social void caused by disaffiliation.

Apart from changes in the structure of employment, changes in other institutional spheres socially isolate the economically excluded. First, losing a job or re-employment on a temporary, short-term basis means losing job-related social insurance coverage. Receiving means-tested assistance that
was formerly reserved for the permanently excluded entails a loss of status as well as of income (Castel, 1991). Second, the decline of organized labour, ideological politics, and the break-up of working-class neighbourhoods has eroded class solidarity. In deprived outer suburbs, many young people do not form stable relationships and immigrants cannot assimilate (Dubet, 1987); in the ghettos, the young have no positive role models, clubs or centres of their own (Wilson, 1987). The decline of shared values and practices in daily life also weakens financial and social support from neighbours. Third, while school should be a vector of social cohesion, many young people drop out of school because they feel excluded. One's own home can amount to a ghetto if the family has no money. Indeed, job and family instability have led to more single-parent families and to more people living alone (Daugareilh and Laborde, 1993). In sum, exclusion is a series of breaks in the web of belonging that leave individuals stranded in a "social no-man's-land" (Castel, 1991).

As in the other paradigms, these French sociological studies consider exclusion to be a process both economic and social. However, they focus on the individual's experience. The analysis posits the existence of separate spheres, and individuals are located along multiple dimensions which do not necessarily intersect. A similar approach was used by Jencks (1991) who rejected the idea of the existence of an American underclass, arguing that because trends in various social indicators have moved in different directions over time, disadvantages do not cluster in the same group of people. New and increasingly multi-dimensional ways of measuring the underclass consistently show that single parents, ghetto residents, school drop-outs and people dependent on transfers constitute only a subset of the poor. Findings like these are moving social policy in an increasingly individualistic direction. Since each individual has a different combination of problems, assistance must be personalized and rendered comprehensively. Income support, medical and housing assistance, social services, training, and subsidized employment are increasingly "packaged" to fit each individual's or household's needs.

The specialization paradigm does not emphasize the individual and micro-sociological causes of economic exclusion only. Social liberals are cognizant of the effects of structural changes in labour demand on individuals' immediate social environments, and thus on their opportunities for social affiliation in a variety of separate spheres. The split between supply-side and demand-side theories parallels the division between classical and social liberalism. The latter is concerned with maintaining boundaries between separate spheres, including that between politics (with its equality of citizenship) and the market (with its inequality of resources).

In contrast to supply-side theoreticians who attribute poverty or unemployment to individual failings, most sociologists now accept that the new poverty and long-term unemployment have demand-side or structural causes, perhaps exacerbated by liberal economic and social policies (Wilson, 1987; Jencks and Peterson, 1991). The educational level of the Western
labour force continues to rise, suggesting that supply-side policies will be ineffective in addressing these problems (Jencks, 1991; Wuhl, 1991). Evaluations of French training schemes, for example, report that they do little to improve the job prospects of the trainees unless they are tied to enterprises (Delahaye, 1994; CGP, 1993; Paugam, 1993). Even when the unemployed re-enter the labour market, new openings are almost all to jobs of short duration. About half the figures of newly registered unemployed in France concern lost “precarious jobs” (Paugam, 1993; Wuhl, 1992). The trend is for jobs at all skill levels to offer little security.

However, different social spheres offer different affiliations and resources. Family and community ties may replace income for the long-term structurally unemployed. With access to productive assets (land, capital, credit), self-employment and self-support/sufficiency in food may be possible, incorporating the excluded into direct market exchanges, barter, and informal economies. The West has seen a rise in self-employment, self-help strategies, and household economies among the poor, a phenomenon once confined to developing countries (Pahl, 1984; Morris, 1990; Esping-Anderson, 1994).

