Keynote 1
‘Epistemic Injustice Revisited’
Miranda Fricker
University of Sheffield

I will present some respects in which the ideas of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice have evolved since 2007. Regarding testimonial injustice I will focus somewhat on the shift from an exclusively ‘transactional’ phenomenon to an expanded conception that includes a ‘structural’ phenomenon (from Elizabeth Anderson). Regarding hermeneutical injustice I will aim to explain how the notion relates to the idea of ‘white ignorance’ (from Charles Mills).

Session 1

James Andow
‘Who Knows? Who’s Asking? Epistemic Injustice and Theory of Knowledge’
University of Nottingham

Social inequalities have epistemic effects. This has long been recognised. Along with possessions, legal rights and access to resources, epistemic goods are distributed unjustly. Information is shared within privileged classes only. Oppressed groups are denied access to education, and the like. But that is not the extent of the epistemic effects of social inequality. Miranda Fricker had recently drawn attention to, and explored the concept of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice occurs, as Fricker introduces the concept, when someone is given less credence than they deserve. As a source of testimony, they are treated unjustly. Members of groups against whom there is widespread prejudice are the most obvious victims.

In this paper, I explore a related phenomenon. Something else of epistemic significance is true of those at the receiving end of epistemic injustice and the unjust distribution of epistemic goods. I reflect upon the ways in which members of certain groups are ill-treated as epistemic agents — the ways in which their epistemic capacities can be underestimated. (This may not be best attributed to fault on the part of individuals but, as with other epistemic injustices, the result of structural and society-level problems.) Members of certain groups are treated as being more gullible; they are treated having more manipulable beliefs; they are more prone to attempts to dupe; they are condescended to; they are given different justifications; they are presented the same facts in different ways. As many recognise, this is ethically important. As Fricker certainly recognises, this has important implications for how members of those certain groups ought to be treated (epistemically). However, as is rather less well recognised, it also has important implications for how members of those groups ought to treat other people (epistemically). And I urge that this has some important implications for that most traditional of epistemological projects: theory of knowledge.

The purpose of the concept of knowledge is plausibly to enable us to track good informants. However, when it comes to evaluating individual informants we are not all in the same boat. Some of us are treated differently than others when testified to. This being so, whom one appropriately treats as a good informant seems to depend rather upon whether one is a member
of a group against which prejudice is rife. Who counts as a knower seems rightly to depend on whom one asks. The question is how this is best accommodated by a theory of knowledge. In the paper, I briefly argue that a non-indexicalist assessor relativism about ‘knows’ and knowledge (similar to that countenanced by MacFarlane) seems best equipped to capture the sense in which who counts as a knower depends on who is asking.

Bennett Holman and Justin Bruner
‘Keeping Epistemic Justice Social: Why Credibility Excess Matters’
University of California, Irvine

On Fricker’s account, credibility excess does not constitute epistemic injustice. In essence, norms of distributive justice do not apply because credibility is not an exhaustible resource. We argue that when the community of knowers in kept in view, a credibility excess can regularly precipitate epistemic injustice because though credibility is not exhaustible, influence is. To explore this effect, we examine the use of Diethylstilbestrol (DES) to prevent miscarriage. Soon after FDA approval, substantial evidence emerged that DES was dangerous to both the expectant mother and her unborn child, and ineffective at preventing miscarriage. Despite disconfirming evidence, doctors continued to prescribe DES for more than three decades, resulting in one of America’s worst medical tragedies. The case-study showcases the ability of pharmaceutical companies to maintain a level of influence with doctors that exceeded their rational authority and overwhelmed the influence of credible sources of information (including the doctor’s own experience). We suggest that this is merely one instance of what we call the intransigently biased agent problem. Such a problem occurs when a member of an epistemic community is motivated to convince other members of a view, regardless of the truth.

As a means to explore this problem we adopt Zollman’s network epistemology paradigm in which agents continuously learn about the world both directly and indirectly from other inquirers. Zollman’s counterintuitive results show that the free exchange of information can inhibit a group from acquiring true beliefs. We show that these results fail to obtain with the introduction of an intransigently biased agent. Moreover, two types of testimonial injustice are caused by the credibility excess accorded to the intransigently biased agent. First, honest agents suffer testimonial injustice because though they are accorded appropriate credibility, their influence is unduly diminished. Second, is the epistemic injustice caused to the community by introducing an obstacle to discovering truth. This motivates the introduction of a model in which agents can strengthen and weaken their credibility assignments as an epistemic corrective. While such a practice yields epistemic gains for the community, the trade-off is the possibility of a third type of injustice in which an honest agent accords credibility to the biased agent over her own experience (i.e. she comes to doubt her own ability as a knower). We close by revisiting the DES case-study and discuss how the introduction of such epistemic correctives might have prevented the wide-spread use of DES and the resultant medical disaster.

Irena Cronin
‘The Epistemic Injustice of Self-Directed Prejudice’
UCLA

Miranda Fricker, in her landmark book Epistemic Injustice, presents the notions of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice; according to Fricker, testimonial injustice occurs between individuals, with the question of culpability of falling on the hearer, while with hermeneutical injustice, both the occurrence and culpability of injustice have collective societal origins. There are some cases of conflicted individuals that Fricker presents, such as the ‘card-carrying’ feminist and the man with ‘homosexual tendencies’, where her emphasis is on delineating the individual’s belief from beliefs that occur as a result of stereotypical pressures. The case of an individual who has developed self-directed prejudice is not discussed or developed by Fricker, and yet, this kind of prejudice might be the most damaging of all in that it prevents an individual from the possibilities
of fulfilling their true capabilities and living a complete life.

A person who would experience self-directed prejudice is one who would experience both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice; this person would inflict testimonial injustice on themselves and would be the receiver of hermeneutical injustice. In terms of testimonial injustice, the person would serve as both speaker and hearer. Imagine a person speaking or thinking to themselves that the idea that they had been thinking of was just not good enough; let’s say, in fact, that this idea was a very good one, so, in this way, the self-prejudiced person would be harming and limiting themselves through testimonial injustice. Good illustrations of this type of person could be a person of color or any other person of a group that could be viewed as societally disadvantaged or marginalized, such as a woman. Of course, this kind of self-inflicted injustice might occur to anyone who was insecure, but the kind of person that I am interested in who would do this is one where the roots of the insecurity would be found externally as a result of societal issues, rather than internally, as a result of purely mental processes. With regards to hermeneutical injustice, the self-directed prejudiced person would experience injustice as a result of collective societal structural biases. This is the injustice that causes a woman, a person of color, and persons of other disadvantaged groups to subject themselves to testimonial injustices.

Even though Fricker had not developed her theories to include the notion of self-directed injustice, her framework is highly adaptable and expandable to include this notion. A self-directed prejudiced person, as I have defined such a person, takes their cues from a prejudiced society; due to both the individual’s self-ingested prejudice and society’s prejudice, the individual is at a great epistemic disadvantage, in that they degrade their own thoughts and abilities—never truly knowing their full capabilities.

