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Panel session 3

DISCOURSE AND IDEAS

Coordinative Narratives of Leaders in Libya
Lessons from the Authoritarian Epoch 2003-2010

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Abstract

In this paper I report on my preliminary findings on how authoritarian leaders talk about ‘good governance’ in the field of economic policy, drawing on original evidence on the Libyan case. Authoritarian leaders need coordinative discourse to mobilize their bureaucracy and the management of publicly-owned firms, as well as to show commitment to their foreign partners and reduce external audience costs. To gain empirical leverage, I specify the discursive institutional approach in terms of the narrative policy framework. I elaborate a set of expectations of the basis of discursive institutionalism and contextual knowledge about Libya. Then I probe the expectations on a corpus coded with the narrative policy framework categories. The findings show that discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy framework ‘travel well’ in authoritarian regimes.

DRAFT / COMMENTS WELCOME
Introduction

In this paper I explore how authoritarian regimes ‘talk’ about governance and why they choose a repertoire of topics or another, using the case of Libya under authoritarian rule. The contribution to the literature is twofold: first, the paper applies discursive institutionalism, an approach that has been tested on OECD countries, to authoritarian regimes. Second, to understand how discourse is cast and to gain insight on its narrative structure, the paper deploys the narrative policy framework.

At the outset, however, we have to explain why authoritarian regimes would ‘talk’ about governance. We do not expect authoritarian regimes to invest in rule of law, freedom of the press, and other domains where the domestic political costs for the regime are high. However, domains such as economic privatization and regulatory reform are much more attractive for these regimes: they do not challenge the distribution of core governmental power – hence they have limited internal costs. At the same time, these reforms have potentially high external benefits in that, they are positively perceived by the international business community and international institutions involved in trade, such as the European Commission, IMF, World Trade Organisation, and by close economic partners such as Italy for Libya or the potential union of Mediterranean. Indeed these reforms are also important for individual trade partners that, like Italy at the time of the Italian-Libyan friendship treaty of 2008. Some are not interested or simply cannot press for human rights and other governance reforms that would lessen the grip of authoritarian regimes on society and on political life.

How does this differentiated audience affect the structure of discourse in authoritarian regimes? How does it connect with the internal audience – a minimum of legitimacy is indispensable even for the most brutal regime? This is where another body of literature can assist us, broadly speaking a literature concerned with policy-discourse. Since the pioneering work of Peter Hall on the political economy of change (Hall,1989),
political economists have distinguished between the contents of reforms and how they are communicated.

After all, economic policy change is both a process of ‘doing things’ and of obtaining legitimacy for the reforms. Even authoritarian regimes, who have formidable levers of power for producing or stopping change, have to talk about change and seek legitimacy for this as policy change is both a set of reforms and a set of discursive representations of the reforms. In centrally controlled economies like those of dictatorships, the government has plenty of power to privatise and to produce regulatory reforms. This aspect of economic policy change is less problematic than in democratic systems with multiple veto powers, free unions, and pluralistic pressure group politics.

And yet, whatever change is planned or carried out, authoritarian regimes have to ‘sell’ it. They have to gain support from the international business community, as they want the reforms to attract foreign firms and investments. Countries such as Libya also promoted economic policy change for another related reason, that is to attract support from trading partners involved in bilateral treaty negotiations. Finally, they wanted to give signals to their domestic audience that the government was positively engaged with growth and delivering on economic policy goals to alleviate any potential internal anger. This kind of internal and external legitimacy issues explains the importance of discourse in authoritarian regimes to provide more nuanced analysis of governance change. The literature on this topic is massive.

Here I consider discursive institutionalism (DI) and the narrative policy framework (NPF, hereafter). Then I will discuss how these two approaches, combined in a syncretic research design, support our research and the adaptations, caveats and special points to bear in mind when examining authoritarian regimes in the first attempt in this field. We stress this because as mentioned, these approaches have been tested mainly on advanced democracies such as Britain, France, Germany and the USA, hence they cannot be imported wholesale into the analysis of dictatorships.

The organization of the paper is in different sections:

1. Policy change Discourse: Concept formation
2. Modern frameworks of study: Discursive Institutionalism (DI) Narrative Policy Framework (NPF)

3. Implications for authoritarian regimes

4. Methodology

5. Findings

6. Discussion of findings and conclusions

**1. Policy Discourse: Concept formation**

Discourse-oriented scholars argue that actors need ideas, beliefs, symbols, frames of reference to communicate and seek legitimacy, as well as to understand what their interests are in a given situation and to be able to take action and make decisions (Hay 2002, 2006). Interests are not even ‘actionable’ without ideas. In turn, ‘ideas’ is a broad category, which, depending on the authors we are considering, includes values, core policy beliefs, and norms. The literature on discourse is intimately associated with the grand debate in contemporary political economy about the three ‘I’s: ideas, interests, and institutions (Schmidt, 2002).

Discourse is defined as the ‘specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories that are (re)produced, and transformed to give meaning to physical and social relations’ (Hajer 1995: 44). The literature also argues that discourse consists of “representing both the policy ideas that speak to the soundness and appropriateness of policy programmes and the interactive processes of policy formulation and communication that serve to generate and disseminate new ideas” (Schmidt 2000a, 2000b; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 184).

These approaches are ideational and interactive at the same time. This is what Vivien Schmidt has argued throughout her career. This ideational dimension refers mainly to the content of discourse and seeks to legitimize decisions of policy makers (Hay and Rosamond 2002; Radaelli 2004: 195), while the interactive part of discourse is linked mainly to the collective actions of and connection among policy actors. Both
dimensions clearly reveal that discourse can serve as an approach to analyse causality between institutions and new policy. According to Schmidt (2002a), discourse as a set of ideas, can serve as policy process in terms of demonstrating and legitimizing policy change (2002a: 170 &171).

2. Frameworks of analysis

As mentioned, this paper combines two different frameworks, discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy framework. In this section I discuss them and relate one to the other.

2.1 Discursive Institutionalism (DI)

The most notable contribution of the DI framework is that it connects institutions, actors and ideas through discourse. Firstly, DI allows policy researchers to better identify ideas in general terms as regimes present policy plans, programs, development policies (Schmidt 2008: 305) in a given institutional context.

The second level is concerned mainly with the two types of discourse: the ‘coordinative discourse’ of elites and the ‘communicative discourse’ though which elites try to secure legitimacy for their policy reforms. To identify coordinative discourse, Schmidt (2008: 310) refers to “individuals and groups at the centre of policy construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration, and justification of new policy and programmatic ideas”. Schmidt also explained the contribution of this type of discourse in terms of providing information interpreting interaction between main actors, civil servants, elected policy legislatures, policy experts.

Governments deploy coordinative discourse when they are building consensus for a new policy at the level of elites, and communicative discourse when they seek legitimacy across citizens (Schmidt 2002a). Recall that discourse is both ideational and interactive. It follows that coordinative discourse is not just about the ideas used by elites, but also about the institutions and fora where elites interact and discuss emerging reforms and policy change in general. This concept requires adaptation when we move
from liberal democracies to authoritarian regimes, since institutions and planning fora are bound to be different in content and function.