One illustration of the liberal approach to informal economies wedds network theories to the concept of “social capital.” It builds on rational choice theory but rejects its extreme, individualistic premises of utility maximization by assuming that individuals are socialized in micro-sociological settings. For example, James Coleman (1988) views the various forms of social capital – obligations and expectations, information channels, and social norms – as resources for action, increasing human and financial capital. Networks that attain social structural “closure” enhance the positive effects of particularistic obligations, expectations, and norms. Larger households and residents of tightly-knit local communities have an advantage in maintaining consumption on these bases. By contrast, informal economies are less likely to work among the socially disaffiliated and the State may be the only recourse to the latter.

Such attention to the various institutions, groups, and spheres in civil society is characteristic of liberal paradigms in sociology and political science. Unlike the monopoly paradigm, these approaches do not privilege the market. Like the solidarity paradigm, they highlight the social embeddedness of economic activity, but do not assume that rank in one social sphere is always consonant with rank in the others. Indeed, social liberalism finds the roots of exclusion in the inadequate separation of spheres, unenforced rights, or market failures, which justify state intervention.

Monopoly and labour market segmentation

The monopoly paradigm treats exclusion and unemployment as symptoms of group monopolies which generate inequality and severe economic exploitation. As Joan Robinson put it, “the only thing that is
worse than being exploited is not being exploited” (cited in Streeter, 1993, p. 2). Powerful “status groups” with distinctive cultural identities and institutions use social closure to restrict the access of outsiders to valued resources. The overlap of group distinctions and inequality is at the heart of the problématique of this paradigm.

Theories of labour market segmentation epitomize the paradigm’s link between social closure and economic exclusion. Segmentation occurs wherever there are barriers to free competition between workers and/or firms. Many labour market barriers—from regulations to credentials—operate simultaneously. Like social closure in a more general way, labour market segmentation results in poverty and economic inequality.

Two theories dominated the first wave of segmentation research. First, in institutional economics, Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore (1971) identified the “dual labour market”, which distinguished between primary and secondary labour markets based on both job quality and worker characteristics. To explain why some groups could not gain access to highly paid, secure employment, they proposed the notion of the “internal labour market” that insulates primary workers from external market competition. Early dual labour market theories assumed that the secondary labour market operates like a classic competitive market, but that non-price criteria, such as the racial origin of workers, ration good jobs in the primary labour market (Lang and Dickens, 1988). Similarly, some firms can use union membership, promotion from within, and other institutional restrictions on mobility to limit access to in-house jobs. Second, complementing the neo-institutional approach, neo-Marxist economists portrayed the segmentation and stratification of labour markets as mechanisms to divide and control labour under conditions of partial unionization. Worker power produces higher wages in unionized segments, while the disproportionately female and minority secondary and subordinate labour markets serve as a reserve army of labour (Gordon, Reich, and Edwards, 1982).

Although these early studies were criticized on theoretical, methodological, and empirical grounds, they shared the assumption that, contrary to competitive or human capital theories of wages, jobs vary in the compensation they offer to equally productive workers. Compensation of all kinds—wages, promotion opportunities, fringe benefits, or risks of unemployment—can serve as monopolized resources. Since the supply side is controlled, these theories reason, a persisting differential must result from the rationality of firms. If wages remain higher, there must be institutional or

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2 Castel (1991) also cited the seventeenth-century Tracté des Ordres as saying “il n’est certes pire profession que de ne pas avoir profession” [there is no worse occupation than to have none].

3 These studies attracted criticism for various deficiencies, among the most important that the industrial characteristics defining sectors were not strongly correlated; that classifying workers into sectors by their earnings introduced circular reasoning and truncation bias in rates of return; and that individuals choose sectors for their differential characteristics, introducing heterogeneity and selectivity bias.
"non-price" barriers to mobility, access, and competition from unemployed or otherwise employed workers. Such exclusion rationed jobs and creates queues. Thus, high unemployment may in fact be compatible with productivity and economic growth.