Session 2

Kristin Voigt
‘Epistemic Justice and Disclosure of Non-Financial Conflicts of Interest’
McGill University

Does epistemic justice have implications for the kinds of information individuals ought or ought not to reveal about themselves, and the kinds of information we may require others to disclose about themselves? In this paper, I explore this question in relation to journal guidelines regarding the disclosure of non-financial, ‘personal’ conflicts of interest.

Medical journals require authors of academic articles to disclose competing interests. The primary rationale for requiring such disclosures is a concern about the undue influence of authors’ financial interests – for example in the form of research funding obtained from pharmaceutical or other industries – on the results obtained in studies or the presentation of these results. Increasingly, however, authors are also encouraged – and sometimes required – to disclose non-financial, personal interests. Journals rely on expansive and often rather vague descriptions of what might be considered a competing interest of this kind.

To assess the considerations that should guide authors’ and journals’ decisions about such declarations, I focus on three characteristics recently disclosed by authors of journal articles: political affiliation, smoking status and class background. The distinction between those personal characteristics that are simply part of the researcher’s perspective and those that can reasonably be regarded as biases is not clear-cut. As a consequence, authors and journals may assume that they should ‘err on the side of caution’ and disclose any feature that could conceivably be construed as a competing interest. However, I argue that this move is problematic because it
does not take into account the possible negative consequences of such disclosures. In developing this argument, I draw on Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice and in particular her notion of testimonial injustice. I argue that disclosures of personal characteristics are problematic in two respects. First, they can undermine the credibility of the researchers whose work is presented and may prejudice readers against the results or arguments proposed. Such effects disadvantage the authors concerned and such disadvantages will often be unwarranted and unfair. Second, such disclosures can have broader effects: they imply that individuals who share the features disclosed should, at least in some contexts, be given less credibility than others. This is particularly worrying when the characteristics disclosed (e.g. social class) are related to other forms of injustice. Declarations of non-financial interests in academic debate raise concerns of epistemic justice. This concern should be reflected in decisions about the guidelines governing such disclosures. More broadly, epistemic justice gives participants in academic and other debates reasons to refrain from providing certain kinds of information about themselves.

Anna M.C. de Bruyckere
‘Understanding Epistemic Injustice: Policy Modelling’
Durham University

This essay examines the applicability of Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice (EI) to model-based policy reasoning. My goal is threefold: to add to recent work which extends EI analyses to political contexts; to consider discursive or expressive styles as underexplored sources of hermeneutic injustice; and to critically engage with Laura Beeby’s suggestion to understand EI by focusing on epistemic tools and capabilities rather than the wrongs done to marginalized groups. Drawing on case-work on healthcare and population aging modelling, I explore two guises—objectual and discursive—of hermeneutic marginalization and EI that may surround policy models.

First, models shape perceptions of what is fundamental—and, supposedly, ‘real’—about policy challenges, most strongly so when they originate from institutionally privileged organizations such as national policy bureaus. But given these perceptions, policy views based on conflicting approaches may seem not to grapple with ‘the real world’, because they do not relate to the reality of the accepted model. Thus, policy models may hamper serious uptake of alternative views. Second, models have come to set standards for precise, rigorous, serious policy discourse. Agents who are not fluent in model-based reasoning, or perceive a policy challenge as more aptly expressed in ethico-politically thicker, less technical ways, may be disadvantaged by their ‘deviating’ discursive or expressive style. What is at stake is not so much the communicability of alternative views, but their potential for political traction or persuasion potential. I argue this calls for a) epistemic virtue in model use, remedying unjustly deflated persuasion potentials; and b) epistemic-political accountability in model construction, criticizing hermeneutic marginalization in semantic practices surrounding policy challenges like healthcare sustainability and population ageing.

Critics may suggest that, no matter the methods applied, in policy-making some people will be hurt in their interests. Yet, I understand the core of EI analyses as asserting that people will occasionally be hurt but that they should nevertheless be heard. The EI perspective helps to call attention to the systematicity and occasional intentionality of the tool-related deliberation constraints discussed. While in no sense pleading to eliminate models from policy deliberation, I argue these practices should be viewed with caution. Finally, Beeby’s proposal appears to be a false dilemma: focusing on epistemic tools reconfirms – rather than replaces – a focus on the unequal distribution of disadvantages of hermeneutic marginalization.

Sydney Keough
‘How to Be an Epistemically Just Subjective Bayesian’
University of Michigan
Does a subjective Bayesian epistemology furnish us with the resources to prescribe belief revision procedures that can successfully combat the influence of prejudiced attitudes? Subjectivists model belief revision as a process in which a prior subjective probability $P_0$ is replaced by a posterior probability $P_1$, which incorporates the information that one has learned. This process of moving from $P_0$ to $P_1$ proceeds in two stages. First, one acquires some piece of information via a direct, non-inferential mechanism (e.g., perception, memory, etc.) and this acquisition causally alters a portion of one’s credences. Second, one applies an updating procedure in order to bring the rest of one’s credences in line with the initial alteration.

Though a majority of the subjectivist literature on belief revision focuses on the second stage, Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice—and specifically, of testimonial injustice—throws into sharp relief how important the first stage of belief revision is. Fricker identifies our testimonial sensibility as a kind of perceptual capacity, the deliverances of which are credibility judgments about a testifier’s sincerity and competence. Testimonial injustice arises when prejudice infects our testimonial sensibility so that we end up with a deflated assessment of our interlocutor’s competence or sincerity. Put into the subjectivist’s framework, these testimonially unjust exchanges demonstrate that the first stage of belief revision—the causal impact of experience on a portion of our credences—might itself depend causally on the agent’s prior probability. So, subjectivists ought to be concerned not only with the rational requirements for the second stage of belief revision, but also with ways in which we can combat the potentially benighting effects of the first stage of belief revision.

This paper will proceed by considering what criteria a subjectivist might provide for evaluating the changes in a hearer’s credences that result from testimonial exchanges between that hearer and an interlocutor toward whom the hearer is prejudiced. What must the hearer do, by the subjectivist’s lights, in order to count as rationally incorporating the information that she receives as a result of her interlocutor’s testimony? I contend that subjectivists ought to appeal to Jeffrey conditioning—specifically non-Field Jeffrey shifts. Non-Field Jeffrey shifts crucially do not depend on one’s prior probability, with the consequence that people with very different values for $P_0(E)$ and $P_0(\neg E)$ end up with the same posterior probabilities as a result of having the same experience (e.g., the same testimonial exchange with a single interlocutor). So, subjective Bayesianism does provide us with some powerful resources for combating the effects of prejudicial attitudes on our doxastic states.'
Religious ministers and other leaders may also practice EI in relation to mental illness. For example, voluntarist accounts of depression (found in some Christian self-help books) put forward the view that the depressed person can choose not to be depressed by doing certain things, such as getting out of bed, seeing friends, and taking exercise, and that failure to do these things entails that depression is the person’s fault. This claim rests on a type of TI, since it ignores the testimonies of people with depression who claim that, when depressed, there are certain things that are experienced as impossible to do. Such testimonies indicate that the phenomenology of depression is characterised, in at least some cases, by an experience of diminished free will. Again, some discussions of depression from both religious and psychiatric quarters posit an ontological distinction between depression that is pathological (which belongs within the domain of medicine, and is spiritually fruitless), and depression that is a Dark Night of the Soul (which is a fundamentally religious phenomenon, and should transcend medical interventions). This can lead to further instances of both TI and HI, since the judgement that a person’s depression is pathological or ‘crazy’ rather than salutary means that the person’s claims that the experience is in some sense transformative or insightful are discounted. This can in turn affect the meaning people with depression are authorised by medical and religious professionals to give to their experiences.