Moreover, coordination ideas reflect arrangements among actors in a certain institutional setting such as a council of economic policy advisers or a corporatist venue in countries with this style of policy-making. Hence, coordinative discourse may go so far as to cover the ‘domain of individuals’ connection in ‘epistemic communities’, also in transnational settings on the basis of shared cognitive and normative ideas about a common policy enterprise” (Jobert 2001; Schmidt 2008). In many cases of policy change, scholars have argued that coordinative discourse can be captured in the relationship between regimes, policy actors and business leaders in the global diffusion of competition policy for example, but one can also (encounter norms entrepreneurs in an international setting and mediating factors like veto players and coalition that constrain or expand the reach of discursive strategies (Schmidt 2008: 310).

Communicative discourse concerns actions taken to legitimate policy ideas, the deliberation of ideas, and the social representations of reform (Schmidt 2008: 310). In this regard, communicative discourse aims for persuasion and legitimacy, focusing on convincing internal and external audiences of the change proposed or under way (Mutz et al. 1996; Schmidt 2008). Along with coordinative discourse, communicative discourse serves as facilitator of policy change, particularly in relation to the external audience(s), as it concerns mainly the justification of new reform.

Granted that DI works well for policy analysis, what are the specific forms in which discourse is elaborated within elites and communicated to citizens? This question brings the NPF framework into the discussion of the discourse of policy leaders and policy change.

2.2 The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF)

In policy analysis, discourse has been examined in terms of its different, specific features and of the functions in which it is created and communicated. The concept of discourse – as we said earlier - is broad. It is difficult to pin down exactly what discourse is. For this reason some policy scholars working within discourse analysis have gone
down the ladder of the abstract: simply put, they have turned their attention to the ‘forms’ in which policy discourse is often cast, that is, policy narratives.

I argue that NPF is a specification of DI at a lower level on the ladder of abstraction, not a critique or an alternative. Indeed, there is nothing in the work of Vivien Schmidt and others that points to a rejection of the NPF. Equally, although the NPF is perhaps less concerned with institutions than DI, this approach is eminently compatible with the analytical core of DI, such as coordinative and communicative discourse, and the notion of the ideational and interactive dimensions of discourse analysis. The major claims of the NPF are portrayed in the box below – it is impossible to comment on each of them within a single paper. But a few points need clarification.

Most pertinently perhaps, there are empirical advantages in using this framework. Indeed, empirically, the NPF enable us to code elements of policy narratives of privatization and regulatory governance. This is its major advantage within the context of this project. The NPF framework is associated with the work of policy analysts such as McBeth, Jones,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE CLAIMS OF THE NARRATIVE POLICY FRAMEWORK</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Policy problems are socially constructed by categories and meanings</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Public policy discourse is grounded in narratives</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. A policy narrative is more structured than a frame. It is different from other texts because it contains a clear stance or judgment (on a policy-related behavior) and (at least one) categorizations. At least a ‘story character’ is cast as victim, hero or villain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Actors involved in public policymaking mobilize evidence and emotional categories in their narratives in order to persuade and influence decisions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Pressure groups author their own narratives - hence narratives are also crucial observational elements to expose lobby tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. NPF researchers can judge whether an explanation of public policy is better or worse than another on the basis of explicit, replicable, evidence-based research methods. Socially constructed realities exist, but they can be studied with objective, transparent, and often replicable methods. Thus, in contrast to post-modern and critical discourse analysis, the NPF embraces an objective epistemology: social scientists can and should use empirical evidence to falsify their conjectures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The NPF workshop, University of Exeter, 2014
Anas Buera, Claire Dunlop, Laura Gardner, Adele Marsullo, Claudio Radaelli, Chris Waite
Shanahan in the USA (2007,2010), and, in Europe, Radaelli and colleagues (Radaelli, 1989, Radaelli et al. 2013).

The foundational proposition of the NPF is that public policy has a narrative dimension that can be studied with the same tools of rigorous, empirical policy analysis that we use for other dimensions of public policy. More specifically, the NPF acknowledges that public policy is socially constructed: policy problems, opportunities for change, even the notion of ‘good governance’ and ‘regulation’ exist only in terms of shared or contested meanings within a given set of actors or a society.

NPF-inspired studies in media, communication, and the environment have shown that this approach can provide rigorous analysis, particularly in testing claims and hypotheses such as the case study presented by McComas and Shanahan (1999). Jones and Song (2013) have integrated the NPF with elements from cognitive and behavioral sciences. Radaelli et al (2013) have used the NPF to shed light on processes of identity construction that operate during the preparation of benefit-cost analyses of policy proposals. Dunlop, O’Bryan and Radaelli (2014, forthcoming) have coded parliamentary hearings on the Arab Spring and concluded that experts’ testimonies do not rectify the heuristics used by elected policy-makers in Congress and Westminster.

The NPF considers causal stories as the main discursive element of public policy. Stories are characterized by a ‘causal plot’, the dominant metaphors being the distinction between ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’ (the good and bad characters in the story), the meanings associated with policy conflict, the doomsday scenario, or what happens if we do not act now. Essentially, for the NPF scholars, a policy story transforms problems into situations that can be handled by public policy (Roe 1994). A typical NPF study revolves around the following key elements:

1). Institutional settings of a policy - in this the NPF is not different from DI.
2). A causal plot that introduces the temporal element and a sequence of policy events as represented in discourse.
3) Characters who are narrators, fixers of the problem (heroes), causes of the problem (villains)
4). Policy solution (often supported by a doomsday scenario), and 5) Identity and metaphors. Each component can be studied as a set of ideas and as an interactive dimension concerning the actors involved- yet another element where the NPF can go along with the DI propositions.
Additionally, we have specific ‘narrative tactics & strategies’ - these tactics are used to mobilize members of certain groups, e.g. pressure groups in pluralist political systems or the higher levels of the bureaucracy and publicly-owned firms in an authoritarian regime (McBeth et al. 2007; McBeth et al. 2010: 394). Costs and benefits are represented differently by those who want to narrow down or expand the scope of conflict.

Policy actors use symbols to characterize their opponents to sketch out their attitudes. Condensation symbols simplify complexity and increase the leverage of a narrative. According to McBeth et al. (2007: 91), “winning groups have fewer incentives to use condensation symbols because doing so might invoke unintended consequences such as riling the opposition. Losing groups, however, have tremendous incentives to negatively portray both the issue and their opponents through the use of condensation symbols”.

To wrap up, then, the adoption of DI types of discourse is connected to the identification of the NPF; essentially we use DI as macro template (level) to explain the two functions of discourse, and narratives as specific forms (meso level) in which discourse is cast. In this we follow the recent hybridization of both DI and NPF suggested by some European scholars (Radaelli et al. 2013). Our NPF analysis will range from the macro-level– when the documents present the regime’s perspective on regulation and the economy – and the meso level when the documents refer to a specific policy like liberalization. We will explore the narrative structure of these levels by looking at classic features of narratives, such as canonicity and breach, narrative transportation (shifts), congruence and incongruence, and trust in the narrator (Jones and McBeth 2010) specifically when we reach the communicative stage.