The second round of labour market segmentation studies improved upon methodology and provided strong evidence for the theory (Dickens and Lang, 1988). Some of the most compelling empirical substantiation for the theory was the evidence provided by some American economists of large and enduring inter-industry wage differentials between equally productive workers (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Bulow and Summers, 1986). Yet, current economic segmentation theories differ as to the particular mechanisms responsible. For example, "insider-outsider" models start from the same premise as efficiency wage models. However, reasoning from union behaviour, they argue that the turnover costs of replacing incumbent workers with the unemployed increase the bargaining power of organized insiders who, by threatening to quit, can demand higher wages. Since insiders can cost employers more than they would gain by hiring outsiders, the acceptance of lower wages by outsiders is insufficient to give them access to good jobs. Both the erosion of skills and the stigma employers attach to "outsiders" make it more difficult to re-enter the labour market after a spell of unemployment, particularly if it is a long one. The empirical support for this model is that high-wage industries have lower quit rates (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986).

Where monitoring and turnover costs are more important in some sectors, industries or firms than in others, one would expect to find labour market segmentation. Some jobs will pay higher wages to increase productivity and will be rationed. Occupants of "good jobs" who do not need added incentives will still collect "rents" because those jobs will be scarce relative to the number of workers wanting them. In neo-classical theory, this excess labour supply for good jobs should drive down primary sector wages, enabling workers to attain access through intersectoral mobility. Instead, it produces a labour queue of either the unemployed or workers in "bad" jobs. Labour market queues also support the theory of statistical discrimination (Thurow, 1975).

In sum, labour market institutions and institutional demand-side variables can be seen as the source of group monopolies and social exclusion, which in turn cause wage inequality. Because of non-universal coverage, attempts to reduce inequality through collective bargaining and labour legislation may have inadvertently created new bases of exclusion. For example, there is an incentive to shift work to small firms, the self-employed, or part-time and temporary employees who evade or are exempted from

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10 Two techniques for testing the existence of labour market segmentation appear to pass muster. One uses "switching models" in which no assumptions are made as to which jobs are in which sectors; the other uses clustering techniques that split jobs at the mean to avoid truncation and estimates effects separately by race and gender to avoid heterogeneity bias.
compulsory welfare contributions and taxes, paying compulsory benefits, or respecting standards on hours and safety. Rules on length of service also restrict the access of new labour market entrants to well-paid, protected jobs. There may also be trade-offs between redistributive equity, in the form of social security contributions, and economic efficiency. Although negative income tax experiments suggest that substitution effects (that reduce effort) may be outweighed or at least offset by income effects (that increase effort), marginal (rather than proportional) taxation may exacerbate the trade-off. Assumptions about a decent family wage that underlie much labour legislation and collective bargaining may also have contributed to exclusion on the basis of sex and of household structure. The labour force influx of working women partly accounts for growth in part-time employment (Godbout, 1993).

The European Union appears to have accepted the existence of these trade-offs. The Commission’s 1994 White Paper, *Growth, competitiveness, employment*, proposed collective mechanisms of “solidarity” between those with and without jobs, rich and poor, men and women, generations, regions, and neighbours:

Social protection schemes have – in part at least – had a negative impact on employment in that they have, in the main, tended to protect people already in work, making their situation more secure and consolidating certain advantages. They have in effect proved to be an obstacle to the recruitment of jobseekers or of new entrants to the labour market (p. 124).

In addition to this “dual standard of treatment working to the detriment of the jobless,” the Commission deemed labour market rigidity to be “the root cause of what are relatively high labour costs”. Those in employment have enjoyed the fruits of economic growth while the unemployed are excluded. Of the 10 million new jobs in the European Union created between 1990 and 1993, only 3 million were taken by the registered unemployed: the rest absorbed new entrants or re-entrants (p. 141). In countries where a large youth cohort has bloated the labour supply, there may indeed be a trade-off between wages and employment (Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman, 1988; OECD, 1993).

