**Epistemic Injustice**

**Anthologies, Symposia, and Overview**


**Epistemic Injustice (both ‘testimonial’ and ‘hermeneutical’)**


This monograph presents the proposed two main kinds of discriminatory epistemic injustice: ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’. It also puts forward a virtue theoretical epistemology of testimony containing the
notion of a 'testimonial sensibility', and conceptions of corrective epistemic-ethical virtues of 'testimonial justice' and 'hermeneutical justice'.


Critical Notice of Fricker's 2007 book, arguing that Fricker's conception of testimonial injustice is too broad in one dimension, and too narrow in another; and that testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are more similar than Fricker allows.


Argues that distributive epistemic injustice is an important kind of epistemic injustice in its own right, discussing both Fricker's work on epistemic injustice and Alvin Goldman’s veritistic social epistemology.


Organised around the ambivalent notion of silence, this paper traces the aetiology of the author’s interest in epistemic injustice back to the absence of feminist philosophy in the philosophical curriculum of the eighties; also makes arguments for the importance of institutional virtues of epistemic justice.


Extends the concept of epistemic injustice into the domain of practical knowledge or know-how.


Presents a third category of epistemic injustice besides Fricker's testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice: contributory injustice. This kind of injustice is where an interlocutor is wilfully insensible to the hermeneutical resources being used by the speaker, with the result that the speaker’s ability to contribute to shared epistemic resources is thwarted, and her epistemic agency compromised.


Follows the idea of epistemic injustice into the political domain by arguing that institutions need to cultivate institutional virtues of epistemic justice, on pain of dominating citizens by effectively disabling them as contesters of interferences in their freedom.


Explores many richly interwoven themes of (epistemic and social)
insensitivity, its motivations and antidotes, in social contexts of unequal power
and oppression. Such themes centrally include: ‘active ignorance’, forms of
epistemic injustice, ‘white ignorance’, silences; and the need for active resistance,
pluralistic communities, ‘epistemic heroes’, resistant imaginations and relations
of social solidarity.

Testimonial Injustice

reprinted in Alvin Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb eds. (2010) Social
Epistemology: An Anthology (Oxford University Press).

Note: In this early paper the term ‘epistemic injustice’ is used to signify
what later comes to be specifically called ‘testimonial injustice’. Fricker also
treats prejudicial credibility excess as an epistemic injustice, whereas in the
2007 book it is only credibility deficit that is argued to be an epistemic injustice.
(See Medina 2011 for an argument against this limitation.)

Witt eds. A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (2nd
dition only) (Westview Press).

Independently explores in its own terms how epistemic trust in cases of
‘astonishing reports’ can be influenced by patterns of ignorance structured by
power relations. A set of ameliorative norms governing self-trust is proposed.

of Knowing’, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 34, Nos. 1/2, pp.154-173;
reprinted in Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard eds. (2003) Moral and
Epistemic Virtues (Blackwell).

An early statement of the concept of testimonial injustice and a virtue
account of the epistemology of testimony.

Injustice” as a Problem of Recognition’, Politics Vol. 24, No. 3; 198-205.

Explores epistemic injustice (testimonial injustice) as a form of failure of
recognition.

Argumentation in Theory and Practice Vol. 30, No. 3.

Develops a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice, namely ‘argumentative
injustice’. This happens when someone puts forward an argument and its
reception is negatively affected by prejudice.

Economy’ Hypatia Vol. 26, No. 2; pp. 280-93.

Argues for a view of testimonial injustice as a sub-species of a more
generic kind of injustice—trust injustice.

Distinguishes two kinds of silencing: testimonial ‘quieting’ which occurs when a hearer fails to recognize the speaker as a knower; and testimonial ‘smothering’, which occurs when a speaker, upon recognising that her interlocutor will not properly acknowledge her testimony, tailors and truncates her word to fit the hearer’s ‘testimonial competence’.


Makes a case for regarding prejudicial credibility excess as a form of epistemic injustice.


Argues for a strongly interpersonal strain of testimonial injustice in terms of the wrong of ‘rejecting’, as opposed to merely ‘ignoring’ the word of the speaker.


Argues that the harm of testimonial injustice is best construed not as a kind of epistemic objectification as in Fricker’s account, but rather in terms of the subject-other relation, as drawn from the work of Ann Cahill and Simone de Beauvoir.

**Hermeneutical Injustice**


Presents the notion of ‘hermeneutical injustice’. An extended version of this paper constitutes the final chapter of Fricker’s *Epistemic Injustice* (2007).


Argues that there is equal disadvantage incurred by both parties involved in a discursive exchange structured by hermeneutical injustice.


Argues for the view that we should regard at least some kinds of hermeneutical injustice as agential (rather than purely structural), in the sense that the injustice is aided and abetted by those who fail to challenge hermeneutical gaps. (Material from this paper features as ch. 3 of Medina’s *The Epistemology of Resistance* (2013)—see above list, ‘Epistemic Injustice (both testimonial and hermeneutical’).)


Argues that ‘willful hermeneutical ignorance’ should be considered a third type of epistemic injustice.

Note: ‘Willful hermeneutical ignorance’ is presented as a more generic term for what Charles Mills, specifically in regard to race, has termed ‘white ignorance’. Again, see Mills’ ‘White Ignorance’, and other papers in Sullivan and Tuana eds. (2007) *Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance* (SUNY Press).

**New contexts**

Issues of epistemic injustice are being extended to new areas in different ways.

**Philosophy of Medicine:**

In Philosophy of Medicine the chief applications of concepts of epistemic injustice concern the epistemic standing of the patient, the conceptual tools available to them, and the communicative relations between patient and medical practitioner.


Argues that testimonial and/or hermeneutical injustices are foundational in that people suffering from mental ill-health may be subject to them and as a direct result be seriously disadvantaged in other ways.


An exploration of patients’ experiences of epistemic injustice (testimonial and hermeneutical) in medical treatment.


Advances the view that child-patients are often subject to epistemic injustice.

Presents case studies showing how psychiatrists may do an epistemic injustice to delusional psychiatric patients owing to prejudicial over-generalisation of their cognitive dysfunction.

**Philosophy of Education:**

In Philosophy of Education two of the key emerging issues concern the broad aims and value of education, and issues of bias in classroom interactions.


Makes a case against Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift’s position that education is a positional good, and their case for levelling down educational provision. Focussing on education’s nonpositional benefits, Kotzee outlines an alternative account of educational justice in terms of epistemic justice.


Argues that in the effort to create a more inclusive educational context, researchers should move from a language of epistemic diversity to a language of epistemic injustice.

**Philosophy of Law:**

In Philosophy of Law the key issue so far emerging is the ways in which our understanding of witnesses and defendants’ experiences might be hampered by hermeneutical injustice. This same problem is iterated at the level of groups or peoples and how they may relate to prevailing legalistic language and concepts.


Explores the virtues required to avoid both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice in legal fact finding.


Argues that indigenous peoples of the U. S. have been harmed by both kinds of epistemic injustice at the hands of government science policy and the domestic legal system.

Note: an entry for Epistemic Injustice is forthcoming on Oxford Bibliographies Online.