Paul Crichton
‘Epistemic Injustice in Psychiatry’
Ministry of Justice (UK)

Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd (2013) have argued very persuasively that people suffering from a physical illness can experience epistemic injustice as defined and explicated by Miranda Fricker (2007). The epistemic injustice they experience can be testimonial, hermeneutical, participatory or informational. My main claim is that people with mental disorders can suffer even greater epistemic injustice, especially testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, than those with physical illnesses. The sources of epistemic injustice in the case of psychiatric patients in general can be divided roughly into two main groups: global and specific. The purpose of this presentation is to elucidate the global and specific sources of epistemic injustice in people with mental disorders.

Global sources can in turn be subdivided into two main groups of problems. First, psychiatric patients are often financially impoverished are frequently socially isolated, may be dependent on licit and illicit substances (nicotine, alcohol and street drugs) and frequently suffer from physical illnesses (partly as a result of abusing these substances and of self-neglect, secondary to substance abuse and/or their mental disorder). This can be characterized as an ‘accumulation of sources of epistemic injustice’. Secondly, people suffering from mental disorders are socially stigmatized. Many people regard mental illness as leading as characterized, not only by cognitive difficulties (and hence to), but by erratic and unpredictable behaviour (including violence), These negative stereotypes can lead to testimonial, hermeneutical and participatory injustice.

In addition to these global sources of epistemic injustice in people with mental disorders, there are specific problems which can lead to further epistemic injustice as a consequence of the particular nature of the mental disorder in question. Here are two, of many possible, examples. The central characteristic of dementia is memory loss, although there is often a wide range of other deficits as well. As a consequence people with dementia can find it very difficult to retain information long enough to be able to take certain key decisions, such as organizing their finances and their care, and thus become dependent on others who act on what they, the others, think is in the best interests of the person with dementia. People with schizophrenia may suffer a significant drop in IQ. In addition they often have a narrower range of emotional reactivity (“flattening of affect”), lack of motivation and specific cognitive deficits related, for instance, to reality distortion (delusions and hallucinations) and to executive function (decision-making, evaluation, planning, etc). Again, others may need to take some decisions on their behalf, decisions which may not be consistent with the wishes of the person with schizophrenia.
These specific deficits in dementia and schizophrenia can increase the possibility of epistemic injustice – in addition to the global sources with all mental disorders already mentioned.

**Erene Stergiopulos**

‘Unstable Epistemologies and Epistemic Injustice: The Case of Secondary Trauma in Healthcare Providers’

University of Toronto

What are the consequences of caring for traumatized individuals? While post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) — the pathological reaction to direct trauma — is a well-defined construct in the psychiatric literature, the effects of exposure to indirect trauma are less well-documented. Secondary trauma is a condition described since 1990, primarily within populations of healthcare providers, in which listening to the traumatic narratives of patients can elicit a pathological response. This response includes intrusive thoughts, avoidance, and hyperarousal, thus mirroring the symptoms of PTSD.

While neither an officially recognized disease, nor a well-defined or stable condition, the term ‘secondary trauma’ nevertheless describes a prevalent response to listening to traumatic narratives. In this paper, I address how the unstable epistemology of this phenomenon creates conditions for both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice among healthcare providers. In particular, I will take stock of three core epistemological issues facing secondary trauma as a medical phenomenon. First, it has been described using several similar but non-interchangeable terms, including ‘secondary traumatic stress,’ ‘compassion fatigue,’ and ‘vicarious trauma.’ While these terms describe similar constellations of symptoms, their theoretical bases remain distinct. Second, the existing scales for measuring this phenomenon lack congruity, and demonstrate divergent conceptualizations of the condition and its symptoms. Third, the degree to which secondary trauma can be considered a pathology remains subject to debate, particularly within a medical literature that wishes to avoid labeling the consequences of empathic care as potentially pathological.

Taken together, these issues destabilize secondary trauma as a medical concept, and delegitimize it as a construct. In particular, literature reviews of the phenomenon argue that (1) the divergent lines of research on different conceptualizations of secondary trauma cannot be compared; and moreover, (2) that the concept lacks sufficient evidence within the medical literature to be recognized as a condition meriting treatment, despite the prevalence of these symptoms among populations of healthcare providers. This lack of recognition creates a space in which clinicians suffering the effects of the trauma narratives of their patients face a lack of explanatory means for ‘making sense of their social experiences’ (Fricker 2007: 1). Moreover, it limits their ability to seek treatment for their distressing symptoms, creating the conditions for testimonial injustice. In taking stock of these epistemological issues, I ask how these different conceptualizations of the condition affect its status as a medical phenomenon, and its social and ethical ramifications for clinical care.

**Silke Schicktanz**

‘The Ethical Legitimacy of Patient Organizations’ Involvement in Politics and Knowledge Production: Epistemic Justice as a Conceptual Basis’

University of Göttingen

This paper discusses the ethical legitimacy of the inclusion of the perspectives provided by patient associations and related advocacy groups in public, political and scientific debates. Ethical legitimacy is defended by criticizing the existing epistemic injustices of public-political debates. Epistemic injustice means, according to Miranda Fricker, that statements by members of particular groups are systematically neglected or discredited, for instance because of negative
social stereotypes associated with them. This theoretical point helps to identify unfair exclusion, e.g. of patients, and one-sided advantages given to particular discourse participants, here mostly experts. The inclusion of patients’ perspectives is justified by the two criteria of being affected and of sharing particular situated knowledge.

Paul Bloomfield
‘Epistemic Intemperance’
University of Connecticut

Miranda Fricker’s *Epistemic Injustice* is truly an inspiring book, as it has breathed new life into both epistemology and moral philosophy by demonstrating their interrelations. Yet I believe that she has misidentified a large share, perhaps the lion’s share, of the cause of epistemic injustice by attributing it to a lack of the virtue of epistemic justice when in fact it is most often due to a lack of epistemic temperance. Consider a brief exchange between Hursthouse and Swanton cast in purely moral terms: a quartermaster steals chocolate bars from the troops and thereby does them an injustice. But note that the quartermaster may steal the chocolate because he wants to resell it for profit, in which case the cause of the theft is injustice, or he may steal the chocolate because he is a glutton for chocolate and his appetite is demanding. In this latter case, the injustice is caused by intemperance. Traditionally, injustice is marked by an arrogant appropriation of more than one’s rightful share (*pleonexia*, in the Greek), while intemperance is when we let our non-cognitive, affective capacities play an inappropriate role in determining what we do.