Yet, the higher wages produced by group monopolies may also have created incentives to shift employment to more competitive sectors. Indeed, these processes underlie some theories of the informal economy (Portes, Castells, and Benton, 1989). In both developed and developing countries, employers and the self-employed evade legal regulations in order to lower the cost of production. This makes them attractive as subcontractors for larger, even multinational, corporations. Obviously, differential sectoral labour costs are only one reason for the rise of precarious informal employment and subcontracting. Others are greater market uncertainty and the economies of scale derived from specialization. Nevertheless, the monopoly paradigm emphasizes the contribution of regulatory barriers to sectoral segmentation and, thus, economic exploitation and exclusion.
As the French regulation school points out, similar processes may account for the increasing "numerical" flexibility in Western labour markets (OECD, 1989, 1986; Boyer, 1987; Tarling, 1987; Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989). Global competition has increased the pressure to cut labour costs through quantitative flexibility, hiring and firing workers with fluctuations in demand. Indeed, in OECD countries like France and Germany, growth was almost exclusively in part-time employment (Godbout 1993). As good jobs in high-wage sectors are automated or subdivided into more low-wage jobs in less regulated, more competitive sectors, employment growth may be decoupled from its historic association with rising wages and greater income equality.

The problem is not only a consequence of low-wage job growth, however. With technological innovation, the relative wage return to higher education has been rising in most advanced countries, resulting in greater income inequality (Davis 1993; Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower, 1994; OECD, 1993). Differential access to firms, or jobs within firms introducing internal, "qualitative" flexibility - where jobs and profits are more tied to capital investment, reorganization, teamwork, and retraining than to the cost of labour inputs - may itself generate a new basis for labour market segmentation and exclusion in the future. Job security and benefits as well as wages may be traded off for employment. In sum, there is a tendency towards dualism among those who do have jobs, as well as between those in and those out of work.

This example of "dual closure" (Parkin, 1974; Murphy, 1988) illustrates how segmentation theories account for economic exclusion within the framework of the monopoly paradigm. Any labour market barriers to or shelters from competition that persistently raise wages for some workers at the expense of others effectively exclude the latter from access to some forms of compensation or employment conditions. Whether justified on grounds of efficiency, merit or for political or institutional reasons, exclusion may result from differential access to high-wage countries, high-wage industries, or firms and jobs with internal labour markets and "flexible specialization".

Since informal social contacts and place of residence often channel some groups into such firms and industries, socially isolated or minority groups may find themselves at a disadvantage. Thus, not only material and legal, but also cultural and geographic boundaries restrict access to valued resources, giving insiders a form of monopoly and power over outsiders. The monopoly paradigm sees culture as a form of domination: by including some, it necessarily excludes others. While the solidarity paradigm stresses culture's essentialism and the specialization paradigm sees culture as an autonomous sphere of valued beliefs and practices, the monopoly paradigm's deconstructivism sees culture as "interested", i.e. protecting material advantages. Any form of exclusion necessarily entails inequality. For this reason, perhaps, British writers' discussions of economic post-Fordism often conflate it with cultural post-modernism: both advocate relaxing rigid social boundaries.
The monopoly paradigm treats the subject of informal economies as another aspect of sectoral segmentation. The formal/informal split is yet another expression of exploitative core/periphery relations. Although social contacts and community ties, coupled with free time, may help all the economically inactive to enlarge their social world through participation in the "household economy" and local voluntary activities, the opportunity to engage in informal economic activities is differentially distributed among the unemployed (Pahl, 1984; Morris, 1994).

In the monopoly paradigm, the unequal power underlying group monopolies can be mitigated, if not eliminated, by inclusive citizenship or social rights. The social democratic formulation of citizenship as "full and equal participation in the community" draws explicitly upon Marshall's (1950) classic formulation. The gradual extension of civil, then political and, finally, social rights bestows an equal status and the equal rights and duties with which that status is endowed. Although capitalist societies are inherently unequal and conflictual, social citizenship in a redistributive welfare state and "a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilization which is a common possession" would "abate" economic inequality. Over time, European social democrats adopted Marshall's rhetoric of citizenship to support an egalitarian programme of de commodification, class compromise, and material redistribution through the expansion of universalist welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1991; Klausen, 1995). They contrasted citizenship with inequality.