3. Implications for authoritarian regimes

Institutions are not the same in democracies and authoritarian regimes. The party system is rigidly controlled. The elite is extremely narrow, in some cases not extending beyond the family of dictators and their advisors. According to Gandhi (2008: 8), “Some dictators are crowned; others wear a uniform. Some organize a ruling party and stage
single-party elections; others maintain a ‘façade’ of controlled multiparty competition’.\(^1\) Authoritarian leaders face two main problems of governance in their authoritarian rule.

Firstly, the problem of ‘governance legitimacy’ as they have not been chosen by their people and they seek to face challenges that undermines their rule. Secondly, they have to assure and maintain ‘compliance’ in society and reduce any potential dissatisfaction that may arise from the opposition side.

Referring to autocracies and foreign pressures, particularly in Latin America, the literature revealed the third problem facing dictators which links directly to ‘managing the survival of leaders’ faced by outside threats. In their argument entitled “authoritarian institutions and regime survival”, Wright and Escriba-Folch (2010) provided empirical evidence of how institutional change matters for the survival of authoritarian leaders through internal institutions such as parties and legislators, as dictators create and/or amend institutions or even establish new policy ideas that help to maintain subsequent governance to insure the interests of policy elites and dominant parties in autocracies (Dahl 1971; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2010).

As DI is linked directly with the role of institutions through the interactive process of communicative and coordinative narratives, we need to understand how dictators shape institutions in autocracies. Gandhi (2008: 34) mentions that dictator tends to establish nominal governance institutions as they do not rule alone, and need such institutions to craft new policies. Irrespective of variations among autocracies, the most common institutions under dictatorships include, as mentioned, legislatures and political parties. Policy elites represent actors who support the leader to stay in power through a narrow elite group coalition. Planning councils exist to execute the policies of the elites; they are not a forum for open deliberation and contestation of the choices made by the elite. They may still deliberate about how a given choice can be implemented in practice and with what type of policy instruments.

Gandhi (2008: 164) further explains the given institutional settings in survival strategy by noting:

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\(^1\) The clear example of this notion is reflected in assessment of Teorell (2007) based on findings revealed by Geddess (1999,2003) as military and persona-list regimes are more prone to institutional change.
“Dictators establish institutions such as consultative councils, Juntas, and political bureaus, as a first institutional trench against threat from the ruling elite, but when dictators need to neutralize threats from larger groups within society and solicit the cooperation of outsiders, they rely on normally democratic institutions, such as legislators and political parties. Dictators who are more dependent on outsiders and face stronger opposition must institutionalize significantly, whereas those rulers have little need for cooperation and face weak opposition institutionalize little or not at all.”

DI analysis in such cases will focus mainly on the discursive interactions in the elites and planning council(s) for the coordinative dimension. The communicative dimension refers to citizens, the outsiders including: international business community, international organization and individual treaty partners.

In the case of the national institutional settings in Libya as an authoritarian regime, Gaddafi created both formal and informal governance institutions that lacked the actual power to access the central policy decision which were mainly controlled by him, his son (Saif) and close policy figures. In fact, this control is based on the governance arrangements he created in the early stages of his authoritarian rule. In his study of formal and informal authority in Libya, Mattes (2011: 57) presented three key institutional transformations that have drawn the shape of the national institutional settings in Libya including: 1. the revolutionary legitimacy of leadership 2. the rejection of pluralism and political parties and their role in the formation of governance policies 3. the rejection of policy institutions elections in the classical sense in favor of a local unique style called ‘election by the mass (Jamahir)’ as Gaddafi considered it the only way of direct democracy and solutions of governance according to his views (2011:57).

Personalist regimes like Libya present the features of family-oriented governance; some of them restrict or ban pluralism and political parties. We have to situate discourse in these institutional features. Coordinative discourse can vary between ‘thick’ or ‘thin’, depending on how internally conflictual the elite is. But it will never be as thick as it can be in open pluralistic societies. When power is concentrated in the hands of the leader, and policy making is the purview of a very restricted government elite, such types of dictatorships are most likely to have thick and elaborate
communicative discourse which mainly focuses on persuading the general public of the necessity and justifications of new policy with little outside input (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004:198).

Overall, we expect thin coordinative discourse in authoritarian regimes as the policy formulations and building consensus on reform issues is very restricted to the ruling dictator, ruling family members and actors linked to them. In order to illustrate the thick communicative discourse expected to be found as the most prevalent type of policy discourse in the case of the Libyan regime, we need to explain what audience matters to them. Wolf (2011:1), mentioned that ‘audience costs’ reflect the threats and promises that leaders suffer from and face politically. Therefore, audience costs are part of the communicative strategy to mitigate concerns about potential conflicts, as they present solutions such as economic reform to resolve the new situation (Schultz 2001: 52). For Baum(2004: 628) the external audience is of paramount importance for political leaders in international affairs. However, the domestic audience also matters when there is a need to rationalise the leader's decisions, raising the issue of the leader's behavior and how to communicate new policy ideas effectively (Slantchev 2006: 470). This depends on communicative narrative strategies and tactics that the regime uses for its aims.

Externally, the international society, the business community and international organisations represent the main external audience for an authoritarian regime. For a country sanctioned by the United Nations like Libya, compliance with the norms of international society is key to legitimation. At the same time, the use of economic reforms has been instrumental in gaining at least some leverage in relation to treaty partners, the European Union and the international business community. We can expect that business firms are more sensitive to regulatory quality, privatisation plans and compliance with the norms of the World Trade Organisation than with compliance with the human rights notions supported by the United Nations. Libya represents the institutional settings of a personalist regime type with a declared orientation towards reform after 10 years of international isolation caused by the Lockerbie political crisis and decades of socialist economic orientation of governance.
In terms of landmark discourses defining institutions, the master references for Libya are the ‘Declaration on the Authority of the People’ in 1977, and the ‘Declaration on the Separation of Rule and Revolution’ in 1979 which influenced the national institutional settings of the Libyan authoritarian regime (Mattes 2011: 58). While the former was issued to regulate elections, the latter declaration was prepared to confer a special status on any political or governing actions by Gaddafi as a personal revolutionary leader. According to the first declaration (1977), Gaddafi created ‘formal non-binding legislative and executive institutions’. The main national legislative body of public policies was the General People's Congress (GCP), while the national executive branch was the General People's Committee (GPC) representing the Libyan government, or the ‘the council of ministries’ (2011: 59).

The second declaration of separating rule from revolution (1979) enabled Gaddafi to build the ‘informal power’ to safeguard the revolutionary system and maintain influence on the formal internal governance policies (2011: 72 & 73). Thus, the regime built its institutions based on the ‘revolutionary ideology’ of Gaddafi. According to Joffé (2011: 199), there were formal legislative and executive structures for policy formulations, implementation and consultation, providing government officers and rule. However, Gaddafi sought to control the policy decision through intervening via the informal authorities such as the ‘revolutionary committees’ founded in 1977 to maintain the revolutionary traditions of the regime and control the policy process (2011: 200). Beside formal policy actors, these informal bodies have been also identified by Mattes (2011: 62-77) as authorities providing key policy characters for the dictator to rely on in many aspects of internal and external policy deliberation. As the formal bodies contained the legislative and executive branches, the informal structures relied on ‘protagonists’ who had a political influence derived from  

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2 Legislative and executive branches

The legislative body (GCP) and the government (GPC) form the branches of the formal governance. They both represent the formal, ‘non-binding’ institutions of governance under dictatorship. These bodies also served under Gaddafi's ‘Declaration on the authority of the people’ in 1977, and ‘The declaration on the separation of rule and revolution’ in 1979 to present his political part of the Green Book (Mattes 2011: 57-59). What was important in presenting these formal bodies is how they both coordinated with the NPC council. Additionally, their role served mainly in presenting the formal turning points of economic regulatory reform beside the determination of which ‘initiative’ of economic development was to be adopted, such as the development program 2008-2012 which was formally presented by the last Libyan prime minister, Al-Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi in 2008 and which was notably given the priority of implementation rather than the informal initiatives of Sall’s reformers. Our analysis of discourse also considers the key transitions in policy measures of economic governance. Hence, it was important to present the key regulatory reform transitions as the main domain to show the change.

