Philosophy Research Seminar - The Anti-Psychology of Belief - Umut Baysan (Oxford)

25 October 2018, 2.00 PM - 25 October 2018, 3.30 PM

Umut Baysan (Oxford)

Cotham House, G2

Abstract:

Traditionally, philosophers of mind take beliefs to be standard examples of propositional attitudes, and propositional attitudes to be paradigmatic examples of mental states. In this talk, I will explore the plausibility of the view that beliefs, understood as propositional attitudes, are not mental states. I call this view “anti-psychologism”. I will contrast anti-psychologism with both anti-realism (i.e., the view that there is no psychological reality) and eliminativism (i.e., the view that there are no propositional attitudes), and show that anti-psychologism is not committed to either of these views. Anti-psychologism makes it intelligible that some things that have beliefs may not be minded, and some things that are minded may never have beliefs. I will discuss the implications of these possibilities to broader issues in philosophy of mind.

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