The distinction between the monopoly and solidarity paradigms is clearly illustrated by the European Union's shifting discourse of exclusion. Initial discussions used the French Republican sense of the term. For example, the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers adopted by the (then) European Community's Heads of State declares that "... in a spirit of solidarity, it is important to combat social exclusion" (Room, et al., 1992, p. 11). However, the European Commission's report, *Towards a Europe of solidarity*, already shifted towards a rhetoric of social rights:

...social exclusion refers, in particular, to inability to enjoy social rights without help, suffering from low self-esteem, inadequacy in their [sic] capacity to meet their obligations, the risk of long-term relegation to the ranks of those on social benefits, and stigmatization which, particularly in the urban environment, extends to the areas in which they live (1992, p. 10).

The subsequent European Commission report on the subject explicitly used Marshall's notion of social citizenship:

Here we define social exclusion first and foremost in relation to the social rights of citizens ... to a certain basic standard of living and to participation in the major social and occupational opportunities of the society (Room, et al., 1992 p. 14).

The Final Poverty 3 Programme report also noted this passage and itself concluded that exclusion "implies the denial (or non-realization) of social rights" (Andersen et al., 1994).
Many European social scientists are now analysing the underclass in terms of a Marshallian understanding of exclusion (Schmitter-Heisler, 1991; Dahrendorf 1985). In the rare cases in which the term exclusion is used in this context in the United Kingdom, reference is usually made to Marshall's three-pronged conception of citizenship and its role in combating inequality. For example, the Child Poverty Action Group used the rhetoric of exclusion to argue that the poor are excluded from full citizenship and participation in the society and, thus, are often excluded from public consciousness as well (Lister, 1990; Golding, 1986).

A contrast with the liberal perspective highlights the monopoly paradigm's incorporation of inequality into the notion of exclusion. In line with Marshall, the monopoly perspective defines the underclass as "that group of people who are not fully citizens because they are not able to participate in certain basic social activities" and "are excluded from the mainstream of society ... Against this, it can be argued that members of the underclass exclude themselves by refusing to make the best of their opportunities" (Smith, 1992, p. 7). The paradigms thus differ on the question of who is responsible for exclusion.

Most British thinkers on the question argue along the lines that "the idea of an underclass is a counterpart to the idea of social classes, and acquires its meaning within that same framework of analysis ... they belong to family units having no stable relationship at all with the 'mode of production' – with legitimate gainful employment" (Smith, 1992, p.4). Like poverty and the underclass, exclusion has class-based connotations in the United Kingdom. For example, Peter Townsend (1979) maintained that the poor "are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs, and activities". Frank Field (1989, p. 4) noted that "the very poorest are separated, not only from other groups on low income, but, more importantly, from the working class". The underclass is situated below the working classes, because their "roles place them more or less permanently at the economic level where benefits are paid by the State to those unable to participate in the labour market at all" (Runciman, 1990).

Slowly, the monopoly model of citizenship is expanding beyond social class questions. Social democratic thought is just beginning to adjust to increasing diversity in styles of life and cultural values and to the political challenges posed by immigrant minorities, environmental movements, and long-term unemployment. British multiculturalist and post-modernist thinkers are increasingly using the notion of citizenship and equality of status to encompass the recognition of diversity, the inclusion of all groups, and the protection from stigma (e.g. Harris, 1987). Weberian references consonant with the monopoly paradigm can also be found: Lydia Morris (1994), for example, concluded that the British underclass consists of those suffering from "status exclusion".