Formal and informal institutions are also expected to represent the conflictual, and consensual patterns of interaction emanating from the national settings under the dictator’s control of rule. Hence, it is important to look at the types of ‘quasi-formal policy institution’ created by Gaddafi to govern the policy reform episodes after the international isolation. These institutions included types such as: the National Planning Council (NPC) which was formed in 2000 as an un-elected policy body providing policy reform and economic governance proposals based on the ideas of academics and experts. The ‘Gaddafi International Foundation of Development’ headed by Saif Gaddafi presents another type of these institutions, established in 1999 as an umbrella of non-government charity, and development organisations (2011:61).

We expect that coordinative narratives in the period under examination involved formal and informal authorities representing restricted policy elites. In contrast to thin coordinative discourse, the Libyan regime relied for years on ‘the presentation of self ’ on the front stage to the external audience through rich communicative narratives with plenty of ‘villains’ acting against Gaddafi's survival, and on the attempt to craft a new imagine for the regime in international politics and political economy, using economic reforms, regulatory quality and privatisation as discursive lynchpins. Communicative discourse is the second stage of extending this research in the future.

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4 This institution had emerged in 2000 after the UN decision to lift the sanctions imposed on Libya after the Lockerbie political crisis. According to the literature on authoritarianism, the NPC is considered as one of the ‘quasi-formal bodies of consultancy’ often created by dictators to provide direct plans for policy reform. Therefore, the NPC started its actual work in economic governance in 2001 to present solutions for the Libyan economic problems which had accumulated through the socialism epoch. Its notable policy and economic governance included initial proposals, such as: economic policies (2000), policy alternatives to oil revenues (2001), and the policy of ‘one billion’ Libyan dinars for housing projects between 2000-2002 (NPC 2003). The analysis of the text carried within its reports reveals the significance of the coordinative narratives strategies of new governance.
4. Methodology

The single case study method is justified given the exploratory nature of our project. It is also suitable when issues of context play a large role in the exploration of social mechanisms (Falleti and Lynch 2009), in our case mechanisms of persuasion and legitimation via narrative tactics. In addition, it is feasible for the understanding of how individual reforms are narrated by authoritarian leaders to their public opinion and to the international audience. Hence, the expected contribution of this case is exploratory.

We have chosen the period of this single case-study as a fundamental step. We start from 2003, with Muammar Gaddafi's speech on 14 June 2003, to both the Libyan parliament and to the public audience in which he declared the dismantling of the public sector’s dominance of economic governance and the adoption of a new orientation of reform (The Libyan broadcasting service 2003). This announcement went in parallel with the emergence of his eldest son's (Saif) initiative of reform entitled ‘Libya and the 21st Century’, designed to justify the appropriateness of the intended ‘economic governance change’ in light of the failure of past policies. Following these developments, there were key amendments to economic governance measures based on ideas of privatisation, and opening foreign investments, breaking the public sector monopoly, and plans for future sustainability. These changes were launched through some regulatory and structural adjustments manifested in regulations affecting economic activities, banking, foreign investment and the stock market, or through the re-adjustment and amendment of past regulations from the epoch of socialism from 2003 to 2010, as the last year witnessed further regulatory change before the fall of the regime in 2011.

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5 This initiative was formally distributed to the public audience in 2003 in a book containing extensive economic steps for good governance. It also presented an appraisal of the past economic governance problems in Libya for the past epoch of a socialist economy, criticizing public sector dominance of economic activities. Additionally, this initiative included five main aspects of Libya’s movements in economic governance according to the international standards based on regulatory and structural change: 1. lessons from the dominance of the public sector over economic activities in the past 2. breaking the monopoly by privatization through new regulations 3. introducing a new monetary policy 4. Prospects of a new trade policy 5. prospects of Libya and EU/Italy cooperation

The unit of analysis in this paper is the 'discourse text'. Hence our data collection techniques include the collection of ‘written texts’ derived from primary material such as the speeches of policy actors, providing a great deal of communicative and coordinative actions needed for discursive narrative analysis. In terms of data analysis techniques, we analyze policy discourse and narratives by coding text with the help of software. With NVivo we keep track of codes generated from the narrative policy framework. We developed our original coding framework (see table.A1- in the appendix at the end of this paper).

Let us introduce our expectations for empirical analysis. The following are expectations linked to the stage of coordination (they are extensively motivated in my PhD chapters) – we leave the analysis of communicative discourse to a second paper.

E.1 Coordinative discourse on economic governance (regulatory reform, privatisation, elements of sustainable development) is thin rather than thick. It revolves around the vision of the leader and his family, especially the son who was effectively in charge of economic policy.

E.2 The main forum of coordinative discourse is not an elected assembly. It is instead the National Planning Council (NPC).

E.3 Narratives of economic governance do not include elements such as individual economic freedom, liberties, the human rights of workers and the economic benefits of a free press. Instead, the causal plot, metaphors, and other core narrative features revolve around ease of business, the process of the opening up of the economy, and the key economic position of Libya in international trade. The causal plot will not stress the endowment of the country in terms of raw materials, oil, etc, since this was already experienced prior to 2003 with limited success, but rather the skills of the people and the good regulatory framework that supports business.

E.4 The role of time is to project economic success and a modern economy into the near future, showing that the regime is moving towards modern values of economic governance such as sustainability, privatisation, investment, and regulatory reform.

E.5 The characterisation of heroes and villain is blunt, with the heroes working for the future economic progress of the country and the villains being either aggressive
foreign regimes or those internal actors who resist modernisation of the economy to protect their privileges.