In turning to the bearing of these virtues on matters of epistemology, it is not hard to see the injustices that Fricker discusses as being caused by either injustice or intemperance, depending on the case. We may arrogantly discount the value of a witness’s testimony because we believe he or she is claiming an authority that we unfairly think is not theirs to claim. But we may also discount people’s testimony because we have a desire for their testimony to be false. When we allow our belief-forming mechanisms to be unduly influenced by our needs, desires, appetites, passions, or emotions, then the root cause of the injustice is, perhaps surprisingly, not epistemic injustice but epistemic intemperance. The familiar problem of ‘confirmation bias’, as well as many forms of prejudice, especially insofar these are defense mechanisms against psychological insecurity, are best explained as failures of temperance: we believe what makes us feel most comfortable. Thus, we may better understand many of the epistemic injustices we do to others through a better understanding of epistemic temperance. A start towards this end will be made, beginning with Plato’s discussion, in *Charmides*, of the Delphic prescription to ‘Know Thyself’, and its relations to both the recognition of experts and temperance.

Machteld Geuskens
‘Epistemic Justice: A Positive Conception’
Tilburg University

To ground her conception of ‘epistemic injustice’ Fricker argues that social inequalities are the root of epistemic injustices. These inequalities come into play because we engage in epistemic practices as socially situated epistemic agents. Fricker’s prime examples are: testimonial injustice, which is the injustice of not receiving due credence as a speaker because of ‘negative identity prejudice’ and hermeneutical injustice which is the injustice of not being able to understand and make intelligible one’s social experience as the collective hermeneutical resources for doing so are lacking as a result of social inequality.
It is argued in this paper that Fricker’s characterization of epistemic injustice as stemming from social inequality is unduly narrow. It does not capture a wider range of epistemic wrongs that are not based on social inequality. Moreover, Fricker’s characterization of epistemic wrong would seem to offer only a contingent relation to the epistemic. For it appears on her view that the moral valence of the epistemic wrong derives from the contingent fact that one’s human dignity is related to one’s epistemic status. Accordingly, the deeper conceptual connection between the moral and epistemic remains underexposed. To resolve both issues, I argue that we should reorient the conception of epistemic injustice. In this revised conception, epistemic justice concerns the just exercise and attribution of ‘epistemic power’.

I define epistemic power as one’s ability to exert epistemic influence and/or one’s ability to enable or disable others from exerting epistemic influence. Epistemic power is enabled by authority or credence, as these are prerequisites for being regarded as epistemically trustworthy (as a knowledge-giver) or deserving of trust (as a knowledge-receiver). Focusing on epistemic power allows us to explain the moral-epistemic nature of epistemic injustices. To deny someone the opportunity either to contribute knowledge or to receive knowledge without epistemic reason is a moral as well as an epistemic wrong, because it is a failure to give epistemic credit which is due and therewith undermines the cooperative nature of epistemic practices. Because such practices are successful only to the extent they are cooperative, they require the mutuality of trust and trustworthiness. Accordingly, the allocation of epistemic power (by investing epistemic trust in the form of credence or authority) morally-epistemically should proceed on the basis of the source’s (comparative) trustworthiness. The upshot is that ‘epistemic justice’ is the proper inclusion and balancing of the available epistemic sources and those cases which we consider epistemic injustices are violations of this norm.

Casey Johnson
‘Communicative Injustice’
University of Connecticut

Miranda Fricker claims that her account of testimonial injustice offers a better analysis of the experience of silencing than does the speech-act theoretic version defended by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby. Fricker suggests that the speech act theoretic account fails on two fronts where her account succeeds: first, the speech-act theoretic account mis-describes the moment the wrong is done to a silenced speaker. Second, Fricker suggests that the speech-act theoretic does not make room for sufficient nuances. The silencing of an illocution, according to Fricker, could only take place after a great deal of what she calls ‘erosion of [the speaker’s] human status’. Testimonial injustice offers a more nuanced account. I argue, in this paper, that the Fricker and Langton/Hornsby accounts need not be incompatible. On the contrary, by making two slight adjustments to each, the views can be brought into fruitful harmony. First, our new account will have to adopt a new analysis of illocutions – illocutionary relativism. On this view, illocutionary status is relative to the count of a conversational participant. This allows the view to capture the intuition that testifiers in cases of testimonial justice have illocuted relative to their own count, but also to capture the intuition that their illocution has been less than successful relative to their interlocutor’s count. The testifier has not been able to do what she wanted with her words, namely influence the perception of her interlocutor. By adopting this account of illocutions, I will argue, we get a more complete and more accurate account both of silencing and of testimonial injustice. Second, Fricker’s account needs to make room for a speech-act theory, in order to take advantage of the full artillery of tools available. This will allow her to account for injustices related to her paradigm testimonial injustice – injustices of communication, more broadly. These are conversational injustices that contribute to speakers’ subordination, but not in virtue of restricting their testimony alone. The novel account I defend in the paper has the virtues of fitting with both Fricker’s and Langton/Hornsby’s views, and of offering the tools to account for a broader spectrum of communicative injustice.
Jane Wright
‘Epistemic Injustice and the Possibilities of Sincerity’
University of Bristol

In this paper I will ask whether learning to understand epistemic injustice reshapes our understanding of sincerity. I am interested in particular in two aspects of Fricker’s development of the idea of epistemic injustice: (1) her use of Bernard Williams’s work on sincerity and trustful dialogue to help describe the intersubjective nature of identity, and (2) her exploration of the idea outlined in this striking statement, early in Epistemic Injustice: ‘the primary harm one incurs in being wronged [...] by testimonial injustice [...] may go more or less deep in the psychology of the subject, and I explore the idea that, where it goes deep, it can cramp self-development, so that a person may be, quite literally, prevented from becoming who they are’ (Introduction, p. 5). What becomes of sincerity on such terms? Or, to put it differently, what does sincerity become? Drawing on Diderot’s work, Williams suggests in Truth and Truthfulness that sincerity is a precondition, rather than the expression, of a stable self—that sincerity is a precondition for the trustfulness of my communication with others, without which coherent thought is impossible. Fricker’s further insight that persistent testimonial injustice may prevent a person from ‘becoming who they are’ (in part by disrupting the possibility of coherent thought) brings into focus the notion that we might not be able to define sincerity securely, or exclusively, as either (a) the expression of a stable self or (b) a precondition of a stable self, but that instead it might be always a work in progress, so to speak, between the two. As such we might consider sincerity to require (even to be constituted by?) unrelentingly careful attention: attention to specificity, particularity, content, context, form, singularity, detail, my own bias, the bias of others, and my continuous openness to the possibility of as-yet unrecognized, unconscious bias. The term sincerity has a long and conflicted history in literary criticism, one that repeatedly makes contact with the work of philosophers. Taking examples from work in my own discipline (English Literature), I will consider what epistemic injustice might have to teach literary critics about responsible reading.