Even some American social democrats have adopted the monopoly paradigm's exclusion discourse. Lee Rainwater (1974, p. 135) has argued that "the person living in poverty is not the Middle American: he has passed
over an invisible border”. Michael Harrington (1962, p. 18) asserted that The Other America is invisible: “to be impoverished is to be an internal alien [without] links with the great world”. Michael Katz provides an excellent example. First, he deconstructs the solidarity approach to exclusion in terms reminiscent of Marshall:

We can think about poor people as “them” or as “us”. For the most part, Americans have talked about “them”. Even in the language of social science, as well as in ordinary conversation and political rhetoric, poor people usually remain outsiders, strangers to be pitied or despised, helped or punished, ignored or studied, but rarely full citizens, members of a larger community on the same terms as the rest of us (1989, p. 236).

Then he deconstructs liberal discourse: “Poverty in America is profoundly individual; like popular economics, it is supply side” (p. 237). Lastly, he casts exclusion and citizenship as issues of monopoly and inequality:

For finally, the politics of poverty are about the processes of inclusion and exclusion in American life: who, to put the question crudely, gets what? How are goods distributed? As such, it is a question of race, class, gender, and the bases of power ... Europeans today write about the “new poverty”, which they understand in a similar way. They do not write very much about the underclass, which highlights the peculiarly American tendency to transform poverty from a product of politics and economics into a matter of individual behaviour (p. 237).

He blames the economic, spatial, social and cultural isolation of the inner-city black poor on exclusionary laws and practices of private employers, unions, and white workers. And like Marshall and social democrats, Katz calls for “finding ways to talk about poor people as ‘us’ that expand ideas of citizenship” (p. 239).

The dominance of the monopoly perspective on the Continent is also reflected in methodology. The European Union’s statistical service, Eurostat, and the Luxembourg Income Survey adopted standardized comparative methods to measure poverty relative to average national income (equivalent expenditure). Relative poverty lines simultaneously incorporate absolute deprivation and inequality, “a barrier and a level”. Moreover, many justify these measures with reference to Marshall’s definition of citizenship, arguing that poverty must be measured relative to a society’s normative standards of living (Fuchs, 1967; EC Commission, 1992) or consumption levels (Townsend, 1987, 1979; Mayer and Jencks, 1989). “Without a requisite level of goods and services, ... individuals cannot participate as full members of their society” (Rainwater, 1992, p. 5). Similarly, poverty may be considered in subjective terms, based on what most people in a society regard as the “decent” or “adequate” income necessary to “get by” (Rainwater, 1992; van Praag et al., 1980; Danziger et al., 1984).

Relative poverty lines have been used for decades, but the term “new poverty” was introduced to maintain the distinction between those populations traditionally considered as the poor and those displaced by economic change (Room, 1990; Donzelot and Roman, 1991; Paukam, 1991). Unlike the old poverty which reflected cyclical downturns, the new poverty,
especially in the United Kingdom, was considered structural, grounded in a new economy that subjects all social classes to employment insecurity. This vulnerability to downward mobility created a relative poverty of deprivation, as many lose what they expected to have—a socially accepted or customary style of life (Townsend, 1993, 1987, 1979; Rainwater, 1992, 1990, 1974). The term "new poverty" encompassed many of the same empirical realities as those that the French labelled "exclusion" phenomena.

Yet French observers insist on the distinction between "exclusion" and "inequality." For example, Touraine (1991, 1992) argues that the two phenomena follow different types of logic. Inequality occurs in an industrial society of production in which opposing classes are "integrated" because they confront each other face to face; whereas exclusion is a symptom of economic growth and social change in which social actors contesting the dominant power structure and culture are divorced from the economic and political system. In the emerging postindustrial society, the social problem is no longer inequality, but justice and the rules of the game. Jean-Baptiste de Foucauld (1992a, b) also argues that inequalities and exclusions are not the same, although both are rising and may have cumulative effects. Unlike inequality, exclusion is associated with rising individualism and a changing market society which is divorcing actors from the system and separating productive and social demands. De Foucauld still sees inequality and exclusion through Republican eyes: despite their differences they are joined through the perspective of the need for social cohesion in a dynamic society. Thus, it is necessary to encourage both equality and justice, rather than trade one off against the other.