5. Findings

To empirically investigate our corpus of documents, we have transcribed and coded the evidence about coordinative discourse. We transcribed segments of text and it was translated from Arabic to English. Each coordinative item within the corpus was given a specific number (CRD.1.2.3…..28). The coded documents of the corpus comprised the following:

Table 1 – Coordinative evidence coded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set of coordinative discourse</th>
<th>Actor / Institutions</th>
<th>Title of document</th>
<th>Number of Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRD-1,4,26,27,28</td>
<td>Muammar Gaddafi</td>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>7078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Dismantling public sector-June2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Call to find alternatives to Oil revenues-April2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Speech to the Libyan parliament GCP-January2006</td>
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<td>-Speech to the Libyan parliament GCP-January2007</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Speech to the Libyan parliament GCP-January2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD-2</td>
<td>Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem 2003-2006</td>
<td>Shokri Ghanem's statement during the first annual session of the Libyan parliament: ‘hearing session of the economic program’</td>
<td>1107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD-3</td>
<td>Policy Ministers</td>
<td>Dialogue of New Economic Governance</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD-5</td>
<td>Saif Gaddafi</td>
<td>Saif Gaddafi speech -August 2005</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD-6</td>
<td>Saif Gaddafi</td>
<td>‘Libya and the 21st Century’ launched by Saif Gaddafi</td>
<td>4001</td>
</tr>
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<td>News items- Libya our home : News and Views</td>
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<td>NPC Council –Informal initiative</td>
<td>The National Economic Strategy in Libya NES</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<td>CRD-25</td>
<td>NPC Council –Informal initiative</td>
<td>Libya 2025 : Sustainable Development Culture</td>
<td>850</td>
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</table>

We have then established the relationships between the NPF themes based on data which emanated from the sources. Firstly, we focused on the language carried in the discourse. According to Drew & Heritage(2006), “language is employed in the service of
doing things in social world”. We then established our empirical analysis of the following features of narrative (Bazeley 2008:80): ‘transitions in discourse’, ‘turning points’, ‘denotation in time’, ‘repetitions’, ‘silence’, ‘omissions’, ‘ endings’, and ‘inconsistencies,’ beside other features which we explored through capturing series of discourse segments during the research period. This significantly expands on the classic NPF themes of causal plots, doomsday scenarios, heroes and villains and so on. Coding also helped in identifying relationships between NPF themes based on the software tools including: ‘associated’, ‘influence/ affects’, ‘leads to’, ‘prepares’, ‘symmetrical influence’(Bazeley 2008). These relationships were identified through our original coding of corpus to understand the coordinative narratives.

We have investigated the NPF components of coordinative discourse based on the coded series of discourses to explore the adoption of ‘good governance’ in this authoritarian rule. In dressing the argument to audiences. At the outset, some features of economic governance are signals of an approach geared to entering the international society – mostly defined in terms of trade, not values and liberties. The implications for coordination within the regime were very clear: we want Coca-Cola, not the American constitution. According to Saif:

“We want to invest in the New York Stock Exchange. We want the economic cooperation .. to have Pepsi Cola,Coca-Cola. We don’t want confrontation and aggression” (CRD.7).

The reactive side’ of the international audience in both the stage of coordination and communication also reflect the beginnings of interaction. According to U.S. Congressman, Chris Chocola, when heading to Libya: “Gaddafi decided to get out of the terrorist business, we should cooperate and we should try to make sure that we have more stability”(CRD.8). The ‘ending signal’ to entrench this argument in discourse was defined by the main ‘initiator,’ Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi appointed the minister of the economy, Shokri Ghanem, as a new prime minister to present another initiator of the change.7 Our coding found that the ‘percentage coverage’ of the coded text of the ‘argument’ presents some evidence. The family discourse (Saif and his father) presented

7 A former mentor of Saif Gaddafi for the study of ‘Libya and the 21st Century’, and also a key policy actor appointed by Muammar Gaddafi, Ghanem presented his economic program mainly based on privatisation that aimed at dismantling the state monopoly, resolving labor market issues, and elements of investment through new regulatory measures. He also called for ending corruption in the public sector, preventing the misuse of resources and for enhancing transparency in the government apparatus.
more than 70% of the discourse that cover the argument, Shokri Ghanem and other formal actors present 23%. Whilst the NPC council (quasi-formal) is at 17% from the text coded.

Moving to the NPF component of ‘policy problem’, we found discursive definition for this feature was introduced by Saif presenting the rhetorical question: “How did the regime control economic activities in Libya?” (CRD.6). He also aimed to deploy the problem: “Any comprehensive strategy must provide a clear dimension for the new economic governance features of reform based on the international standards” (CRD.6). In addition, the public sector is presented by his father as the problem in the following quotation: “the public sector dominance of the economy must be ended now, the public sector needs idealist officials and people with a high level of patriotism” (CRD.4). In terms of goals, we found a dominant pattern of ‘inconsistency’ language which refers mainly to the changeableness of attitudes. According to Saif, the new reform should abide by the international standards, while his father wanted the reform to be established on a “Specific national vision of dismantling the public sector and in light of our philosophy of ‘popular capitalism’” (CRD.1). We have also noticed a detailed perspective in presenting a ‘type of solution’ suggested by Saif Gaddafi when he included the ‘regulatory reforms’ and privatization 8, combined with cooperation with Italy and the European union. Whilst his father was not clear, there is still an evocation of a future scenario in terms of vision: “I urge the Libyan parliament, GCP, to call for the preparation of a new vision of the Economy” (CRD.4).

In exploring further components, we found a contradiction between the ‘terms of reference’ and the ‘structure of beliefs’. Saif’s discourse was more linked to new modern thoughts marking more details of reform rather than the ‘silence’ of ‘norms and values’ in his father’s language. We found the quasi-formal settings (NPC council) engaged in ‘repetition’ in adopting Gaddafi’s definition of policy problem. The NPC reports mentioned the expression “guidance of the brother leader” twenty-second times in its reports. Additionally, these reports were clearly ‘silent’ in mentioning the role of Saif Gaddafi in the coordination between NPC and the GCP. To sum up then, the presence of policy problem mainly came from the discourse of the Gaddafi family (75% father, 70 %

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son) then Shokri Ghanem, 48%, and the NPC council 10%. We noticed that policy problem in Saif’s discourse declined in 2005-2008 to the level of 55% and less of the percentage coverage provided by the NVivo tool.

Additionally, the terms used to present the problem were deployed significantly by the family with notable differences. Gaddafi used the term “Failure of public sector-popular capitalism” (CRD.4), while Saif used “Failure of socialism” (CRD.6). We found the NPC council using ‘economic problem’, abiding by the guidance of Gaddafi (CRD.15). The policy problem also reveals a pattern of association was found as “the economic problem prepares the causal plot”.

Our coding of the NPF-narrative structure found a turning point in 2005 when Saif presented himself as a ‘key initiator’, albeit no formal position was appointed for him – hence he was a self-appointed initiator: “There will be no delay in our economic governance reform ....The leader has given me the permission to lead the reform” (CRD.5). In NPC reports, a notable silence was witnessed in presenting Saif’s role in the new governance, as the reports continued to discuss the visions of economic development linked to him in the years 2006-2007-2008 without officially adopting them. In CRD.4 we see the emergence of orders for the Congress-discourse here goes further than ‘structuring the interaction among the elites’ and approaches the discursive format of a military order: “I call on the Libyan congress immediately to dismantle the public sector” (CRD.4). Although Gaddafi asserted the need for new governance, coding consequent speeches (CRD.26 to CRD.28) shows a clear language of ‘avoidance’ which refers mainly to the aversion and the omission of the international norms contained in the initiative presented by his son. We found one signal from Gaddafi pointing to the informal role of Saif: “GCP, NPC and social leaders in Libya should find a clear role for Saif” (CRD.28). In addition, the text found former prime-minister, Shokri Ghanem, to be one of the main formal initiators supported by Gaddafi’s family to present another level of reform. According to a statement by Ghanem: “The mission was clear, as I have been commissioned by our leader to end the domination of the public sector of economic activity and to open the economy to new elements” (CRD.2).