Keynote 2
‘Authority and Epistemic Injustice’
Rae Langton
University of Cambridge

Testimonial injustice involves an unjust distribution of epistemic authority, understood by Miranda Fricker as credibility. This has implications that go far beyond the epistemology of testimony. I will be arguing that (i) epistemic authority interacts with practical authority, in a way that leads to an unjust distribution of speech act powers. This is because (ii) the possession of epistemic and/or practical authority can fulfil felicity conditions for certain verdictive and exercitive speech acts, enabling authoritative speakers to perform speech acts that rank as inferior, issue directives, and legitimate discrimination. Furthermore, (iii) the evolution of authority (of both kinds) follows informal ‘rules of accommodation’ (cf. Lewis, Maitra), in a way that can sustain existing hierarchies, and help enact new ones. Finally, (iv) this has neglected implications for speaker, and hearer, responsibility, since bystander omissions as well as actions contribute to the unjust accommodation of authority.
The aim of my paper is to explore two sets of questions. The first is to explore in what ways the kinds of epistemic injustice identified by Miranda Fricker in her pioneering book are cases of 'injustice'. Why are they injustices? What kinds of injustice are they? How do they relate to existing accounts of justice? Do they constitute a new distinct kind of injustice or can they captured by existing ideals of justice? The second question turns to the question of who bears what responsibilities to prevent epistemic injustice and protect people from it. I argue that there are three distinct kinds of responsibility. I then examine the extent to which those who bear the brunt of epistemic injustice themselves have a responsibility to prevent its occurrence. An overarching aim throughout is to explore how the concept of epistemic injustice relates to existing concepts in political philosophy, and how the analysis of epistemic injustice can enrich, and also be enriched by, prevailing concepts in contemporary political philosophy.

In Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker introduces hermeneutical injustice, which ‘occurs when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences’. A hermeneutical gap is often owing to an absence of concepts or language which can help those marginalized to make sense of their experience, and, can result in their exclusion from the pooling and spread of knowledge. But, equally, and sometimes inseparably, a hermeneutical gap can be due to the style or form of expression in which knowledge is conveyed. In this paper we elaborate this latter type of hermeneutical injustice by concentrating on what we term ‘form of expression bias’. This occurs when a particular form or style of expression is intrinsically associated with negative epistemic qualities, and, consequently, is not heard as fully rational irrespective of its content with respect to knowledge.

We elaborate form of expression bias using the setting of evaluation practices in international development. We choose this setting primarily because international development is a potential site of hermeneutical marginalization or unequal hermeneutical participation owing to unequal structural power relations and involves a wide range of cultural and linguistic differences which are potential hotspots for diversity in styles or forms of expression. Using this case, we elaborate two ways in which form of expression bias operates: exclusionary and distortive.

Exclusionary form of expression bias occurs when the knowledge content conveyed by a subject is excluded from the collective knowledge practice merely because of the form it takes. The distortive form of expression bias occurs when the knowledge of a subject in a collective knowledge practice gets variable uptake owing to it being translated into a non-commensurate form. The distortive type, in contrast to the exclusionary, does take up a subject’s knowledge on first blush but its translation into other forms of expression can eradicably alter the meaning and thus significance of the subject’s original account of their experience. This can not only
undermine the subject’s understanding of their experience but can also result in the misrepresentation of their experience in the pooling and spread of knowledge.

Two primary contributions emerge from our analysis. First, we expand understanding of hermeneutical injustice by highlighting how it can arise through the operations of form of expression bias. Second, we draw attention to the significant ethical implications that stem from the epistemic practices used in international development, which have been neglected in favour of a focus on our moral obligations to donate and distribute funding to disadvantaged groups.

Blair Peruniak
‘Asylum Seekers in the ‘Space of Reasons’: Causes and Consequences of Testimonial Injustice in Refugee Status Determination’
University of Oxford

In this paper, I employ Miranda Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice in order to account for the epistemic harms suffered by asylum seekers as informants in the context of refugee status determination procedures. Justice-based criticisms of the processes and procedures associated with refugee status determination are increasingly common in human rights discourse and normative political theory. To date, however, there has been little discussion of the distinctively epistemic forms of injustice faced by asylum seekers in determinations of refugee status. The paper is divided into two sections. In part one, I argue that the practices and procedures for assessing credibility in modern liberal asylum systems encourage systematic forms of testimonial injustice. In many liberal states asylum seekers’ credibility is routinely denied on the basis of a pervasive social prejudice reflected in a dominant public political discourse that identifies asylum seekers with ‘bogus refugees’ who are motivated not by ‘well founded fears of persecution’, but by economic self-interest. The significance of this social prejudice lies not only in its capacity to influence general standards of refugee status determination, but also in its ability to enable or encourage other familiar forms of discrimination (e.g., based on culture, gender, or sexual orientation) in influencing assessments of asylum seekers as ‘credible knowers’. Since the assessment of testimony is often the sole means for determining refugee status, and opportunities to appeal initial decisions are extremely limited, genuine asylum seekers tend also to suffer from the ‘persistent’ effects of systematic epistemic injustices. The second half of the paper considers the moral and epistemic effects of states’ attempts to treat credibility as a scarce resource by imposing specific rates of recognition’ for asylum applicants on initial assessments. I argue that by treating credibility as a distributive good, states not only violate asylum seekers’ rights to a basic level of epistemic authority. They also violate the epistemic interests of their own citizenries by undermining the capacity of institutions and institutional representatives to serve as credible public informants on important moral-political issues where knowledge is crucial for preventing harms that result from ignorance about the complex contexts and motivational aspects of seeking asylum.

Simon Thompson
‘Epistemic injustice and Misrecognition’
University of the West of England, Bristol

My aim in this paper is to consider whether a political theory of recognition can help us to understand the nature of epistemic injustice. I define recognition as the property of a relationship in which one party appropriately acknowledges another. Thus in cases of misrecognition one party appropriately acknowledges another, and in cases of nonrecognition one party fails to acknowledge the other at all. Defining recognition and its cognate terms in this way is useful since it marks a distinction between what may be called the epistemic component of recognition – i.e. acknowledgement – and the normative component – i.e. appropriateness. It is arguable that in much of the contemporary literature on recognition the epistemic component is assumed to be unproblematic. In this literature, it is suggested that misrecognition occurs when
one party knows exactly what the other is like, but then chooses to deny them appropriate acknowledgement.

In this paper, I shall suggest that matters are more complicated than this. One possibility is that a failure to acknowledge another appropriately may be solely the result of epistemic than normative failure. That is to say, one party misrecognizes another only because they do not understand what the other is like. Consider, for example, possibly apocryphal stories about family pets being put on electoral registers. Another possibility is that a normative mistake leads to an epistemic mistake. In other words, one party’s judgment that another is unworthy of recognition shapes their understanding of what that other is like. It may that a man has certain views about what women are like because he feels contempt for them.

A more likely scenario is that misrecognition is the result of a complex combination of epistemic and normative mistakes. In order to investigate this possibility, I consider debates amongst theorists of recognition about whether recognition is an evaluative response to an already existing object, or whether the act of recognition actually helps constitute that object. Did Germany recognition of Croatia in 1991 acknowledge its already existing status as an independent nation? Or did this act of recognition actually (help) make Croatia an independent nation? My suggestion here will be that since it is impossible to say that recognition is purely responsive or purely constitutive, it may also be impossible to draw a watertight distinction between the normative and epistemic components of recognition, misrecognition and nonrecognition.