Finally, it is worth noting that while participatory democracy is an essential part of the social democratic vision of citizenship, it is not directed towards a form of solidarity based on national consensus. Rather than stressing participation as a duty of citizenship or integration in the republic or nation, both the Catholic and the Socialist Left advocate direct participation in local associations and social movements as a means of connecting the excluded to the larger society through organized opposition and challenges to powerful interests. Decentralizing power to localities and workplaces permits the excluded, whatever their group background, to pursue their common interests in inclusion and redistribution. Locally based "insertion" and integration policies should create "a political space of belonging." Integration is a project seeking to reconstruct an active citizenship. Participation in public life makes the struggle against exclusion political and launches a debate over the nature of new forms of solidarity and the terms of a new social contract (Donzelot and Roman, 1991; Mongin, 1992). State intervention might thereby be legitimated.

Conclusion: Exclusion, politics, and social policy

In this paper I have presented three major paradigms of exclusion, each grounded in a different conception of integration and citizenship. In the
solidarity paradigm dominant in France, exclusion is the breakdown of a social bond between the individual and society that is cultural and moral, rather than economically interested. Cultural boundaries give rise to socially constructed dualistic categories for ordering the world, defining the poor, the unemployed, and ethnic minorities as deviant outsiders. However, by tying national solidarity to political rights and duties, Republican citizenship imposes an obligation on the State to aid in the inclusion of the excluded. By presenting itself as a “third way” between liberalism and socialism, Republican thought weds economic to social concerns through the notion of solidarity. Similar emphases can be found in new schools of political economy.

In the specialization paradigm, exclusion reflects discrimination. Social differentiation, economic divisions of labour, and the separation of spheres should not produce hierarchically ordered social categories if excluded individuals are free to move across boundaries and if spheres of social life governed by different principles are kept legally separate. Cultural pluralism, like political pluralism, rests upon voluntary membership and group competition. Liberal models of citizenship emphasize the contractual exchange between individual rights and obligations and the tensions between the sphere of civil society based on liberty and a public sphere based on equality and democracy. Liberal assumptions are rooted in micro-sociology, which emphasizes small groups, and in neo-classical economics and other social sciences which are characterized by methodological individualism.

Finally, the third paradigm sees exclusion as a consequence of the formation of group monopolies. Powerful groups, often displaying distinctive cultural identities and institutions, restrict the access of outsiders to valued resources through a process of “social closure”. The same process is evident in labour market and enterprise segmentation which draws exclusive boundaries between and within firms. At the heart of this paradigm is the necessary overlap of group distinctions and inequality, “the barrier and the level”. Inequality is mitigated by social democratic citizenship which, in Marshall’s formulation, entails full participation in the community.

However they are conceived, the empirical manifestations of rising deprivation in the advanced countries call into question the adequacy of existing welfare arrangements. The numbers of means-tested schemes designed to serve small constituencies are growing rapidly. The assumption underlying post-war social insurance schemes of a uniform life-cycle, career pattern, and family structure applies to a shrinking number of people. “New” types of social disadvantage are increasingly emerging as are demands that these newly identified social problems be addressed.

Once-quiescent beneficiaries are organizing politically under the banners of their various “demographic identities”, are forming lobby groups, and are pressuring local government in the areas where they are concentrated. This “politics of consumption” is concerned less with transfers than with unpopular and residual social services (e.g., drug rehabilitation, assistance for refugees or immigrants, urban renewal programmes): as such
it introduces distributive conflicts not only between productive and unproductive citizens, but between cultural groups as well. The demand for individualized, differentiated services for socially marginal groups also challenges the principle of universalism that once legitimated the postwar welfare states (Immergut, 1993). This crisis in social policy requires a rethinking of the notions of citizenship and solidarity.