As he was dismissed from his mission in 2006, the strategies and tactics of NPF coordination will further shed light on his role in the plot. The ‘institutional settings’ is
one of the NPF framework themes investigating the representation of coordinative discourse in both formal and informal venues.

We noticed that his father’s discourse was devoid of the ideological concessions in the detailed vision of his son. But rather the plot, in coordinative terms, has the objective of disorienting the elites in order to then group them under the call of the new vision put forward by the leader: “I call you now to discuss the new visions to reconsider the situation of our economy. I warn the Libyans against dependence on oil. I call to find economic alternatives for oil” (CRD.1). We have also noticed that the family’s informal and formal visions were used as the main guidelines of the NPC council reports. Muammar Gaddafi was considered as the ‘formal initiator’ who orders the governance change:

“The NPC Board devoted its closing session of the second regular meeting entirely to reviewing the guidance of the leader” (CRD.15). Even the last informal initiative of sustainable development required the leader’s approval: The vision must be submitted to the historic Libyan leadership to gain the final approval” (CRD.20).

The NPC reports also show little institutional links with the informal structure of narrative. In fact, the NPC discourse was ‘silent’ regarding any formal role of Saif Gaddafi in preparing policy change. Its language witnessed several ‘turning points’ concerning the role of expertise, academics and international norms in presenting the reform. The text search found that the word ‘preparation’, as linked to the new development vision, was repeated ‘eight times’ in the final recommendations of the NPC reports. We found this language of ‘denotation in time’ often used by the NPC coordinative reports.

We see that the ruling family had manipulated narratives limiting the policy preparation to a small number of elite. In addition, the text defines the nature of coordinative discourse as ‘thin’ and restricted, as the NPC report (2003) stated that it “devoted its closing session of the second regular meeting solely to a review of the guidance of the brother leader Gaddafi” (CRD.15).

Governance coordinative discourse revealed the ‘thin’ nature of deliberating economic governance through limited actors. In terms of coding relationships, the structure of narratives of economic governance is a ‘lead to’ pattern which means that the
intended good governance features were defined in light of the ruling family’s intentions. Therefore, the causal plot of manipulating governance will further determine the links between narrative structure and other NPF themes.

To understand the NPF- causal plot, texts in our corpus were coded further to identify ‘patterns of relationship’ between the causal plot and other components of NPF framework. Hence, the coding revealed policy problems as defined by the informal and formal narrator and initiators and how they ‘prepare’ the new governance.

The causal plot starts with the reader over the narrator's shoulder: the international investors and the new ‘friends’. They need a suitable environment. To achieve this, the elites have to work hard together to change laws and regulations. This is a colossal task. It will not be achieved - the plot carries on - if the elites do not change their core beliefs about how they govern the economy. Gaddafi’s discourse (2003) was already eloquent on these steps in the causal plot:

“We need to review all laws and regulations that organize the Libyan economy to create a new effective environment for investment and achieve the new goals” (CRD.1). In another segment he added: “We must change our pattern of governing the economy” (CRD.4).

Notice the language of coordinating economic governance in the father's discourse as ‘selective’ to regulatory reform as a domain linked to the regime’s ‘beliefs’ rather than calling for a radical change in the economic values and standards as presented by his son in the policy argument and problem (CRD.6). The ‘selectivity’ of good economic governance arrangements has been clearly followed by the discourse of the NPC council which contained ‘variation’ in the language employed to address the domain of regulatory reform. In the first instance, it seems that NPC reports offered support for Saif in presenting details of regulatory reform as an approach for the new economic governance: “New economic regulatory governance based on modern privatization, investment, a new regulatory system”(CRD.15). However, there was no mention of a clear role for Saif even when he declared himself as the initiator of reform in 2005.

Crucial in the causal plot is the thinking about governance. This is yet again ‘new thinking’ geared to please the reader over the shoulders of the regime, that is, the international audience. The elites ought to embrace new thinking to produce change, but
this thinking is the ‘modern’ thinking of international organisations. Indeed, we find that according to the NES report: “In conducting this assessment, the project team adapted the latest thinking on competitiveness and the global economy”(CRD.24). Also, the same report stated, the NES suggested arrangements containing: “The steps of perfect democracy, clear governance structure, and regulatory capacity”. This discourse also stressed “enhancing the energy and oil sector in national and foreign investment” (Porter and Yargin 2006). The pattern of ‘incongruence’ in the NPC council reports between informal initiatives and formal speech is evidenced by the neglect of immediate implementation of the NES strategy. Another ‘turning point’ in discourse was also witnessed during the presentation of the vision of ‘Libya 2025: sustainable development’ (2007) by Mahmoud Gibril.\footnote{Mahmoud Gibril was one of the key policy actors backed by Saif Gaddafi and was the first president of the National Economic Board (NEB) which took over the National Economic Strategy (NES) as an informal economic project directly linked to Saif Gaddafi and conducted by Porter and Yargin (2005/2006) from Monitor Group/Harvard university and some notable think-tanks, to implement Saif Gaddafi’s reform vision (2003). In parallel with this informal position with Saif, the Libyan parliament appointed Gibril as the minister of the National Planning Council NPC to be responsible for economic governance coordination. In 2008, Gibril presented his initiative: ‘Libya 2025, sustainable development culture’, declaring new economic governance based on sustainability elements and not only on narrow governance reform just to the economic domain. This initiative was based on the deliberation between Gibril and a number of experts, key ministers and parliament officers during the first national conference of public policies held at the University of Benghazi on the 23rd June 2007 and published in a book. This conference resulted in the formation of the NPC team that was selected to present a written document on this project to the NPC council (NPC & Center for Research and Consultation 2008). The team was attacked by some formal officials confronting the vision in a formal NPC meeting (2008) particularly by ministers linked to the ‘revolutionary committees’.} Although this vision also contained modern norms of governance in a comprehensive manner of development, it was officially neglected in the NPC’s last formal reports in 2008 in favour of presenting the formal development program 2008-2012.

We see that causal plot that prepares the economic governance is directly built on the ‘structure of beliefs’. Despite the explicit declaration of the radical ideas of change, the structure of ‘core beliefs’ signaled the regime's tendency to avoid any radical concession of ideology in practice. The use of the new term ‘shift to new popular capitalism’ was a reflection of this discourse. Our original coding also identified ‘the role of time/ doomsday scenarios’. According to Gaddafi: “If the public sector stays now, it would damage the economy of Libya and lead to the waste of public money and the country's oil resources and corruption hence will be further produced ”(CRD.4). Shokri Ghanem also mentioned the ‘International legal consequences’ affecting Libya's economy to refer to the delay in adopting genuine governance standards (CRD.2).
When comparing this language of the early co-ordinative discourse in the plot with the later sources, Gaddafi signalled ‘the importance of time’ in projecting the reform to present some changes in the regime governance style. The discourse of Saif (2003) presented the ‘urgency’ of adopting the international norms and the failure of past policies: “If we do not change drastically, there will be real problems of our economy” (CRD.5).