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Session 6

Dagmar Wilhelm
‘Thought Experiments, Epistemic Injustice and Status Subordination’
University of Bristol

In this paper I want to conceive of epistemic injustice within the two-dimensional theory of justice proposed by Nancy Fraser. Epistemic injustice would then be a type of status subordination which (a) prevents those targeted from participatory parity in a domain or across various domains and (b) due to a lack of parity restricts the value of deliberative processes in which this subordination occurs (at the very least by preventing relevant information from being given adequate consideration). Status subordination in Fraser’s framework is always systematic injustice, due to institutional set-ups and practices. This focus on systematic, institutional injustice has implications for the way in which injustice can be combatted (i.e. the focus must be on particular steps taken to change institutional set-ups rather than changing attitudes of individuals directly). I hope to show that one practice that contributes to and helps maintain epistemic injustice in several domains (most obviously, but not exclusively, philosophy) is the current use of thought experiments, which tends to appeal to stereotypes in order to elicit desired intuitions. After some brief remarks on the nature of those intuitions and a closer analysis of the use of thought experiments I will introduce Fraser’s notion of institutional reform and argue that if we were to apply this reform to our current use of thought experiments we could – at least in the domains affected – eventually reduce some types of epistemic injustice.

Axel Gelfert
‘Towards a Genealogy of Epistemic Injustice’
National University of Singapore
The recent surge of interest in the concept of ‘epistemic injustice’, following the publication of Miranda Fricker’s *Epistemic Injustice*, is a good indicator that the concept fills a perceived gap in contemporary epistemology, which has long been characterized by what Lorraine Code has termed ‘epistemophilia’ - a view that considers ‘knowledge increase as the only epistemic good’ (as Cynthia Townley puts it). Fricker herself motivates her project by insisting that, while philosophers have traditionally (and understandably) been concerned with giving positive accounts of various concepts, such as knowledge and justification, ‘we should not stop there if we also want to understand the human practices that may only very patchily approximate the rational ideal’.

In the present paper, I argue that a historical perspective on the conceptual space demarcated by the term ‘epistemic injustice’ can significantly aid our understanding of epistemic injustice and of its place within epistemology. In particular, it can help with developing a taxonomy of problematic speech acts and communicative practices that often accompany epistemic injustice. Traditional ways of classifying speech acts, e.g. in terms of ‘formal’ vs. ‘informal’ testimony, are often incapable of distinguishing between speech acts that purport to be informative (i.e., aimed at conveying knowledge) and those that are employed with the performative goal of undermining the trusted epistemic authority of others. Many instances of gossip, rumour, and slander would fall into this category, as would the propagation of, say, pseudo-scientific belief system and conspiracy theories. From a philosophical point of view, the specific character of such speech acts is not adequately captured by the umbrella term ‘informal communication’. Whereas informal communication is often truth-oriented – and can even fulfill vital epistemic functions, for example in bringing to light inconvenient truths ignored in official communications – speech acts such as rumour, gossip, and the propagation of conspiracy theories are intrinsically problematic.

C.A.J. Coady has recently proposed the term ‘pathology of testimony’ as a label for speech acts that constitute a deformation of the institution of testimony as a source of knowledge. This relates in interesting ways not only to Jürgen Habermas’s notion of a ‘communicative pathology’ (which he defines as a situation when ‘at least one of the parties is deceiving himself about the fact that he is acting with an attitude oriented to success and is only keeping up the appearance of communicative action’), but also to recent attempts to model an account of problematic speech acts after Fricker’s definition of epistemic injustice. On this account, a pathology of testimony is ‘any type of overtly informative speech act that disrespects another person in their capacity as a rational being’. The present paper goes beyond these initial attempts to link specific types of speech acts to the concept of epistemic injustice, by comparing and contrasting the latter, in a genealogical way, with historical precursors.

Nathaniel Adam Tobias Coleman
‘Methodology: Moral Distrust and Moral Deference’
University College London

I tell a tale of two epistemic journeys, each of which constitutes an epistemic injustice.

‘From Oran Outan to Obvious’ is the epistemic journey taken by European abolitionists, from a racial justification of slavery, to an assumption of its self-evident wrongness. This curious journey suggests we should treat the arguments of European abolitionists with moral distrust.

‘From The Facts to The Philosophy’ is the journey that authors once enslaved-as-negro have been prevented from making, from a position of epistemic authority only on the narration of the negro system, to a position of epistemic authority also on the normativity of that system. This hindered journey suggests we should treat the arguments of authors once enslaved-as-negro with what Laurence Mordekhai Thomas has called ‘moral deference’.
Thus, our reflection on two epistemic injustices relating to negro slavery leads us to a new methodology for social and political philosophy. In an ideal social world, and were we pursuing ideal social theory, we ought to approach all accounts, from all authors, with moral neutrality. However, since we live in an unjust social world and since we are pursuing a social theory fit for that particular unjust society, our generalised moral indifference must give way, on the one hand, to a moral distrust of accounts offered by the socially dominant and, on the other, to a moral deference towards accounts offered by the socially oppressed. Applied to my book ‘Why Was Negro Slavery Wrong?’, this methodology involves my approaching the canonical accounts of British, French, and Prussian theorists with moral distrust and my approaching the accounts of formerly enslaved authors and Haitian revolutionaries with moral deference.

Vittorio Bufacchi
‘Epistemic Injustice, Social Injustice and How to Rectify Historical Injustice’
University College Cork

This paper explores the relationship between social injustice and epistemic (testimonial) injustice. In the first half of this paper, I will argue that epistemic injustice, as defined by Miranda Fricker, does not refer merely to a distinctively epistemic form of injustice, instead epistemic injustice is more specifically the epistemic element of social injustice. Epistemic injustice is not different or separate from social injustice, instead epistemic injustice is one specific form which social injustice can take. It follows that social injustice and epistemic injustice are intrinsically related, which suggests that the literature on social injustice can shed light on epistemic injustice, and vice-versa. In Social Injustice: Essays in Political Philosophy, I argued that there are three dimensions to social injustice: maldistribution; exclusion; disempowerment. I also argued that epistemic injustice is primarily (although not exclusively) captured by the second dimension: exclusion. I now believe that epistemic injustice plays a much bigger role in the origin, establishment and protracting of social injustice, in all its dimensions, and that any attempt to overturn social injustice must necessarily engage with the epistemic side of social injustice.

The second half of this paper will look at one specific issue that has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature on social justice in recent years: the problem of historical (or enduring) injustice, and how to rectify it. I will argue that undoing historical injustice does not necessarily require the rectification of the original misappropriation of resources, but it always demands engaging with the wronged party at the epistemic level. In this respect, addressing the issue of epistemic injustice is the best, and often the only way, to start the long process of rectifying historical injustice. The problem with the recent literature on historical injustice is precisely that it neglects the fact that epistemic injustice is an integral part of social injustice. For example Jeff Spinner-Halev distinguishes between ‘apologising’ for past crimes, which he is critical of, and ‘acknowledging’ past crimes, which he endorses. While this distinction between ‘apology’ and ‘acknowledgement’ is valid, and useful, his neglect of the epistemic aspect of enduring injustice is a major lacuna. I will argue that in order to rectify an historical injustice it is necessary to start by rectifying epistemic injustice.

