Philosophy Research Seminar - The Anti-Psychology of Belief - Umut Baysan (Oxford)
Umut Baysan (Oxford)
Cotham House, G2
Traditionally, philosophers of mind take beliefs to be standard examples of propositional attitudes, and propositional attitudes to be paradigmatic examples of mental states. In this talk, I will explore the plausibility of the view that beliefs, understood as propositional attitudes, are not mental states. I call this view “anti-psychologism”. I will contrast anti-psychologism with both anti-realism (i.e., the view that there is no psychological reality) and eliminativism (i.e., the view that there are no propositional attitudes), and show that anti-psychologism is not committed to either of these views. Anti-psychologism makes it intelligible that some things that have beliefs may not be minded, and some things that are minded may never have beliefs. I will discuss the implications of these possibilities to broader issues in philosophy of mind.