We have also explored NPC council data to gain further insight regarding time and the causal plot. Thus, the texts show that the plot was linked to Gaddafi’s guidance rather than the informal sources that urged for detailed economic governance change. In 2003, the NPC council recommendations stressed the call for “further preparation of another holistic development plan in Libya” (CRD.15). Another report pointed out: “There is a need for a long, medium-term plan, built on a holistic development plan rather than a narrow economic policy reform. This plan must be clear, straightforward, and with accurate data” (CRD.16). This report also stressed, “The continuing need for coordination between sectoral policies in order to create a unified perspective of governance” (CRD.16).

The previous review shows that the role of time has been mainly linked to the early strategies of changes in the governance style rather than presenting substantive elements of genuine reform. The delay in adopting consistent strategy of reform was noted through the different policy attitudes we witnessed, ranging from ‘alteration’ in highlighting the importance of time to minimize its importance (Saif as informal actor) or the language of ‘omission’ and ‘silence’ by his father at later stages of the plot (2006-2010). Thus, our coding found that the relationship between the causal plot and the role of time is ‘symmetrical’ as the initiator, informal narrator, and the quasi-formal forum of coordination all deployed narratives that employed the role of time in presenting the plot.

The component of ‘identity and metaphors’ tells us that according to the leader's vision, new governance is required but should not be separate from the past political ideas and the philosophy of socialism. Therefore, the text presents his new idea of ‘popular capitalism’ which aimed to provide a specificity to the new arrangements. According to Gaddafi: “We will provide added value to the economic thought in this world through our intellectual idea of Popular Capitalism” (CRD.1).
We find this discourse as implying the refusal of any imposed ready-made political arrangements of liberal democracy that carry radical economic adjustments to the core grounds of the authoritarian regime (as in NES). However, this presentation of identity took a different method in narratives deployed by the son: “Understanding the problem will lead to the adoption of new economic measures that are compatible with international standards” (CRD.6).

These two different types of narratives affected both ‘terms of reference’ as well as the orientation of governance coordination. Both perspectives of father and son differed in the deployment. We witnessed the informal sources of discourse presenting ‘terms of references’ of new ‘modern norms and values’ such as: elements of ‘Opening and regulating an unstructured economy,’ presented by Saif to reflect the new informal plan (CRD.6), ‘future vision of economy’ (CRD.4), ‘Libya and the 21st Century’ (CRD.6) ‘the vision for Libya 2019: Enhancing competitiveness’ (CRD.24), and also ‘The vision Libya 2025: sustainable development’ (CRD-21).

On the other side, the language of ‘reservation’ towards any radical change in the formal sources of discourse remained used by Muammar Gaddafi to reflect the entrenched ideology of socialism even there is an urgent need for economic change (CRD.4)

Additionally, the use of ‘Metaphors’ has been very thin in coordinative discourse. We noticed that it was mainly used by Gaddafi at the early stage to be linked to the role of time in presenting some features of change: “New People’s Socialist Economy”, and also “jump towards a system of success based on collective ownership” (CRD.4).

The plot also defined ‘policy characters’ who were responsible for the new change. Our investigation of characters is mainly concerned with the ‘conflictual and consensus pattern’ between actors of the plot. Shokri Ghanem as a formal initiator was the first to explicitly raise the ‘internal conflict’ in governance. The regime was using this conflict to manipulate the grouping of elites.

We found a clear “variation between the parliament and government perspectives on the content of the vision of Libya 2025: sustainable development” was mentioned in the NPC coordinative report (2007) (CRD.19). The regime protagonists had explicitly
declared their refusal of this new initiative in a formal NPC coordinative meeting in 2007. This was asserted by Yousef Al-Sawani, the head of Saif Gaddafi foundation of development, stating: “Saif was supposed to be the patron of economic reform. He did not care about it at last. The project has faced very sharp attacks in the NPC forum last meeting of 2007” (Al-Sawani 2013). This discourse also raises how the actors manipulated the plot, based on the time element. Analyzing communicative discourse will further shed light on the dynamics of these narratives.

To sum up, the causal plot of economic governance coordination was ‘selective’ to the domain of economic regulatory reform that does not challenge the regime powers, while the informal language shows more presentation of the international standards of governance. Also, the NPC discourse of coordination formally neglected any norms and standards provided by the informal sources which contained a challenge to the regime control of powers.

Our coding of discourse identifies a ‘symmetrical relationship’ between the structure of beliefs and the causal plot as the regime actors had manipulated narratives of a selective governance to present change in light of the regime intentions.

The coding shows that the role of time was mainly linked to the early strategies of presenting some changes in governance style rather than substantive elements of economic reform. The ‘silent’ language of time at the later stage supports this remark.

We found a clear distinction between formal and informal sources of discourse in presenting both ‘identity’ and ‘terms of references’ to the internal coordination as the regime used both sources to manipulate the new economic governance narratives. The regime used metaphors to serve its intention of presenting some features of economic governance at the early stage.

The characterization of ‘heroes and villains’ is sharp in the plot. It leads us to consider the regime strategy of ‘winners vs. losers’ to manipulate policy narratives to serve strategic goals and intentions. The causal plot was mainly deployed by the Gaddafi family and linked elite, aiming to balance both new thoughts and core beliefs in the governance discourse.
6. Discussion of findings and Conclusions

Back to our expectations, we can now revisit them on the basis of our empirical findings. As for E.1, we found that the vision of economic reform was very limited. The authoritarian leaders use coordinative discourse to target selective aspects of governance change limited to regulation and privatization. The leaders do not need wide coordinative discourse. But they need to produce effective coordination at home on regulation and privatization to speak with a single effective voice in the international system and trade partners like Italy – Libya was negotiating an important treaty with this country during these years. Thus, thin coordinative discourse is produced ‘in the shadow of’ external (read: international) audience costs and benefits.

In E.2 (that is, key institution for coordinative discourse) we identified the NPC council as the main institutional venue of coordination although this does not mean that the NPC was a creative, original narrator. This body had some characteristics of the simulacra. More exactly, it was a forum in the sense that coordinative discourse was produced elsewhere and formally legitimised within the NPC. The NPC’s role was to give resonance and formal endorsement to plans devised by the self-appointed narrator, Saif, and Gaddafi himself. The role of NPC in providing stability and legitimacy to narratives created elsewhere is shown by the almost obsessive use of the ‘repetition’ technique. The evidence clearly shows a restricted ‘official specification’ for the concept of governance. The analysis of NPF components within the communicative discourse will further extend the analysis.

Turning to E.3, the regime had used the domain of economic regulatory reform to show that Libya was moving away from state socialism after 2003 with a single commitment from the leader, the bureaucracy, and the state managers in charge of publicly-owned firms and sectors of the economy. The evidence shows no sign of individual liberties having a role in this change – it is always economics to feature in coordinative discourse. There is a language of modernization, but it does not extend to the standards of human rights and rule of law. The major effort is to sell the new regulatory framework instead, with new approaches to the registration of companies for example. According to the NPC 2005 report: “Based on the brother leader’s guidance,
the NPC council discussed this new regulatory framework in a paper prepared by the general authority for ownership of companies and economic units” (NPC 2005). In this context, sustainable development becomes a very tall order indeed. The informal initiative, ‘Libya 2025: sustainable development culture,’ points to contradictions and frustration, “Economic governance pattern has been ineffective as there was not a good enough regulatory and legislative environment to encourage the change” (CRD. 25).