Andreas Pantazatos
‘In Public Displays We Trust: Museums and Epistemic Injustice’
Durham University
Universal museums should ensure that they are responsive to the interests of different groups of stakeholders for whom their collections hold significance. In this paper, I argue that if museum curators are to achieve such inclusivity they need to avoid the epistemic injustice that can arise where the interpretative modes of one community are privileged over those of others. In particular, I contend that museums commit epistemic injustice against resident immigrant communities when they ignore or sideline those groups’ interpretations of objects with which they have historical or cultural ties.

For immigrants who have moved away from their place of origin, the artefacts and objects of cultural significance to be found in museum collections in the countries they have entered can be hugely significant. These objects can help immigrants form and preserve a sense of identity and ethnic origin, by enabling them to link their personal narratives with the place of their birth. But while objects can shape immigrants’ sense of identity in their new country, immigrants can also change and enrich the meaning of those objects by the stories they can tell about their origins. Consequently, a museum which fails to take immigrants’ perspectives into account not only treats them with epistemic injustice, thereby failing to be properly inclusive, but also misses an opportunity to enlarge its own interpretative base.

Drawing upon Christopher Hookway’s work on epistemic injustice, I argue that museums can be charged with informational prejudice and participatory prejudice against immigrant communities. Since it is a central role of museums to provide information about their objects, museums should allow immigrants to give their accounts of objects not only for their own satisfaction, but for the enlightenment of the wider public. Museums, however, tend to overlook immigrants’ information in relation to specific objects, sometimes claiming that their information is not relevant from the museum’s favoured perspective and so must be excluded. Hereby they display both informational and participatory prejudices.

I conclude that a commitment to epistemic justice is fundamental to good stewardship, and that it is possible to amend epistemic prejudices by developing a model of stewardship that is grounded on care and respect. I further show that the successful development of a caring and respectful relationship requires epistemic trust, because to give credibility to what others say is central to mutual understanding.

Ann Hutchinson
‘How Do People Who Suffer Chronic Breathlessness Experience Epistemic Injustice?’
University of Hull

‘So it’s gradually, little things were in my head but not enough to go to the doctor. You can’t go to the doctor and say “I can’t dance.” It’s a strange thing to say to the doctor.’ (Gysels and Higginson)

In this paper, I will apply the concept of epistemic injustice as articulated by Miranda Fricker (2007) and expanded on by Havi Carel and Ian Kidd (2013) to the experience chronic breathlessness. A case study of epistemic injustice in the case of chronic breathlessness is presented drawing on examples from relevant qualitative literature and also from a recent qualitative research study with patients who presented to the emergency department due to their chronic breathlessness. My aim is to demonstrate how the experience of chronic breathlessness is not well understood by others (in particular some healthcare professionals) and as a result those experiencing chronic breathlessness suffer a ‘double blow’ of both difficulties engendered by their breathlessness and those engendered by the lack of understanding of others. In particular I will concentrate on examples of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice and how these injustices mean that many people with chronic breathlessness are not receiving optimal healthcare, nor are they living life as fully as they might otherwise do.

Michael D. Burroughs and Deborah Tollefson
‘Seen But Not Heard: Epistemic Injustice and the Child’
Pennsylvania State University and University of Memphis

In *Epistemic Injustice* Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in his or her capacity as a knower. One form of epistemic injustice—identity prejudicial credibility deficit—occurs when someone is given less credibility due to his/her social identity. Fricker’s examples of identity prejudicial credibility deficit primarily involve women and minorities, individuals given less credibility in testimonial interactions due to various prejudicial stereotypes. In this paper we will consider whether children, as a class, are subject to epistemic injustice. Epistemologists have developed theories of testimony that make it difficult to regard the child as a testifier. Like various other philosophers, epistemologists often begin their analysis of concepts by taking the adult as the paradigm case. Thus, theories of testimony tend to be cognitively demanding (requiring that a testifier be aware that he or she is offering evidence) or they presuppose a robust theory of mind.

If one begins with an adult-centered conception of testimony it is no surprise that children (especially young children, who lack a concept of evidence and robust theory of mind) are excluded from consideration. Moreover, insofar as the child is regarded as irrational and deficient in relation to the adult, she will not be taken seriously as a testifier. But children do tell us things—about the world, about themselves, about ourselves—all the time. They may be unreliable testifiers (though empirical research suggests that under the right conditions they are actually quite reliable), but their utterances ostensibly count as testimony. Having identified this tension in theories of testimony, we consider the adult’s role in creating successful testimonial interactions with children and the adult’s responsibility to mitigate cases of epistemic injustice. We argue that the child’s epistemic agency and, in turn, her ability to offer testimony is developed in relation to her encounters with the important adult figures in her life. The child develops an identity as a reliable testifier (or fails to do so) in virtue of her treatment by the adult as ‘virtuous hearer.’ In considering the child’s epistemic agency we must pay greater attention to the role and responsibilities of the adult. That is, we need to develop a relational conception of child testimonial agency that includes the adult and her ability to actively listen to the child.

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Session 8

Nora Berenstain
‘Epistemic Exploitation’: What Happens When Dominant Groups Meet Experiences of the Marginalized with Skepticism’
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Sexual harassment, racist and sexist microaggressions, stereotype threat, implicit bias, and explicit discrimination all play a role in upholding sexist and racist oppression in the realms of employment and education. They also play a major role in explaining the gender gap and underrepresentation of people of color in philosophy. In order to provide effective solutions for dealing with these pervasive threats, it is imperative that we not only have a correct understanding of each of these phenomena in the abstract, but that we are able to identify individual instances of each of them when they occur. Many people, especially members of dominant groups who are broadly unaffected by these offenses, take extremely skeptical approaches to identifying single instances of these phenomena. I argue that an attitude of default skepticism toward alleged cases of implicit bias, microaggressions, or harassment is not just harmful but epistemically inappropriate.

What should our epistemic attitudes be toward what seem to be individual cases of these
phenomena? Borrowing from feminist standpoint epistemologists such as Harding and Collins, I acknowledge that those who are members of marginalized groups are in epistemically privileged positions – and thus in the best positions – to recognize when an individual choice is one that is likely to involve implicit bias, for stance. The denial or failure to recognize this amounts to epistemic injustice against those groups who are negatively affected by implicit bias.

Fricker refers to an ascribed ‘credibility deficit’, in which dominant groups deny credibility to oppressed groups, as one of the main ways that epistemic injustice functions. However, dominant groups do not simply deny credibility to members of oppressed groups. Members of dominant groups often place the burden of proof on marginalized people to explain and educate them about the nature of their oppression. Dominant groups demand information from the marginalized about the very power structures that unjustly allow the dominant groups to receive a credibility surplus and deny credibility to the oppressed. That members of dominant groups often remain skeptical about the experiences of the oppressed once they have offered the education requested, constitutes a form of epistemic injustice.

This denial of credibility makes possible another type of injustice, which is both epistemic and socio-political in nature, what I term epistemic exploitation. ‘Epistemic exploitation’ refers to the phenomenon where members of dominant groups demand that the marginalized and oppressed educate them about the nature of their own oppression, and then use the information provided not just to undermine the epistemic credibility of the oppressed groups but to actively promote and uphold the very oppression which marginalized folks are working to dismantle.