Although these manifestations of the phenomenon of “exclusion” have led to new social policy approaches, especially in France, any large-scale recasting of welfare state institutions will require a broad political consensus. It is useful to recall that the initial establishment of national welfare states was a process of “institutional searching” for political compromise (Ashford, 1986). To achieve such compromises, it was necessary to formulate political ideas that blended pre-existing nation-specific norms and practices. As the paradigms illustrate, such ideas are still reflected in existing welfare state institutions. Today, as new social problems call for major social policy reforms, the importance of new ideas to forge political consensus appear to be just as important. Does the notion of exclusion offer a formula with which to achieve the political compromises necessary to meet these challenges?

As I have indicated, exclusion means different things to different people. Only at the extremes of the political spectrum is one likely to find people actually in favour of it. Given the multiple connotations of the term, it might provide a political opportunity to cement a broadly based alliance in favour of new social policies. For example, the importance that French observers attach to distinguishing exclusion from other terms denoting social disadvantage suggests that the concept does have political significance. If we define exclusion as a thoroughly new, multidimensional phenomenon touching people at all levels of the social hierarchy in some respects or at some point in their lives, large, cross-class coalitions to combat it may become easier to build. Most people have suffered from some kind of rejection or misery in their lives, and apprehension about being excluded has become widespread (see Bourdieu, 1993; Balibar, 1992). As the connotations of exclusion expand to encompass the dashing of extravagant aspirations, “in the end everyone will consider himself excluded from something” (Xiberras, 1993).

For example, a survey conducted in France in December 1993 by CSA/La Rue, a newspaper sold by the homeless, found that 55 per cent of French adults and 69 per cent of young people aged 18-24 fear they will become “excluded” and three-quarters worried that someone close to them would (André, 1994). That feeling of vulnerability is not confined to France. The Families and Work Institute found that 42 per cent of American workers report their companies are reducing their workforces temporarily or permanently (Gans, 1993). That near-majorities of respondents perceive a clear threat of exclusion – in the broad sense of a loss of social status – may account for the term’s wide appeal and its even wider application.

Recent inflammatory remarks about immigrants by certain French politicians are nothing if not divisive and have mobilized the opposition.
However, whether public apprehension and indignation will be sufficient to mobilize strong political support for new social policies in France remains to be seen. In the spring of 1994, demonstrations against inadequate provision for unemployed young people revealed a wide range of attitudes among the young – including a fear that their expectations of continuing a comfortable lifestyle acquired at home will not be fulfilled. If the common fear of exclusion may cement an alliance among those differentially placed in the social hierarchy, this may not prove sufficient to overcome other social cleavages.

Indeed, to the extent that exclusion is understood in the liberal, individualistic terms of the specialization paradigm, it may become a euphemism for stigmatized, isolated, or scapegoated groups. Its meaning may narrow to those with multiple disadvantages. From this perspective, the university student protests against declining employment prospects may simply reflect a defence of their traditional prerogatives and a demand for protection from increasing competition. By identifying the victims of economic restructuring and the end of full employment, terms like exclusion, the new poor, or the underclass may even serve to justify majority resistance to redistributive taxation and expenditures (Room, 1990). Targeted social policies will then entail no sacrifice by the privileged and dualism will be reinforced.

Thus, though the idea of exclusion could be useful to reformers who wish to point to the inadequacies of existing welfare states, conversely it may serve to distract attention from the overall rise in inequality, general unemployment, and family breakdown that is affecting all social classes. By ghettoizing risk categories under a new label and publicizing the more spectacular forms of poverty requiring emergency aid, policies to combat exclusion may make it easier to re-target money on smaller social categories, like the homeless or the long-term unemployed. It may even undermine the universal social insurance schemes that traditionally protected the working- and middle-classes. In sum, therefore, just as the idea of exclusion has many meanings, it can also serve a variety of political purposes.

References


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EC Commission: see Commission of the European Communities.