E.4 (that is, role of time) is about speed and rhythm of change. The notion of moving towards the modern economy is linked to the past in different ways depending on whether the narrator was stressing continuity and evolution or radical policy change. “There will be costs if we delay the new regulatory reform” (CRD.3). The language of time started to be more ‘silent’ in the period from 2005. This was clear in a statement by Saif Gaddafi in 2008, expressing the stability of the economic trend “I think we put the train on the tracks now……I announce my withdrawal from the political and economic life now.”

Let us now appraise E.5: the strategy of ‘winners vs. losers’ was based mainly on the theme of ‘heroes and villains’. The plot was manipulated based on the ‘conflict/consensus’ pattern between the two wings within the elites and mutating types of ‘Winners and Losers’ within those who coordinated the stage of reform. According to the former prime minister, Shokri Ghanem’s: “I would like to point out that obstacles, both formal and informal, and of many characters are confronting our government policies. We were surrounded by both "visible" and "invisible" forms of them. Also, some of them are tying the hands of our government, and do not abide by our decisions” (CRD.2). In another segment he adds: “I demand more governance powers to be given to the prime minister of the GPC, in light of the absence of constitutional rules. Governance power must include the selection of members of my cabinet to work as one team” (CRD.2).

We can now provide some more general conclusions that contribute to our understanding of discourse and narratives in authoritarian regimes.

1) We found that the regime manipulated narratives of economic reform focusing rhetorically on the international standards, and at the stage of coordination on (a) specific regulatory policy narratives and (b) the narrative of an open economy that
was moving away from the disasters of state socialism. Gaddafi was however making a distinction between innovation and preserving the past, in the attempt to carve out a special identity for his regime - a regime in evolution, NOT a regime that had made fatal mistakes and had to start from scratch. Elements of radical change such as transparency, productivity, and building a comprehensive sustainable development framework have been silent in the discourse - in favor of some regulatory changes and some aspects of openness.

2) Time was used to represent the necessity of change - recall that in CRD.4 we found that the public sector had to be dismantled “immediately” - something that taken logically is nonsense, given that dismantling the whole public sector takes years of time. But, in the later part of the period we observed, time reverts to a sense of frustration because some of the most ambitious rhetorical and practical claims about reform, like sustainable development, were slipping away. Time as ‘necessity’ and ‘urgency’ becomes silent over time.

3) The coordinative texts presented Muammar Gaddafi as the main formal ‘initiator’ of change who provided the guidance for the new governance arrangements. The text also portrayed Saif as the ‘informal narrator’ of coordinative narratives of the new governance shape. Saif Gaddafi provided the main contents for economic reform in his role of initiator of economic reform. The dual role of father and son comes across as visible in the division of narrative labour between the two.

4) The texts identify the nature of coordinative discourse as very ‘thin’ and restricted between the ruling family and their subordinate elite. Our empirical investigation shows that the family circle manipulated narratives within the NPC forum. But the latter had no real narrative agency. It was a forum whose function was to create resonance for the imperatives of economic change and to stabilise beliefs about the new role of the country in an open economy.

5) The causal plot was mainly deployed by the Gaddafi family and was followed by other agents in the coordination network in hierarchical ways. One element of the causal plot that was exploited internally (to create enthusiasm among the elites for the reforms under way) was that the country was getting new ‘friends’ in the European Union: the 2008 Treaty with Italy was presented as evidence of the
concrete steps under way, the proof that Libya was really finding new ‘friends’ - and consequently all the elites had to rally around the leader to prepare the economy and the regulatory framework for the new friend and the European companies investing in the country.

6) Coordinative discourse revolved more around tactics and strategies used by the family to manipulate the discursive narratives rather than only as a vision presented by Gaddafi’s son for the aim of good governance reform.

7) The analysis shows that the Libyan regime was interested in some features of economic governance. The discourse shows that the coordination of governance was limited and controlled by the main narrators and initiators who manipulated the narratives for their strategic intentions.

Overall, the findings suggest that discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy framework travel well in authoritarian regimes, and generate insights into how authoritarian leaders use strategically terms like ‘good governance’ and ‘modernization’ to consolidate national identity and to seek legitimacy. To elaborate on the contribution of the study of authoritarian leaders’ discourse to the literature on discourse and narratives, however, I need to complement the study of coordination with the analysis of the corpus referring to communication. This will be done in the next phase of my PhD programme.
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APPENDIX

Figure 1: Cognitive map of the coordinative Causal plot model-Economic Governance (NVivo.10)

Figure 2: Some NPF graphical pattern of coding relationships: Policy problem and the structure of beliefs – (NVivo.10)
**Table A1  DI and NPF in Libya: Coding Framework**

<table>
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<th>Concept</th>
<th>In the text we are coding….</th>
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| **Identity**                                 | How does the text define the Libyan identity in texts about economic governance? Does the text define the identity of the regime, the Libyan people, the army? Who is ‘us’ in the text – for example, ‘us’ can be public managers involved in economic reforms, with their own identity as builders of a future.  
1 Who is the narrator? Who tells the story in this text?  
2 What issue/themes does the regime seek to address via the reform? |
| **The structure of the narrative:**           | 3 Is there a predominant genre in talking about the issue, e.g. ‘exhortation’, ‘evidence-based’, the ‘homework’? (see Radaelli, Dunlop, Fritsch 2013 for ‘genres’ in the narrative policy framework) |
| **Narrator, Main issues and Lead discourse genre** | How does the text describe the institutional venues and settings for economic reform? How are institutions evoked and represented discursively?  
Who are heroes working for the future of economic progress?  
Who are the aggressive/negative actors, externally and internally?  
Which specific actors are described as those who have provided momentum for the reform?  
What is the policy problem that the regime actors seek to tackle and remedy  
Which terms are used to describe the referent object or subject matter of narratives of economic reform policies in Libya? |
| **Institutional settings as discursive representations in the narrative** | What is the argument that supports the claim about change?  
What is the form, nature and basis of evidence supporting the claim made in the text?  
Who are the primary actors? Who does what in the narrative?  
What are cause and effect relations? How does time play into causal relations?  
How are metaphors deployed to frame the policy problem or solutions for the Libyan economy such as the issue of ‘climbing’ towards success?  
How are patterns of consensus and conflict represented discursively? How are they described? How do they involve institutions?  
How are proposed solutions to the economic reform justified or explained? Example – evidence or values  
What are norms and values that motivate economic policy reform in the narrative?  
What are the moral implications of the narrative (if any)?  
To what extent are ‘doomsday’ scenarios deployed to justify economic governance? To what degree is it stated that there will be negative consequences if ‘we do not reform now’?  
How does the Libyan regime underplay the country’s economic and political power in favour of overstating the position of opponents to shift the blame away  
What is the conclusion of the narrative? Does it contain a plan of ‘things to do’? |

| **Argument**                                 |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Types of evidence**                        |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Characters**                                |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Causal plot**                              |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Metaphors**                                |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Conflict**                                 |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Types of support for choice**              |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Norms/Values**                             |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Moral implications**                       |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Doomsday scenario**                        |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Blame shift**                              |                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Conclusion**                               |                                                                                                                                                          |