In order to undermine oppressive power structures, dominant groups must not only defer to marginalized people about the nature of their own oppression, they must also use what they learn from the experiences of marginalized people to work against that oppression, rather than using the information gained to uphold the structures that privilege their identities and experiences over those of the oppressed. The notion of epistemic exploitation offers us a much-needed tool to frame those interactions between members of dominant and oppressed groups that are characterized by entitlement and that result in the strengthening rather than the undoing of structural oppression.

Katharine Jenkins
‘Unjust Myths: Domestic Abuse and Hermeneutical Injustice’
University of Sheffield

Hermeneutical injustice (HI), as defined by Miranda Fricker, refers to situations in which a subject’s experiences are obscured from collective understanding due to hermeneutical marginalization. A victim of HI encounters difficulty in rendering her experiences intelligible to herself and/or others due to a lack of appropriate conceptual resources.

Widely discussed cases of HI fall into two categories. In some cases, the experiences in question are unintelligible both to the victim and to third parties, since the requisite conceptual resources do not yet exist at all. In other cases, the experience is intelligible to the subject but unintelligible to other more dominantly situated epistemic agents. In these latter cases, which include cases of ‘white ignorance’, the necessary conceptual resources already exist but are only accessible to members of an oppressed sub-group. This paper identifies a third kind of case that has not hitherto been explored, in which the experience is unintelligible to the victim but intelligible to other more dominantly situated agents. In this third case, the relevant hermeneutical resources are only available to some members of the community, but the oppressed subjects have access to fewer hermeneutical resources than others.

Domestic abuse, I suggest, is a case of this third kind. The official definition of domestic abuse used by government and other agencies is appropriately inclusive; nevertheless, many victims of domestic abuse do not recognize what is happening to them as domestic abuse. I suggest that
prevalent myths about domestic abuse (for instance, that it always involves severe physical violence) prevent some victims of domestic abuse from applying that concept to their own situation. Since they lack the conceptual resources needed to render their experience sufficiently intelligible, they are suffering a form HI. Attending to this distinctive case sheds new light both on social myths of this kind and on hermeneutical injustice itself.

Daniel Putnam
‘You Can’t Recognize Something You Don’t Understand: Recognition and Hermeneutic Injustice’
Yale University

According to Miranda Fricker, hermeneutic injustice obtains when (1) a person is prevented from understanding some aspect of her social experience that she has an interest in understanding, and (2) this results from her being excluded from equal participation in the practices by which social meanings are generated. In this paper, I focus on what follows from the first condition.

The failure to understand certain experiences one has an interest in understanding entails the failure to understand the interests to which those experiences give rise. Because women like Carmita Wood did not have the concept of sexual harassment, they were not in a position to understand their experience of sexual harassment. Consequently, they were not in a position to understand their interest in being free from sexual harassment. For what would be the content of that interest? Moreover, because Wood’s lack of self-understanding reflected a gap in collective understanding, men were also in the dark. Lacking the concept of sexual harassment, they could not attribute content to, and hence could not understand, the interest in being free from sexual harassment.

The fact that this interest was unintelligible entails that it was unrecognizable and hence unrecognized. By ‘recognize’, I refer to the phenomenon of according some weight in one’s practical deliberation to a person’s interest. Recognizing a person’s interest in being free from sexual harassment entails according some weight, in one’s practical deliberation, to that interest. At minimum, it requires treating the fact that a certain action would frustrate someone’s interest in being free from sexual harassment as a reason of some weight not to do that action. I assume furthermore that a necessary condition of treating some consideration as a reason for action is giving content to that consideration. Otherwise what reason does one take oneself to have? From this, it follows that because people were not in a position to understand the interest in being free from sexual harassment, they were not in a position to recognize that interest: as female employees, as male employers, and more broadly as participants in society’s major institutions.

The conceptual connection between understanding and recognition has at least four significant implications for Fricker’s project, which I sketch. First, it reveals something that’s wrong with hermeneutic injustice that Fricker does not make explicit but which underlies several of the wrongs she does identify. More generally, it is a basis for grounding hermeneutic justice in the requirement that people’s interests be equally recognized. Third, it lends support to a deontological rather than a virtue-theoretic construction of Fricker’s view, insofar as recognition is a deontological requirement. Fourth, it illuminates Fricker’s second case study of hermeneutic injustice involving sexual minorities. The paper concludes with some questions for further research.

Boaz Miller and Meital Pinto
‘Epistemic Equality’
Tel Aviv University and Carmel Academic Center

Unequal social power relations obstruct the generation of knowledge. The rich may skew research priorities to areas that suit their interests, e.g., divert medical research to diseases that
strike mostly white males. Powerful bodies may artificially manufacture uncertainty that prevents the closure of controversies, e.g., tobacco companies’ efforts to impede the scientific acceptance of the harms of smoking. Epistemic equality therefore seems necessary for mitigating the negative effects of unequal power relations. It remains unclear, however, what exactly epistemic equality means, what it entails, and how it may be realized. Our paper addresses these questions.

We regard the problem of epistemic equality as a distributive problem, in which participation in, and influence over, a knowledge-generating discourse are a limited good that needs to be justly distributed among members of an epistemic community. We identify two ways in which epistemic equality may be implemented, the intellectual-authority approach, and the social-inclusion approach. We associate the intellectual-authority approach with Helen Longino, who argues that such participation and influence should be distributed according to the principle of ‘tempered equality of intellectual authority’. Tempered equality means that in order to achieve diversity of perspectives, participation in the knowledge-generating discourse should be allocated according to members’ relevant expertise, irrespective of social power, which is influenced by properties such as gender, race, and class.

We argue that while illuminating, tempered equality faces major difficulties. First, it embeds an inherent tension between two conflicting rationales: one that requires that the criterion of inclusion be colour-blind, and another that insists on social, gender, and ethnic diversity for attaining genuine diversity of perspectives. Second, it is often difficult to identify the relevant experts, especially when putative experts contest each other’s authority. Third, trying to identify experts by proxy characters, such as academic education, often leads to marginalizing experts whose expertise stems from alternative training. Last, even if the right experts are identified, they may still misuse their epistemic authority and power.

In light of these difficulties, we argue that a social-inclusion approach is preferable. That is, rather than trying to formulate a criterion of relevant expertise and use it to pick up the right experts and only them, we should only insist on active participation and influence of members of three groups: (1) disempowered groups, such as women and ethnic minorities; (2) uncredited experts, whose expertise stems from relevant life experience or alternative training; (3) relevant stakeholders, especially from underrepresented sectors in the knowledge-generating discourse.

We argue that the social-inclusion approach realizes the epistemic aim of epistemic equality because it enhances the chances of the community to reach the truth, and do so not by accident. In addition, our suggested social inclusion approach is a distributive scheme that is worthy of the name ‘equality’, because it realizes a conception of substantive equality. This is because the social-inclusion approach prevents unjust discrimination even when it is based on reliable stereotypes. While making the last claim we disagree with Miranda Fricker on the conditions under which the use of stereotypes is permissible. While Fricker argues that using stereotypes is permissible only insofar as they are reliable, we argue that some stereotypes may be reliable and still harm a person’s dignity. We therefore side with Deborah Hellman, who argues that the use of stereotypes is permissible only when they are not demeaning.